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Abstract 
 
The thesis examines both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits to higher education in 
the UK and empirically tests the model of demand for higher education. The leading 
theme in this research is the interest in the microeconomic aspect of higher education 
at empirical level. It sets out to investigate the expectations of individuals in terms of 
what they can gain from education. It considers various aspects of higher education, 
including casual effect on pecuniary and non pecuniary returns and demand of higher 
education participation. This thesis is based on 1958 British National Child 
Development Survey in the UK. It is composed by three empirical chapters, each on 
corresponding to a self-contained paper, applying different methodologies and making 
a unique contribution of these overall objectives. The first empirical chapter focus on 
the returns to education justified by the importance accorded as an explanation of 
wage differentials. The second empirical chapter deals with the returns to higher 
education on health. The third empirical chapter explores the relationship between 
higher education decision and expected wage income and personal and family 
characteristics. The main powerful findings of this thesis are: First, the economic 
return of education rises with the greater disparity of the educational groups as age 
increases. Females attending higher education usually enjoy higher returns than males, 
and the gap constantly increases over the years. Second, attending higher education 
may be an effective way to improve population health and reduce the likelihood of 
health damaging behaviours. Third, the hypothesis that individuals’ higher education 
decision only depends on their expectation on future wage income is highly rejected.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Education as a way of increasing human capital is considered to be a basic factor in 
the growth process of the aggregate economy. It confers benefits on individuals, 
enterprises, and societies. There are economic benefits and accrue in the form of wage 
earnings, productivity, or economic growth and social benefits in terms of longer life 
expectancy, less criminal behaviour, stronger social cohesion or greater political 
participation. It contributes directly to the growth of economy by improving the skill 
needs of the modern workplace, productive capacities, faster rate of innovation, and 
the creation of social capital for an individual. It is widely realized that an 
increasingly complex society and rapid technical change requires highly educated 
workforce. Education is also seen almost as a universal cure to some of the severe 
economic problems such as unemployment and poverty. 
 
In a broad sense, individual’s motives for education are associated with human capital 
theory. Much of this work stems from the study of Becker (1964) that introduced the 
concept of treating investment in education as a capital investment. The hard core of 
the human capital theory is a human capital investment undertaken by an individual 
on his/her own behalf (Blaug, 1976). Individuals make the decision not only for the 
sake of present enjoyments, but also in expectation of future pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary returns, the crux of the matter is precisely on whether individual 
possesses a forward looking view for the justification of present actions. In this 
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context, individuals consider themselves as assets and expect that receiving higher 
education will help them to produce extra value so that eventually there will be 
benefits. 
Meanwhile, education also provides a variety of benefits to individuals. Most of the 
benefits of education that directly improve well-being are likely to be reflected in 
higher income. The estimation of the pecuniary return to education has perhaps been 
one of the predominant areas of analysis in applied human capital economics for over 
50 years since the birth of the human capital theory (Schultz, 1961). Yet the economic 
benefits that education bestows are not limited to higher expected pecuniary return. 
They can also give rise to a wide range of non- pecuniary benefits that could also 
consist in direct additions to welfare possibilities in terms of better health, longer life 
expectancy, less criminal behaviour, stronger social cohesion or greater political 
participation.  
 
In case of the UK, there have been many attempts to reform the education system and 
make it more productive. It aims to increase educational opportunities irrespective of 
financial means or socio-economic background, and to raise the overall educational 
level in the population (Kerckhoff and Trott 1993). During last 70 years, education 
and employment opportunities have changed dramatically. Between 1951 and 1991 
the United Kingdom witnessed a significant decline in manual jobs, while 
employment in clerical occupations has increased, and work in professional and 
managerial professions has tripled (Gallie 2000). Following the introduction of new 
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technologies and the disappearance of manual jobs, increasing numbers of young 
people are expected to participate in further education beyond compulsory schooling 
age (Bynner and Parsons 2002; Furlong and Cartmel 1997), and during the last two 
decades a growing number of young people have participated in higher education, 
once the preserve of a privileged minority (Blossfeld and Shavit 1993; Bynner 2005; 
McVicar and Rice 2001). 
 
Measurements of return to education ought to be the area where one might expect 
agreement. However, despite a developed theoretical foundation, empirical work on 
the return to education has been the focus of considerable debate in the economics 
literature, since it reveals a wide range of estimates. A dominant feature of the 
literature that estimates the relationship between education and corresponding returns 
is to make the implicit assumption that education is exogenous, and this has been the 
focus of recent research efforts. In practice, estimates of this return vary significantly, 
depending on the data sets used, the assumptions made and the estimation techniques. 
In terms of broad methodologies, the focus on the issue of endogeneity often requires 
identifying assumptions that cannot be empirically tested or are somewhat fragile in 
estimation. Furthermore, attempts at estimating a single rate of return may not be very 
informative if returns to education differ by education level, or differ by genders.  
 
The leading theme in my research is the interest in the microeconomic aspect of 
education at empirical level. It sets out to investigate the expectations of individuals in 
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terms of what they can gain from education. In fact, this PhD thesis considers various 
aspects of education, especially higher education, including casual effect on pecuniary 
and non pecuniary returns and determinations of higher education participation. This 
thesis is based on British National Child Development Survey (NCDS), a continuing 
panel survey of cohorts born between the week of 3 and 9 of March 1958 in the UK. 
It is composed by three empirical chapters, each on corresponding to a self-contained 
paper, applying different methodologies and making a unique contribution of these 
overall objectives. The first empirical chapter (chapter two) focus on the returns to 
education justified by the importance accorded as an explanation of wage differentials. 
The second empirical chapter (chapter three) deals with the returns to higher 
education on health. The third empirical chapter (chapter four) explores the 
relationship between higher education decision and expected wage income and 
personal and family characteristics. 
In more detail, chapter two examines the impact of different educational attainment on 
the earnings of individuals in the medium and long term. In calculating the pecuniary 
return on education, this chapter considers as benefits only the incremental earnings 
realized by the individual. Individuals with higher levels of education tend to have a 
higher income level. The average earnings of individuals are strongly and positively 
related to both education attainment and the level of their qualifications. However, it 
is difficult to ascertain how much this empirical association between wages and 
education attainments is due to the causal effect of obtaining a higher education (HE) 
qualification and how much is due to unobserved factors, such as an individual’s 
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abilities and family background, which influence both wages and education decisions. 
The propensity score matching method (PSM) approach is therefore applied to tackle 
the selection bias problem, which involves ‘matching’ these individuals according to 
observed characteristics and then comparing the outcomes between individual with 
different educational attainments. It is reported in general, HE has a substantial impact 
on earning at different age levels. The return rises with the greater disparity of the 
educational groups.One of the main contributions of this chapter is to compare the 
differences of the return on earnings by gender from age 33 to 50. The wage 
differentials by genders are higher at various levels of HE attainment than it was with 
non HE attainment individuals. HE normally has a greater impact on earnings for 
females rather than males, and gender gap remains significantly constant in a long 
term.  
 
Chapter three applies same data sweeps used in Chapter two to investigate whether 
there are any non monetary returns to educational investment. This uses information 
from ages 33 to 50 to examine whether gaining a HE qualification at age 23 has any 
effect on health and health related behaviours. Exploiting the panel dimension of the 
data in this way again allows specifying a PSM approach that eliminates any 
unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may differ between individuals and 
affect either education itself or health outcomes investigated. The result shows the 
non pecuniary benefits to HE attainments on health are substantial, implying that 
attending the HE may be a relatively effective way to improve population health. 
12 
 
Higher educated men and women are more likely to have better health, more likely to 
maintain healthy weight, more likely to be non-smokers and to control on drinking 
alcohol. Nevertheless HE is not significant to help reducing the likelihood of 
depression.  
 
Chapter four attempts to build a micro model of HE participation incorporating 
factors for expected return to HE and other personal ability and family 
socio-economic variables based on framework of education decision making behavior 
of individual agents. It makes a full use of data obtained from Chapter two and 
expected wage income estimated by PSM. In contrast to conventional testing and 
estimation approaches, the main contribution is to adopt the Indirect Inference method 
to first evaluate the role of factors on participating in higher education, and 
re-estimate the proposed structural model coefficients. The finding shows individual’s 
family characteristics and personal cognitive ability and academic performance before 
HE study has an influence on the likelihood of HE participation. There effects are 
considered as mediated or indirect effects add to the direct effect of wage return on 
HE decision.  
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Chapter 2: Estimating the effect of higher education on 
earnings by Propensity Score Matching Method 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Many economists have estimated the returns to education since Mincer (1974). In 
particular, the concept of private returns of a higher education (HE) is drawn from 
human capital theory (Becker, 1993), which assumes that an individual’s earnings are 
a function of labour productivity derived from individual investments in education or 
training. However, estimation of the returns to education across individuals is often 
complicated by potential endogeneity and self-selection bias problems driven by 
observable factors (e.g. family background, school quality, personal ability) as well as 
unobservable factors (e.g. cognitive and noncognitive skills). Over decades in practice, 
a large number of researchers have used several methods to try to identify the causal 
impact of education on earnings. There is a vast and comprehensive literature in this 
area (such as Blundell and Dias, 2000; Card, 2001; and, Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 
2006). Given that a twins or sibling study method is usually limited by small sample 
size and potential endogeneity bias of schooling differences, extensive literature uses 
a statistical technique called Proxying and Matching approach to control for observed 
factors while comparing the earnings of people with different levels of education by 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. In addition, Heckman’s two stage 
correction method and instrumental variable (IV) methods are also widely used 
procedures for estimating the effect of selection bias on unobservable. This chapter 
14 
 
sheds light on an alternative ‘counterfactual’ approach to attempt to generate accurate 
causal estimates by balancing the pre-characteristics between the treatment and the 
control group, which removes bias due to observable factors. Great attention has been 
paid to this method of matching. Specifically, the PSM has been used in a large 
amount of the literature in very diverse fields of study, whereas the implication to 
return to education has been widely applied since the influential study by Dehejia and 
Wahba (1999).  
 
The objective of this thesis consists of analysing the effects of private financial 
returns to HE by examining the impact of HE qualifications on the earnings of 
individuals living in Britain using the PSM method. Most previous studies report that 
individuals with HE receive higher wages and earnings than less educated ones while 
HE usually has a greater impact on females than males. However, these studies have 
focused overwhelmingly on return to HE among young people rather than older 
workers, and few studies have focused on whether the incremental return gap has 
varied or whether the gap has always been substantial over lifetime.  
 
There are two main contributions of the present study. Firstly, I will estimate the 
impact of HE on education of both males and females across at the ages of 33, 42 and 
50. In particular, I will investigate whether the return gap between genders still exists 
when the cohort is older. Another contribution is to compare the changes of the 
returns of HE on the earnings and the impact of HE on gender differences in the 
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medium and long term by concentrating on a cohort who were continuously full-time 
employed during the period from 1991 to 2008. In this case, I will investigate if 
education has not only an intercept but also a slope effect on earnings. I am also 
interested to know whether educational attainment has a greater role in affecting the 
female labour market participating rate when the cohorts are in their late thirties. The 
subsequent analysis conducted in this chapter is based on data from 1958 National 
Child Development Survey (NCDS) British Cohort Study. The balance property will 
be examined in detail after the estimation, while robustness against ‘hidden bias’ 
arising from the existence of unobserved variables will also be addressed by the 
Rosenbaum bounds approach. In addition, the result outcome is mainly based on the 
estimation from nearest neighbour matching (NN) estimator; nonetheless, in order to 
check robustness and sensitivity of the result to which the choice of matching 
algorithm is not driving the results, I also perform an alternative Kernel matching 
estimator. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3 describes the main features of 
the NCDS data and it gives some descriptive analysis of the numbers of men and 
women entering and completing a HE degree. Section 4 presents the causal inference 
problem, the methodological approach of the PSM, matching algorithm, and statistical 
properties of matching estimators. Section 5 illustrates the details of the results on 
estimated returns and comparisons of the returns on the earnings of individuals by 
gender at the different ages. In Section 6, I will highlight the main findings and draw 
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some conclusions. 
 
2.1.1 UK education system and route to HE 
The UK’s education system has been subject to much change and reform since the 
World War II. It has expanded dramatically and widened access to all parts of the 
system, from primary school right through to HE level. In the drive to raise standards, 
the UK education system has been on the forefront of the movement to introduce 
market forces into education. With parental choice and better school accountability, 
the UK has strived to improve the productivity and efficiency of its schools. 
In early years, the vast majority of students leave school at 14, which is the 
compulsory school leaving age at that time, although school fees for elementary 
students were abolished since 1918. In response to the need after the war for a more 
educated work force, the school leaving age was raised, in 1947 to age 15 and 
eventually in 1973 to the age of 16. During the 1960s and 1970s, UK secondary 
schools underwent a period of radical change, in a further attempt to widen access. 
Students of differing abilities were sent to different types of school, receiving 
different types of education. Students with higher ability and better academic 
performance (normally students who passed the age 11 entry exam) were sent to state 
sponsored academically orientated schools (grammar schools). These students were 
considerably more likely to go on for participating HE. Other students attended 
Secondary Modern schools undertaking a range of vocationally orientated subjects, 
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eventually leaving the educational system at the age of 15 (or 16 after 1973). During 
the 1960s, there was a growing number of students are selected in favour of mixed 
ability and academic performance, and went to so called comprehensive school. This 
in turn sparked off an ideological battle that was to rage for the next 20 years or more, 
between those who favoured the old selective grammar school system and those who 
wanted comprehensive schooling. Nowadays, most students in secondary school are 
taught in comprehensive school. However, comprehensive school would still stream 
their students and allocate them to classes according to their ability
1
.  
Since the 1950s, secondary school students who were academically inclined took 
Ordinary Level (O-levels) at age 16 and Advanced Level (A-levels) at age 18 
examinations. Obtaining at least one A-level was an essential requirement to enter 
higher education. Less academic students could take the Certificate of Secondary 
Education (CSE) at 16 before they left school. In 1980s (after 1988), the O level and 
CSE exams were combined in the GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) 
and still taken at age 16. Therefore, it marked a turning point in the measured 
achievement of 16 year olds in the UK. The fact that all students at 16 now take the 
same examination in each subject means that they no longer have to decide whether to 
go for the lower level CSE option or the more difficult O-level examination. This may 
encourage those who are academically on the borderline between CSE and O level to 
aim for a higher level of attainment. 
Furthermore, what is more unique to the UK is the extent to which an individual 
                                                             
1 It presents a detailed classification of educational qualifications for UK education system in Appendix B. 
 
2 NCDS is an ongoing survey of all individuals born in Britain in the week 3rd-9th March 1958.   
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participanting HE is strongly related to parental education and social class. It is 
difficult to make international comparisons because data on the relationship between 
family background and educational achievement across different countries is 
remarkably sparse. Hansen and Vignoles (2005) report that currently in the UK 48% 
of young people from professional, managerial and skilled non-manual backgrounds 
enter university, whilst only 18% from a skilled manual or unskilled background do so. 
This gap in participation between rich and poor has been present for a long time 
2.2 Literature review 
Return to HE is categorised as pecuniary and non-pecuniary as well as private and 
social to individuals. An individual’s earnings can be seen as the pecuniary or 
financial and private returns. Non-pecuniary private returns include health effect, 
motivational attributes, continued learning at home, etc. There is a growing literature 
that uses a variety of approaches and data sources to estimate the private financial 
return to HE in the UK. In most cases, the average earnings of individuals are strongly 
and positively related to education attainment and the levels of qualifications. 
Individuals with higher levels of education gain a higher income level. In addition, 
there is a consistent feature among these empirical studies: the gender wage 
differentials either in different degree, class, or subjects. 
  
19 
 
2.2.1 Current time return to HE 
Blundell et al. (2000) is one of the most influential studies to examine the impacts on 
the earnings of individuals who take a university degree level or other form of HE 
qualification from the NCDS.
2
 The paper finds that there are many individuals in the 
NCDS who have not passed A-levels but who follow a different route into non-degree 
HE qualifications, such as nursing and teacher training. It tries to distinguish between 
academic and vocational qualifications, and argues that individuals with non-degree 
HE qualifications do not represent the return to qualifications for those who have been 
successful at school. Therefore, it only looks at the effects of HE on wages by 
comparing a group of British university or college graduates, with a group who 
obtained their secondary school qualification with one or more A-level that would 
have permitted them admission to HE but who did not proceed into HE. In other 
words, the sample of estimated returns is only restricted to those who have performed 
well at secondary school.
3
 It reports an estimated return to a degree over A-level of 
around 17% for men and 37% for women using Proxying and Matching approach and 
applying OLS estimation under the assumption of selection on observables,
4
 which 
imposes homogeneous returns to all qualifications. It also produces some interesting 
findings. First of all, there are significant and substantial raw wage premia for typical 
graduates and a large difference in the returns between men and women. However, the 
gender earnings gap is lower between men and women at levels of HE attainment than 
                                                             
2 NCDS is an ongoing survey of all individuals born in Britain in the week 3rd-9th March 1958.  
3 It results to the reduction of sample size from 18,562 to 3,264 
4 It also is referred to conditional independence or unconfoundness assumption that would be explained in detail 
in following section. Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) suggested this estimator is a simplified version of the fully 
non-parametric propensity score-matching estimators.   
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it was with just A-levels. Secondly, the returns to HE were different for men and 
women. They also found that men starting HE but not completing yields a negative 
return that is 9% lower than those who did not even start HE. However, both men and 
women had positive returns to HE compared with those who achieved only A-levels. 
Finally, for men who started their first HE course at the age of 21 or older, they 
seemed to have an average return of 7% to 8% less than those who started before the 
age of 21. 
A diametrically different approach is taken by Blundell et al. (2005), again using 
NCDS data, who applied four different approaches to examine the impact of HE on 
individual earnings, both for single treatment and multiple treatments, with and 
without heterogeneous returns. It compares OLS and matching methods, which are all 
under the assumption of selection on observables and instrument variable (IV), and 
the control function method, which is under the assumption of selection on 
unobservables. However, instead of trimming the sample only on academic 
qualifications, it focuses on an individual’s highest qualification and uses a broader 
sample that includes academic qualifications and vocational qualifications at an 
equivalent level. For instance, individuals initially with O-levels but who have 
completed professional qualifications can be included as the HE group. On the other 
hand, in order to avoid the endogeneity problem between employment selection 
variables with wages, it only pays attention to male participants. In contrast to 
Blundell et al. (2000), Blundell et al. (2005) adjusts control variables in equation 
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specifications by excluding, for example, employer characteristics.
5
 Since the gender 
groups and sample selection among these two studies are not identical, the empirical 
result of comparison is unclear and limited. It is considered that the main contribution 
of Blundell et al. (2005) is more in terms of an empirical and methodological 
comparison of different approaches for estimating the return to education. This study 
reports a return to HE (ATT) over anything less for males varies significantly from 27% 
to 40%, depending on the estimation method and control variable included. Both OLS 
and matching estimated results are very sensitive to the numbers of inclusion of 
control variables. Generally, adding a control significantly reduces the returns. The 
result from matching is slightly lower than that from OLS. The difference arises 
because the OLS is constrained to estimate the homogeneous return from HE. The 
ATT is unbiased under the OLS only if the treatment effect is homogeneous across 
individuals among different characteristics However, it estimates for an observably 
heterogeneous return when applying PSM. Furthermore, Blundell et al. (2005) proves 
that when allowing interactions between the control variables and the treatment 
indicator, such as adding later personal ability and late family background in 
regression, OLS estimates of the ATT are almost identical to the matching ones. 
Secondly, the estimated sample for matching is restricted in the common support area; 
hence, the sample size is different from that of in OLS. Therefore, it trims the sample 
size only to comparable individuals among treated and non-treated groups.  
 
                                                             
5
 A comparison of the two specifications will be explained in detail in Section 3   
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Massimiliano et al. (2005) showed that the OLS estimates in the common support are 
very similar to the ATT computed using PSM. However, Blundell and Dias (2000) 
also indicate the drawback of matching. On the one hand, it does not succeed in 
finding a non-treated observation with similar propensity score for all the participants. 
On the other hand, it is important to obtain the relevant information to distinguish 
potential participants from others and, therefore, it heavily relies on rich data 
requirements in order to guarantee that the selection on observation assumption is 
verified. In other words, matching conditions on observables is only as good as the 
conditioning variables. On average, compared to leaving school at 16 without any 
qualifications, an average incremental return to O-levels is 18%, to A-levels is 24%, 
and to HE is 48%, respectively, at each educational stage.  
2.2.2 More evidence from cross-sectional data and cohort data 
Dearden (1999) applies OLS to estimate a 17% wage premium to a degree for men 
and 32% for women based on NCDS cohort data. Dearden et al. (2000) also uses 
three different datasets to examine the return to individual’s highest qualification.6 
They apply the metho d of general OLS under the assumption of selection on 
observable, which can be viewed as a form of regression-based linear matching. Their 
result suggests that males/females with an additional 10% / 21% return to degree 
compared to O-level and GCSE equivalent for NCDS data and an additional 21% / 28% 
return for Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, respectively. Walker and Zhu (2002) 
                                                             
6
 Three dataset are: the National Child Development Study sweep 3 (1991), the British data from the 
International Adult Literacy Survey in 1995, and the Labour Force Survey in 1998 
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consider the economic benefits of HE by different subjects using the data from LFS, 
and find that men with an undergraduate degree achieved an earnings premium of 
about 15% over individuals who only have A-levels. The corresponding estimate for 
women was 19%. Men in possession of a mathematics degree achieved a 25.7% 
earnings premium over those with A-levels as their highest qualification, while 
women achieved a 38.6% earnings premium. In contrast, the premium for men in 
possession of undergraduate degrees in the arts was 4% less relative to those 
individuals with A-levels, while women achieved a 17% premium. Irrespective of the 
subject of study, the financial benefit of completing a degree is much greater for 
women than for men, but this may be due to the relatively low earnings of 
non-graduate women.  
Walker and Zhu (2003) estimate the wage premium associated with different levels of 
education from UK LFS data. Under the assumption that the returns to education for 
individuals are the same, they find that the effects of an additional year of schooling 
increase wages by about 9%. O’Leary and Sloane (2005) used a standard OLS human 
capital model to estimate the returns to different degrees, in a variety of disciplines, 
by gender and controlled the variations in student quality across disciplines in Britain 
using LFS. The returns of degrees are considerably higher for women than men. With 
a higher degree provides an hourly earnings boost of 113.76% then without a higher 
degree for men, whereas for women it is 131.52%. The paper notices the benefit of a 
university education on hourly wages is more apparent for women than it is for men. 
The return from an undergraduate degree is 20.23%, a Master’s degree is 29.15%, and 
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a PhD degree is 31.40% for men. In comparison with men, the return from an 
undergraduate degree for women is 35.49%, a Master’s degree is 54%, and a PhD 
degree is 60.02%. It also argues that there is a considerable heterogeneity in the 
returns of undertaking a degree because of the different disciplines, and the 
motivation and performance of the students, which even differs by gender (detailed 
results are shown in Table 2.1). 
The Ramsey and Analytical Services Group of the Department for Employment and 
Learning (2008) estimated the average rate of return of a university degree across the 
UK by using a robust sample of 40,296 graduates, who left UK universities in 
2004-2005, and combined this with the employment and salary information obtained 
six months after graduation. They find that there is a relatively large and significant 
variation in graduate earnings according to the degree classification awarded, 
particularly for males. Figure 2.1 shows that on average, 21% of graduates from the 
elite Russell Group of universities enjoy better earnings than others. The average 
earnings for females are lower than that for males. Figure 2.2 shows a positive 
correlation between the level of achievement and earnings, such that, the starting 
salary for those holding a First is on average 18% higher than people holding a Third 
and the differential is greater for males (26.8%) than females (10.5%).  
More recently, Conlon and Patrignani (2011) report that the marginal earnings return 
associated with an undergraduate degree stands at around 27.4% overall compared to 
possession of two or more A-Levels. Walker and Zhu (2011) estimate the impact of 
HE qualifications on the earnings of graduates in the UK by using the LFS data to 
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consider the effects of the subject studied, class of first degree, and the impact of 
postgraduate qualifications. They provide estimates of the college premium, use 
regression estimates across the distribution of wages, and comparisons of rates of 
return to HE investments by subject and gender under alternative tuition fees. This 
shows the differences on average hourly wages of different HE qualifications by 
gender. Males with first degrees only earn 20% more than those with two or more 
A-levels, for females it is 31%. Males with a Master’s degree can earn 12% more than 
those with a first degree, females earn 17% more. Males with PhDs earn 4% more 
than Master’s, for females earn 7% more. Males with a PGCE earn 6% less than those 
with a first degree, but for females it is 7% more. However, there is an ability bias 
argument that suggests that their estimates may be an upper bound to the true effect. 
Another weakness is that they are not able to control for institutional differences 
because the data does not identify the HE institution that granted the qualifications 
obtained. They also point out that in the UK the quality of the student entrants varies 
by institution.  
Other researchers have also accessed international evidence. For example, 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) at the World Bank report estimated returns to 
education across various countries (also see Montenegro and Patrinos, 2012). Caponi 
and Plesca (2009) accessed the wage differentials between community college and 
university in Canada. Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier (2012) estimated the returns of an 
additional year of education in Germany. Moreover, there some recent studies have 
analysed developing economies, such as China (Kang and Peng, 2012), India 
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(Agrawal, 2011), or BRIC Countries (Carnoy et al., 2013). 
2.2.3 Returns to HE over time 
There is little literature on the extent of focusing on the impact of education on 
lifetime (15 years or more) incremental returns by distinguishing between HE 
attainment and anything less based on UK evidence. Most of the studies that have 
been published, without explicitly modelling, usually only compute the average gross 
graduate premium associated with qualification. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005 and 
2007) undertook recent analysis to consider the lifetime earnings associated with the 
average degree holder compared to an individual in possession of two or more 
A-levels. This analysis assessed the lifetime earnings associated with different degree 
level subjects and qualification levels, such as postgraduate degrees, diplomas and 
certificates. The results show that the gross additional lifetime earnings for degree 
graduates are approximately £160,000 in present value terms. Moreover, Conlon and 
Patrignani (2011) report the mean gross lifetime premium for graduate stands at 
around £125,000.  
 
(i) Evidence from cross-section data 
McIntosh (2004) exploits LFS data from 1996 to 2002 to find how returns to both 
academic and vocational qualifications have been changing in the cross-section over 
time for males and females. Surprisingly, there appears to have been virtually little 
change in the estimated returns to most of qualifications over the time. For instance 
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for academic qualification, with respect to HE, the estimated return to first degree 
level for men/women is 22.1% / 23.4% in 1996 and 25.3% / 23.5% in 2002, 
respectively. With respect to obtaining two or more A-levels, the estimated return for 
men is even decreasing: from 16.9% in 1993, 15.7% in 1996, to 15.4% in 2002; and 
for women from 14.9%, 13.5%, to 14.4%, respectively. For qualifications lower than 
obtaining one A-level, both genders appear to have a decreased incremental return. 
Remarkably, the returns to low GCSEs (grades D-F) have declined to zero for both 
gender by 2001 indicating that low level GCSEs appear to confer no market value. 
Similar studies have also been done by Dearden et al. (2002), and O’Leary and Sloane 
(2011).  
The drawback of using cross-sectional data such as LFS is that it does not 
differentiate between age and cohort effect. The only systematic data in McIntosh’s 
(2004) study is earnings recorded some six years after graduation but the response 
rate is poor and early wages are not a good guide to lifecycle effects; therefore, the 
results may suffer from various sources of bias. For instance, the return to a degree is 
most likely to be higher for those in their thirties than for those in their twenties. 
Migali and Walker (2011) separately identify lifecycle and cohort effects using LFS 
and reject the usual separability assumption. Therefore, to assess the robustness to 
omitted variable bias of the above findings, other studies turn to use the cohort data.  
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(ii) Evidence from cohort data 
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2003) compare the estimated return to a first degree in 
1991 by individuals aged 33 using NCDS cohort data to the estimated the return to a 
first degree in 2000 by individuals aged using the 1970 British birth cohort (BCS70) 
data. For males, it shows the incremental premia between a first degree or equivalent 
level to A-level slightly decreased across the two cohorts and time, reported at 17.5% 
in 1991 and 15% in 2000. Comparing A-levels with O-levels, the premia increases 
from 6.5% in 1991 to 10.3 in 2000. The premia for males achieving O-levels 
compared to only obtaining CES remains are stable at around 7%. A dramatic fall in 
the returns at the lowest of the educational scale is also noted. The incremental return 
for CES certificate over non-qualification in 2000 is almost at zero. Massimiliano et 
al. (2005) also tried to replicate the NCDS cohort analysis of Blundell et al. (2000) on 
BCS70 data. By using the identical specification and subset sample selection, they 
report an estimated wage return to a first degree over those who attained at least an 
A-level education to be 15% for men and 23% for women in the BCS70 cohorts, 
which is similar to 17% and 37%, respectively, from NCDS. Furthermore, they alter 
the specification, which is similar to the one used in Blundell et al. (2005) for the 
1970 cohort, and leads to an estimated return to a first degree of 14% for men and 18% 
for women in 2000, the return to a degree for females appears to fall considerably 
across the two cohorts. However, it argues that the three-year age gap between the two 
cohorts might be problematic in the cross-cohort comparison since it might possibly 
conflate age effect and cohort effect. It also noted that the existing evidence on the 
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magnitude of returns to HE that changed over time is mainly due to the ongoing 
changes in the policies of the UK government, and the estimation samples are based 
upon different cohorts. To that extent, few researchers only focus on cohort data 
sample over time and access in the presence of growing returns to education over the 
lifetime. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 The evaluation problem 
Identifying the casual impact is challenging, especially if the variable is not 
manipulable by the researchers and cannot be randomly assigned. Economists have 
been interested in estimating the return to education in terms of higher pay as a result 
of attending university. However, attending university is not randomly assigned. 
There are various important unobserved factors, including the alternatives available to 
individuals, such as their personal ability, family background, time preferences, the 
tuition fee, and reputation of university options. Suppose that university graduates 
earn £20 per hour and others earn £12 on average. One can argue that HE in 
university has no real effect on an individual’s productivity and earnings, and that 
those who obtained good A-level results and entered college have enough productivity 
to earn £20 per hour on average. Therefore, even in the absence of higher education, 
they would earn the same amount if they could prove their productivity to employers. 
In this case, for those people who have lower personal ability or who obtained 
relatively low A-level results would not be able to improve their productivity and this 
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might not affect their earnings.  Bonjour et al. (2003) summarise two relationships 
between education and earnings: a) the relation that higher educated people earn a 
higher wage is causal; and, b) the relation that people with higher ability or more 
favourable family background are more productive and receive a higher wage is 
spurious.  
2.3.2 Causal inference 
This section aims to illustrate the casual inference identification problem in more 
theoretical terms. In econometrics evaluation studies, it is suggested that observational 
studies use a randomised trial to obtain an objective causal inference. However, data 
often does not come from randomised trials but from non-randomised observations.  
Suppose an experimental design where the assignment to the case of a binary 
treatment is determined by a purely random mechanism: 
            (2.1) 
where D = {0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to treatment and      is the 
multidimensional vector of all observable and unobservable pre-treatment 
characteristics (covariates). In addition,  
               (2.2) 
The potential outcomes are then defined as      . This guarantees that D is 
independent with both observable and unobservable, and the potential outcomes will 
be statistically independent of the treatment status. With randomised assignment, all 
of the characteristics of the individuals are equally distributed between treated and 
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untreated groups, which implies: 
                                       (2.3) 
 
The causal effect for an individual unit i can be defined as the difference between the 
potential outcome in case of treatment and non-treatment: 
     (2.4) 
where         and N denotes the total population. The evaluation problem arises 
because only one of the potential outcomes is observed for each individual i. The 
unobserved outcome is called a counterfactual outcome. Thus, the true causal effect 
of a treatment T on individuals not subjected to the treatment can never be identified. 
The impossibility of observing both treatment and control outcomes for each 
individual is often referred to as the “fundamental problem of causal inference” 
(Rubin, 1978, Holland, 1986). 
Hence, estimating the individual treatment effect τi is not possible without making 
generally untestable assumptions and one has to concentrate on average treatment 
effects at the population. The average treatment effect (ATE) is defined as: 
              .                  (2.5) 
Heckman (1997) argued that ATE might not be of relevance to policymakers because 
it includes the effect on persons for whom the programme was never participated. One 
also concentrates on ATEs at a sub-population. The parameter of interest in most 
evaluation studies is then considered as the average treatment effect on treated (ATT), 
it is then defined as: 

 i  Yi 1 Yi 0 
 
ATE  E Y 1 Y 0  
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            .       (2.6) 
which measures the impact of the program on those individuals who intended the 
program. The problem is that             is a hypothetical outcome because it is 
not observable and it depends on counterfactual outcomes. Under condition of 
equation (3), it then allows us to estimate the ATT by using: 
                                                                        (2.7) 
In the absence of an experimental design or observational studies, using the mean 
outcome of untreated individuals  is not recommended because it is 
likely that the covariates which determine the treatment decision also determine the 
outcome variable of interest. Thus, the differences in means between treated and 
untreated units would differ, even in the absence of treatment leading to a 
self-selection bias. For ATT this can be noted as: 
. (2.8) 
                        is defined as the self-selection bias. Likewise, 
another parameter of interest is the average treatment effect on the non-treated 
(ATNT), which is defined as 
.   (2.9) 
The additional challenge when estimating ATE is that both counterfactual outcomes
 and  have to be constructed. 
 

ATTEY1|D1 EY0 |D1 
  0|0 DYE

E Y 1 |D1 E Y 0 |D0 ATTE Y 0 |D1 E Y 0 |D0 

ATNTEY1|D0 EY0 |D0 
  0|1 DYE   1|0 DYE
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2.3.3 The heterogeneous model 
Let us turn to the empirical heterogeneous model where returns are allowed to be 
heterogeneous across individuals. Suppose each individual receives only one 
treatment, the observed outcome of individual i can be written as 
                                                            (2.10) 
where      denotes the log hourly wage of individual i,    that denotes highest 
academic educational attainment completed. The potential outcomes can also be 
specified between observables and unobservables: 
                                           ,               
                                           ,                        (2.11) 
where     and     are unobservable components of log wages;    measures some 
unobservable individual trait;     and     measure the individual-specific 
unobserved marginal return to education.    presents the observable characteristics 
and maintains exogeneity assumptions throughout. Natural candidates for    that are 
not affected by treatments    are time-constant factors, as well as pre-treatment 
characteristics.  
Substituting (2.11) into (2.10), one can get: 
                                      
                                                                       
                                                         
Define           , 
                                 (2.12) 
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   is then the return to education coefficient and it is allowed to be heterogeneous 
across individuals.      stands for the return for individuals with characteristics Xi 
and captures observable heterogeneity in returns. The parameter of interest for 
treatment effect will be        . For example,                      
 
2.3.4 The least square and endogeneity bias 
The traditional OLS estimated return to education is potentially susceptible to 
problems of endogeneity bias that is caused by unobserved characteristics. Suppose 
that the earning function can be summarised as: 
                          (2.13) 
in which    is the wage,    is a linear function of the observed individual’s 
variables  , and   is the education qualification variable. The parameter of interest 
is the coefficient  , which measure the return (   ) to education ( ). In the case 
of           , OLS is an unbiased and inconsistent estimator. However, many 
researchers argue that the estimated return to education is likely to be upward biased 
because omitted innate ability and family background is positively correlated with 
educational attainment. Card (1999), Bonjour et al. (2003), and Blundell et al. (2003) 
conclude several reasons why the error term   is correlated with both   and , as 
follows: 
(1) Ability bias. There might be an unobserved earnings capacity term  , so that the 
error term consists of two components:       with             
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and           . One cannot interpret   as the causal effect of education on 
wages. Studies concentrate on the issue of ‘ability bias’      which would 
unambiguously upward bias the estimated return because individuals with higher 
ability can both acquire more education and earn higher wages (e.g. Ashenfelter 
and Kreuger, 1995). 
(2) Return bias. This happens when returns to different qualifications may be 
heterogeneous across individuals. In this case,   itself would be correlated with 
education  . Massimiliano et al. (2005) explain that the return bias is due to the 
individuals self-select into the different educational qualifications according to 
their idiosyncratic returns, which only depend on characteristics that are 
observable to individuals. Therefore, in the homogeneous returns model, the 
return bias does not exist. 
(3) Measurement error bias. The measurement error includes wrong self-reported 
survey measures in education qualification variable . However, since D normally 
is a dummy or category variable, measurement error will be non-classical. 
Over many years, a large number of economists have attempted to solve the problem 
of endogeneity. One common approach is to use twins’ data to eliminate differences in 
innate ability, and this provides an unbiased estimator of the return to education (e.g. 
Bonjour et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the twins methodology has been argued to be 
problematic. While still applying the least square estimation method, Blundell et al.  
(2000) tackle endogeneity bias by using a Proxying and Matching approach, which 
attempts to control the possible biases. Such regression would include the individual 
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characteristic X factors, which might affect both the educational qualification and 
wages. This approach assumes that HE decisions are made on the basis of observed 
and included characteristics whereas unobserved characteristics are proxied by the 
included observed variables in order to ensure that the estimated returns are consistent. 
They exploit the fact that the data, such as the NCDS, are rich in information on 
typically unobserved characteristics, for instance: family background, personal ability 
and past educational variables. Researchers can include these variables as regressors 
in their log-wage equations in order to address the issue of ability bias. Dearden et al. 
(2000) explain the reason why estimated return based on NCDS has a lower value 
over that on LFS in their result is because it is less subject to an early age ability bias 
because the omitted ability and family background at an early age controls are 
included in the NCDS equations.  
With regard to measurement error, Dearden et al. (2000) further argue that it may 
exist in the measurement error,
7
 which would tend to down bias coefficients towards 
zero. If the measurement error is corrected, then the estimated returns to academic 
qualifications rise by around 10% for men and 12%-20% for women. They conclude 
that measurement error bias and omitted ability bias largely cancel out in the 
estimation of returns. McIntosh (2004) agrees with this result in his research, which is 
based on Dearden et al.’s (2000) work. Meanwhile, Blundell et al. (2004) argue that 
there is no substantive classical measurement error bias in schooling because NCDS’s 
education measures are fairly accurate. They state that individuals in the NCDS are 
                                                             
7
 They use the qualification measures in the 1991 questionnaire as instruments for the detailed education questions 
in the 1981 and 1991 surveys, and assume that the measurement errors in the two questions are uncorrelated. 
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followed since birth and throughout their schooling period, with exams files being 
collected from schools and interviews being carried out very close to the dates of 
completion of education. They find no evidence of remaining selection bias given the 
information available in that data, under the selection on observables assumption.  
In this study I will focus the matching method, which is one of the alternative 
solutions that deals with the endogeneity problem. Blundell et al. (2003) concludes 
that the properties of least squares bias depends on the richness of other control 
variables that may be entered to capture the omitted factors. However, the matching 
method would try to control directly and flexibly all of the variables at the root of 
selection bias.
8
 I will describe these procedures in more detail in the sections that 
follow. 
 
2.3.5 Matching and PSM 
PSM is a semi-parametric estimator that has origins in experimental work from the 
first half of the twentieth century.
9
 It was developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
and applied in statistics and medical literature in both theoretical and empirical works 
(Heckman et al., 1997; and, Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). In the last 10 years, it has 
become more widely used by researchers in evaluating labour market policies 
(Lechner, 2002; Ichino and Nannicini, 2006; Lechner and Wunsch, 2009a; and, 
                                                             
8 Main methods that are used in the literature to correct for selection bias are the matching estimator, which is 
based on selection on observables, and the instrument variable, control function or Heckman correction estimator, 
which are based on the selection of the unobservables. 
9 By necessity, applications use a parametric structure to calculate the propensity score and a non-parametric 
structure to apply matching method. 
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Sianesi, 2001 and 2004), assessing the effect of college quality (Berg Dale and 
Krueger, 2002, 2014; Black and Smith, 2004; Lindahl and Regnér, 2009; and, de Luna 
and Lundin, 2014), and the return to education (Card, 2001; Blundell et al.  2003; 
Sianesi, 2005; and, Battistin and Sianesi, 2011).  
In the non-experimental designs, I have to account for differences between treated and 
untreated groups in order to estimate the impact of the program properly. The idea of 
PSM methodology is to attempt, in a non-experimental context, to replicate the setup 
of a randomised experiment. This refers to pair treatment and control units with 
similar values on the propensity score, and possibly other covariates, as well as the 
discarding of all unmatched units (Rubin, 2001).  
The matching approach is non-parametric approach that provides one possible 
solution to the problem of selection bias that has been applied in many 
social-economics studies. Matching estimators try to resemble an experiment by 
trying to pair in a group of non-treated units that are as similar as possible to each 
treatment group in terms of all relevant observed covariates X. As discussed above, 
the true parameter τATT is only identified if equation (2.3) holds.  However, equation 
(2.3) is only valid under two precise assumptions if one applies matching.  The first 
necessary assumption is that the untreated units must be statistically equivalent to the 
treated units if observable differences in characteristics can be controlled between the 
treated and non-treated units. This identifying assumption for matching is known as 
the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA): 
                                (2.14) 
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The assumption is also referred to as selection on observables in other program 
evaluation literature. The assumption implies that selection is solely based on 
observable pre-treatment characteristics and that all variables that influence treatment 
and potential outcomes are all observed by the researcher (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2008). Secondly, for the matching procedure to have empirical content, the second 
necessary assumption is that: 
                             (2.15) 
The common support assumption implies that probability of receiving treatment for 
each X lies between 0 and 1 to avoid comparing non-comparable individual units. 
Therefore, individual units with the same X values have a positive probability of being 
both treated and untreated units (Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999; and, Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008) to ensure that each treated unit can be matched with an untreated 
unit. In other words, the common support condition requires that at each level of X, 
the probability of observing untreated unit is positive. When (2.14) and (2.15) are 
valid, the treatment assignment is said to be strongly ignorable (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983).  
The drawback of general matching is that, apart from the difference in treatment 
status, all of the other differences between treated and non-treated units are needed to 
capture their observable attributes, whereas finding exact matches could be not 
feasible if the dimension of the X vector is large. One possible way to reduce this 
‘curse of dimensionality’ problem is to use Mahalanobis metric to combine all the 
matching variables into a scalar measuring the distance between any two observations 
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(Stuart and Rubin, 2007).  
Alternatively, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest that this distance can also be 
measured by balancing score b(X) based on Cochran’s (1968) extension, which is a 
function of the relevant observed covariates X such that         . The propensity 
score is a balancing score, which is defined as the estimated conditional probability of 
receiving a treatment given observed covariates X: 
                                                                     (2.16)  
By definition, the probability for a treated given observed covariates X is a possible 
balancing score.  
Ensuring that the PSM estimators identify and consistently estimate the treatment 
effects of interest leads to the following assumption (Becker and Ichino, 2002, 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
1. Balancing of pre-treatment variables given the propensity score: 
                                                                          (2.17) 
2. Unconfoundedness10 or CIA given the propensity score: 
                                                      (2.18) 
3. Common Support or overlap condition:  
                                                 (2.19) 
 
If the balancing assumption is satisfied, then observations with the same propensity 
score must have the same distribution of observable characteristics independent of 
treatment status (Becker and Ichino, 2002). In other words, if all of the relevant 
                                                             
10
 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) defined the assumption as Uuncofoundedness or ignorable treatment 
assignment. They also show that under the strongly ignorable assumption, or if (2.14) and (2.15) 
hold, assumption (18) is also valid if propensity score is used rather than the vector of X.  
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differences between the control group and treatment group that affect the outcomes 
can be captured by the observed covariates, then matching on the propensity score can 
yield a consistent estimate of the treatment impact. The common support assumption 
for PSM can be enforced by adding a common support constraint, which will be 
discussed in the following section. Imposing the common support condition in the 
estimation of the propensity score may improve the quality of the matches used to 
estimate the ATT (Becker and Ichino, 2002).  
Compared to other standard parametric estimators (e.g. OLS or IV regression), a 
significant advantage of matching or PSM approach is that it doesn't require the 
assumption of constant additive treatment effects across individuals. Instead, 
heterogeneous treatment effects are permitted, and can be retrieved via sub-group 
analysis, whereas standard parametric approaches assume homogeneous treatment 
effects across the sample analysed. This involves selecting the sub-group of interest 
and re-matching within that group and makes PSM a flexible tool for studying 
programme effects on groups of particular interest. PSM estimates of treatment effects 
are confined to counterfactuals in the area of common support and therefore do not 
rely on extrapolations beyond this region (Peel and Makepeace, 2012). In particular, 
PSM has diagnostic methods of screening data prior to parametric estimation so as to 
reveal the joint degree of overlap of covariates or PS. 
PSM has two clear disadvantages relative to experimental techniques. The first and 
most obvious criticism that may be directed to the matching approach is the fact that 
its identifying CIA is in general a very strong one. In the case of random assignment, 
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it is confident that the treated and control units are similar on both observable and 
unobservable characteristics. However, PSM only takes account of selection on 
observables assumption only and it estimation depends on how good the covariates 
used. The plausibility of CIA assumption should always be discussed with account 
being taken of the informational richness of the available dataset in relation to a 
detailed understanding of the institutional set-up by which selection into the treatment 
takes place (Blundell et al 2005).  
Second, PSM can only estimate treatment effects where there is support for the treated 
individuals among control units. However, in the case of social experiments, random 
assignment ensures that there is common support across the whole sample. If the 
treatment effect is heterogeneous, restricting to the common support may actually 
change the parameter being estimated; in other words, it is possible that the estimated 
effect does not represent the mean treatment effect on the treated. It also makes 
experimental techniques unambiguously superior to PSM. 
To formalise the above discussion, in this paper I will begin by looking at a simple 
single treatment model, which in the UK context is the return from undertaking some 
form of HE. This methodological approach assumes that HE decisions are made on 
the basis of variables that are observable in the data. In our model, the control unit is a 
heterogeneous group that is made up of those leaving school with no formal HE 
qualifications and those finishing with one or more A-levels. The treated unit includes 
individuals who achieved HE qualifications, including a first degree or higher 
degrees.  
43 
 
 
2.3.6 Matching estimator and algorithm 
Under assumption (18) and (19), by the law of iterated expectation, the PSM 
estimator for ATT can be written as: 
    
                             
                                                 (2.20) 
The PSM estimator is simply the mean difference in outcomes over the common 
support, appropriately weighted by the propensity score distribution of participants 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). A general class of estimators of equation (20) can also 
be written as: 
    
    
 
  
         
 
  
                (2.21) 
Where    and    are the number of treated and untreated observations,    is the 
treatment indicator and    is a weight related to a function of the estimated PS.  
From equation (2.21), the PSM estimator compares the targeted outcomes of treated 
units with one or more control units. Certain matching algorithms reduce bias by 
maximising the statistical similarities between treatment and non-treatment case, 
while others maximise the number of matches to reduce variance by allowing 
comparisons between less similar treatments and control individuals (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1985). Descriptions of the most commonly employed matching algorithms are 
given below. 
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(a) Nearest neighbour matching 
One of the most straightforward and easiest to implement matching estimators is NN 
matching (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In its simplest 1:1 or pairwise matching, it 
starts from each treated unit’s propensity score and tries to find a control unit with the 
closest or most similar estimated propensity scores to use as a match. Once each 
treated unit is matched with a control unit, the difference between the outcome of the 
treated units   
  and the outcome of the matched untreated units   
  is computed.  
The outcome of treated unit i is matched to a control unit j with the closest propensity 
score:                        . The ATT is then obtained by averaging these 
differences
11
 give by: 
    
 
  
              (2.22) 
This method is usually applied with replacement, in the sense that an untreated unit 
can be a best match for more than one treated unit. Each treated unit can only be used 
once, but the same control unit may be used more than once if it is the closest match 
for many different treatment units.  
Dehejia and Wahba (1999) suggested that matching with replacement is beneficial in 
terms of bias reduction because high-score treated units will match to low-score 
comparisons when there a large number of treated units with high scores but a few 
control units with high scores. When researchers apply matching without replacement, 
they may be forced to match treated units to control units that are significantly 
different in terms of the propensity score. This increases bias but it could also improve 
                                                             
11 The derivation of formula and variance formula can be seen in See Becher and Ichino (2002).  
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the precision of the estimates. A similar argument can also be found in Caliendo and 
Kopeinig’s (2008), who suggested that matching with replacement involves a 
trade-off between bias and variance. Matching with replacement keeps a low bias at 
the cost of larger variance. Another problem of NN matching without replacement is 
that the estimates depend on the order in which the observations are matched. 
However, the results are also potentially sensitive to the order in which the treatment 
units are matched (Rosenbaum, 1995). Hence, it should be ensured that ordering is 
done randomly. Although matching with replacement can often yield better matched 
numbers, if in the case that there are few control units comparable to the treated ones, 
it is most likely that the ATT estimates will be based on just a small number of control 
units because the controls units can be used multiple times.  
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) also suggested that matching by oversampling (match 
with more than one NN) also involves a trade-off between variance and bias. When 
using oversampling, one has to decide on how many matching partners should be 
chosen for each treated individual and for which weight should be assigned. Matching 
with one NN minimises bias at the cost of larger variance, whereas matching with 
additional NNs can increase the bias but decrease the variance.  
This method considers those observations whose propensity score belongs to the 
intersection of the supports of the propensity score of the treated and control units. 
The quality of the matches may be improved by imposing the region of common 
support restriction. However, Lechner (2002) argued that matches may be lost at the 
boundaries of the common support and the sample may be considerably reduced; 
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hence, imposing the region of common support is not necessarily a better solution.  
 
(b) Calliper and radius matching 
NN matching faces the risk of bad matches if the closest neighbour is far away 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Consequently, calliper matching (Cochran and Rubin, 
1973) was developed as a variation of NN matching which attempts to avoid bad 
matches by imposing a pre-specified tolerance δ on the maximum distance         
allowed, where   is the PS score in both cases. From the treated units, if none of the 
control units are within tolerance δ, then they will be excluded. The drawback of 
calliper matching is that it is difficult to know a priori what choice for tolerance δ is 
reasonable (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). 
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) developed radius matching as a variant of calliper 
matching. The idea of radius matching is to use all of the control units with    falling 
within a radius r from    that match the treated unit but not only the NN within each 
calliper. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) stated the benefit is that it uses only as many 
comparison units as are available within the calliper and allows for the use of extra 
units when good matches are available.  
 
(c) Kernel matching 
Kernel matching is a non-parametric matching estimator which uses weighted 
averages of all individuals in the control group within the common support region to 
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construct the counterfactual outcome. In kernel matching, the outcome of the treated 
unit i is matched to a weighted average of the outcomes of possibly all control units 
and the weight is set to: 
    
  
     
 
 
   
     
 
 
          (2.23) 
Where      denotes a non-negative and symmetric kernel function and   denotes 
the bandwidth. ATT advanced by kernel matching is given by: 
    
 
  
                           (2.24) 
The advantage of such approach is the lower variance can be achieved since more 
information on control group is used. However, the estimated results are often very 
sensitive to choice of bandwidth. High value of bandwidth parameter yield a smoother 
estimated density function, a better fit and a lower variance between the estimated and 
the true underlying density function, it nonetheless also leading to a possible biased 
estimate. 
Asymptotically, all different matching techniques produce the same estimation 
because in arbitrary large sample, they all compare only the exact matches. However, 
in finite samples, they differ based on the way they construct      and the way they 
choose the weights. Therefore, these differences lead to a trade off between the bias 
and the variance of matching estimators. For example, the NN matching minimizes 
the bias since it chooses only the closest comparison group and assigns all the weight 
to it in constructing the counterfactual. By contrast, kernel matching assigns positive 
weights to several control units. Then it increases the average PS distance between 
treated unit and the observables used to construct the counterfactual which in turn 
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implies a greater bias.  
In most of the literature the researchers have used and presented several matching 
algorithms to test the robustness of the treatment effect results. When the treated and 
untreated participants are more similar in pre-treatment characteristics
12
, the 
no-replacement algorithms results in similar estimated treatment effects but with 
lower standard errors. When the treated and untreated units are significantly different 
in pre-treatment characteristics, NN matching with replacement, calliper matching, or 
kernel matching are considered to apply. The interest of the parameter in this paper is 
ATT because the estimated ATT may be very sensitive to the applied matching 
algorithm when the there are relatively few matches. To check that the choice of 
matching algorithm is not driving the results, in this paper I will apply two matching 
estimators: one to one NN with replacement and kernel matching 
 
2.3.7 Assessing the matching quality 
Based on assumption (14), the balancing tests are the specification tests that will be 
conducted to check if the matching is able to balance the distribution of the relevant 
variables in both the treated and untreated group. Most of the balance evaluations in 
the literature typically focus on the first moment. The idea of these approaches to 
evaluation is to compare the before and after matching results, and check if the 
differences still exist. If differences still remain, then either the propensity score 
should be re-estimated using a different approach or a different matching approach 
                                                             
12 This is accessed by common support or overlap on the propensity-score distribution in section 5 
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should be used. Multiple versions of the balancing test are discussed in the following 
section.
13
 Most of the tests may be conducted by applying the pstest command in 
STATA.  
 
(a) Equality of means test (t-tests) 
This approach checks for balance based on two sample individual t-tests for each 
covariate used to estimate the propensity score. Before matching, large differences are 
expected in the covariate between the two groups; however, after matching, the 
covariates should be balanced in both groups and no significant differences should be 
found. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argued that t-test might be preferred if the 
evaluator is concerned with the statistical significant of the results. The shortcoming 
here is that the bias reduction before and after matching is not clearly visible.  
(b) Standardised bias 
The standardised bias (SB) test will be used to illustrate the reduction in bias that can 
be attributed to matching on the propensity score. The SB test was introduced by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) to compute the distance of marginal distributions of the 
covariates. The SB formula is given by: 
            
         
   
         
 
   (2.25) 
                                                             
13
 There are also other different balance tests to check for the specification of the propensity score, such as the 
DW test (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999), regression test (Smith and Todd, 2005), bootstrapped 
Kolomgorov-Smirnov tests (Sekhon, 2011), and multivariate significance tests (Hansen and Bowers, 2008), etc. 
Here, I will only examine the tests that can be applied in STATA.  
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      (2.26) 
Where     and     are the means for the unmatched treatment and control group; 
     and      are the values for matched samples; and,       and       are the 
corresponding variances. For each covariate X, the SB is the difference of the sample 
means in the treated and control group sub-samples as a percentage of the square root 
of the average of the sample variances in both groups. Although the SB approach is 
widely applied in most of the literature, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argued that 
since a bias reduction below 3% or 5% is seen as sufficient in this literature, there is 
no clear indication for the success of the matching procedure. 
 
(c) Test of joint equality of means test (Pseudo R2) 
Sianesi (2004) suggested to re-estimate the propensity score on participants and 
matched non-participants, and then compare the Pseudo    before and after matching. 
The indicator shows how well the covariates X explain the participation probability. A 
low Pseudo   value indicates that there should be no significant differences between 
the control and treatment groups after matching. One can also use a joint F test for the 
equality of means in all the covariates between two groups. Based on the F test, the 
null of joint equality of means in the matched sample is expected to be rejected.  
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(d) Sensitivity analysis 
PSM estimators are based on the CIA assumption that selection is based on the 
observables characteristics. However, if there are unobserved variables that relate to 
assignment into treatment and the outcome variable, then a ‘selection on unobservable’ 
or `hidden bias' may arise. Rosenbaum (2002) and DiPrete and Gangl (2004) 
suggested the use of the bounding approach, which is one of the most widely 
employed methods to address this problem. The Rosenbaum bound (RB) method is a 
sensitivity analysis that can assess the inference of how the treatment effects may be 
challenged by unobserved heterogeneity. However, it can only determine the strength 
of the influence of the potential unmeasured variable on the selection process and it 
cannot indicate if there is unobserved heterogeneity in the data and neither can it 
estimate the magnitude of the selection bias. Alternatively, Peel and Makepeace (2013) 
formulate a Heckit (Heckman correction) treatment effect version of the RB model 
and proposed a statistical test for the CIA of no hidden bias for PSM matched 
treatment estimates. They argue that the Heckit model can test and control for 
unobserved bias which may override the RB technique.
14
 
The RB is designed so that the participation probability       is not only determined 
by observed factors    for each participant i but also by an unobservable 
component   . It follows that: 
                             (2.27) 
Where  is the effect of   on the participation decision. If there is no hidden bias, then 
                                                             
14 None of the econometrics software packages are able to apply this method; therefore, I will still use RB to 
access the sensitivity of unobserved selection bias.  
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  will be zero and the       will be only determined by    .However, if there is a 
hidden bias, then the two participants with the same observed covariates   have 
different chances of receiving treatment. For a matched pair i and j, either   
0 (unobserved variables have no influence on the probability) or       (no 
differences in unobserved variables), the odds ratio can only be 1 and      
 
  
 
 .15 Therefore,   is a measurement of the degree of departure from a situation where 
the hidden bias is free. The unobserved covariate would increase the odds of selection 
into treatments I increase the   value. Rosenbaum (2002) proposes test statistics that 
derives bounds on the confidence intervals for matched ATT estimates as   varies and 
define the critical value of    at which the ATT is statistically insignificant. When this 
is conducted in STATA, I will increase the   value until it appears statistically 
significant when ATTs are estimated 
 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 1958 NCDS data 
The availability of birth cohort data in Britain presents an ideal basis for examining 
the issues that are involved in estimating the returns to education. The data used in 
this paper came from the British NCDS, which is a continuing panel survey of all 
individuals born in Britain between the week of 3 and 9 of March 1958. There are 
currently eight follow-up surveys available, up to 2008. Information is gathered about 
                                                             
15 Rosenbaum (2002) defines the odds ratio =
            
            
, and be bounded by 
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these cohort members and their immediate families at ages 7, 11, 16, 33, 42 and 50 
(shown as in Table 2.2). This data has been used extensively in the analysis of 
economic, education, family, health and social outcomes.  
One of the main advantages of using the NCDS is that it allows us to account for the 
full information on the cohorts’ contemporaneous characteristics, such as early 
cognitive ability, early parental information, educational attainment and subsequent. 
For educational attainment, it contains detailed information on the HE qualifications 
achieved by each individual up to 2000, and can be used to identify the type of 
qualification obtained and the information from the 1978 school exams file in the 
NCDS on school qualifications. I updated the main surveys that I use to include the 
surveys that were undertaken from 1965 to 2008, in which the individuals were aged 
50 years.  
 
2.4.2 Attainment in HE and sample analysis 
Initial educational attainments are usually considered to have a strong positive impact 
on wage earnings. There is some mixed evidence with regard to impact of 
qualification attainments. For example, Dearden et al. (2002) states the wage 
premium for different qualifications did not vary associated with the personal ability 
of individuals for academic qualifications. Nonetheless, vocational acquisition could 
be of critical importance for the less able individual, who may still be able to receive 
their highest return. Jenkins et al. (2002) based on NCDS data argues that lifelong 
learning, such as the acquisition of academic or vocational qualifications, at a later 
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age was not overall found to lead to measurable increases in hourly wages. However, 
certain evidence demonstrates that the economic benefits from lifelong learning were 
only found in terms of improving employment outcomes rather than wage outcomes. 
For example, the acquisition of vocational qualifications in age 42 was most likely 
associated with a higher probability of re-entering or remaining in the labour market. 
In this paper, in order to avoid considerable heterogeneity in the value of educational 
qualifications, the education attainment was defined in terms of the highest academic 
qualifications obtained by the age of 33 in Sweep 5. 
To define educational attainment, I began by considering the returns to HE versus no 
HE, which in the UK context is the return from undertaking some form of university 
level or equivalent. The NCDS data set contains detailed information on the highest 
academic qualifications achieved by each individual. Here, I assume that individuals 
stop having further education in 1991 at the age of 33. To focus on the sequential 
nature of educational qualifications, I separate the qualifications variable into: 
individuals who dropped out of school with no qualifications; those who stopped in 
education after completing O-levels or equivalent; those who stopped after 
completing A-levels or equivalent; and, those who completed O-levels, A-levels, and 
HE.  
A summary of the statistics is presented in Table 2.3. The overall sample includes 
11,405 individuals with different educational qualifications. Among the sub-samples, 
there are 1,131 individuals who have a HE qualification (including diploma, degree, 
and higher degree) and 1,369 individuals who obtained at least one A-level but who 
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did not continue into HE. There are 4,336 individuals who completed with good 
O-levels and 4,491 individuals without any qualifications (including no qualifications, 
bad O-levels, and CSE GRADES 2-5).  
 
The proportions of an individual’s highest academic qualification by age 33 are 
presented in Table 2.4. From this table it can be seen that about 9.8% of men in the 
1958 cohort with A-levels go on to get some kind of HE qualification by the age of 23. 
The proportion of women obtained HE qualification (10.1%) is somewhat higher than 
that of men. Nearly 12% of individuals obtained A-levels as their highest qualification, 
of whom 13.3% are men and 11.7% are women. Most of the individuals stop gaining 
qualifications at O-levels and below. Over 35% of the men obtained O-levels as their 
highest academic qualification, and that figure is nearly 41% for woman. The 
proportion of men with no qualifications is slightly higher than that of women (42% 
and 33%, respectively). Furthermore, I also focused on the limited number of 
respondents who have participated in all of the follow-up surveys from 1991 to 2008 
(i.e. reported their wage). This is done since one of the important contributions of this 
paper is to consider the returns by gender and to compare the impacts of education on 
the earnings to men and women over a lifetime. As shown from Table 3.4, the overall 
sample reduced by 56% to 5,003 observations. The proportion of each educational 
group is somewhat similar to the full sample reported in Table 3.3.  
Since the highest academic qualifications are disaggregated by various educational 
56 
 
groups, I would therefore consider six different matching pair groups
16
 thereafter 
based on groups in Table 2.4.  
2.4.3 Variable selection 
In terms of choosing the covariates in matching specifications so as to calculate the 
PS, we first need to classify several variables. There are four types of variables shown 
in Figure 2.0: treatment variables, outcome variables, confounding variables, and 
mediators. Confounding variables are those extraneous variables that can explain 
variations both in treatment and outcomes variables but themselves are not inversely 
caused by treatments or outcomes. Hence, only confounding variables should be 
included in the estimation of the propensity score. This is illustrated by the arrows 
direction in Figure 2.0. 
 
Figure 2.0 Selection of Potential Confounding Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As reviewed previously, Blundell et al. (2000) include a richer set of controls (F91, 
                                                             
16 (1) HE vs A-level (2) HE vs O-level (3) HE vs No qualification (4) A-level vs O-level  
(5) A-level vs No qualification (6) O-level vs No qualification. The former one is the treated group and the later 
one is the control group.  
 
Treatment Variables 
 
Mediator Variables 
 
Outcomes Variables 
 
Confounding Variables 
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specification 3) to control for possible biases when estimating the effect of HE on 
hourly earnings outcomes.
17
 On the other hand, Blundell et al. (2005) include most of 
the variables already included in Blundell et al. (2000), apart from employer 
characteristics. They argue that employers’ characteristics may be endogenous in the 
sense of being choice variables for the individual and were jointly determined with 
wages, and will also be affected by educational qualifications. Theoretically, all of the 
control variables need to be attributes that are unaffected by the treatment itself. In 
other words, variables that are thought to influence both the educational decision of 
interest and wage outcomes should ideally be included as regressors. Hence, the 
choice of specification in this paper was dictated to analogy with the one used in the 
analysis of Blundell et al. (2005):  
 
 
Box 1 Covariates used in the Matching Specification  
1. Personal characteristics variables: Region of residence at birth, ethnicity, gender 
2. School variables: Type of secondary school.  
3. Early personal ability variables: Mathematics score, reading score accessed at age 
7 and 11.  
4. Family background variables: Father’s year of education and father’s social class, 
mother’s year of education, mother’s employment status number of siblings, 
                                                             
17 These are: ethnicity, region, standard family background information, family finance status, test 
score measures at both 7 and 11, school type and parents’ years of education, and when the 
participant was 16’ father’s social class, mother’s employment status and the number of siblings. 
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parents’ interest in participant’s education, all at age 16, and family finance status 
at age 11 and at age 16.  
The wages are collected from sweep 5 when participants were at the aged of 33, 
sweep 6 at the age of 42, and sweep 8 at the age of 50, and are computed on an hourly 
basis. I only select individuals who are full-time employed. Participants who work as 
part-time, self-employed, or in full-time education would be eliminated from the 
sample, I therefore restrict the sample to full-time workers that are defined as working 
for more than 30 hours per week. Since the survey allows people to choose to report 
the frequency of their earnings, when the frequency is different from hourly, I then 
compute wages using the information on the number of weeks worked during the year 
and the usual number of hours worked in a week. Additionally, in order to minimise 
measurement error, those individual who did not present exam files in the 1978 exam 
survey will also be dropped out of the sample.   
Table 2.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample and it also presents 
standardised percentage differences, which are defined as the mean difference 
between treatment and control groups as a percentage of the standard deviation. 
Reading and mathematics scores are measured by quintile. Father’s social class and 
parents’ interest of education are measured by interval. All of the control variables are 
generated as dummy variables as the regression. In addition, variables with missing 
values are kept in the data set and also generate as dummy variables that include in 
the specification. 
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2.5 Empirical result 
In this section, I will report the results of the estimates and corresponding statistical 
testing. Using the different ages as reference points, the premium that is afforded to 
graduates with HE relative to non-HE has been estimated. The results that are 
presented in Tables 2.7 are disaggregated by various educational groups (shown in 
Table 2.11). Several points should be mentioned in advance. Firstly, the full sample 
size for both genders is not always equal to the total of the male and female samples 
because pooling the samples leads to some very different matches to those in the 
separate samples. Secondly, I did not calculate the bootstrap estimator for NN 
matching since the bootstrap estimator standard error is invalid for matching. Instead, 
I apply the teffects psmatch command that is newly updated in STATA 13.
18
 STATA 
User’s Guide Release 13 (2013) states that teffects has one very important advantage 
over psmatch2: it takes into account the fact that propensity scores are estimated 
rather than known when calculating standard errors.  
 
2.5.1 Propensity score and common support  
Concerning the estimation precision, if treated and untreated units are significantly 
different in pre-treatment characteristics, then it may be necessary to conclude that the 
result lacks accuracy. As discussed in Section 4, in order to examine the magnitude of 
the differences between pre-treatment characteristics, I will access the region of 
                                                             
18
 I still use psmatch2 for calculating kernel matching estimator, since teffects is only valid for NN or NN with 
caliper.  
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common support and propensity score distribution. The common support assumption 
requires the existence of a substantial overlap region between the propensity scores of 
treated and control individuals. If the assumption does not hold, then it is impossible 
to construct a counterfactual to estimate the impact of participate the high education. 
Several ways to do this are suggested in the literature, where the most straightforward 
is a visual analysis of the density distribution of the propensity score in both groups 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
A visual analysis of the density distributions of estimated propensity scores on 
common support is given in Figure 2.3. Propensity scores for the both full sample and 
gender sub-groups of age 33 are reported in the first quadrant, the second and third 
quadrants are for the age 42 and 50, respectively. For each quadrant, the top histogram 
reports the propensity score distribution for participants with HE attainment, while the 
bottom histogram represents those with non-HE. The horizontal axis defines the 
intervals of the estimated propensity score and the height of each bar on the vertical 
axis indicates the fraction of the relevant sample with scores in the corresponding 
interval. Problems would arise if the distributions did not overlap. I also imposed the 
common support using the minima and maxima comparison, which ensures common 
support by dropping treated observations whose propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the untreated units. Table 
2.7 reports the number of observations dropped in each group and the propensity 
score regions after the common support imposition 
Figure 2.3 shows that for group 1 both the treated and control individuals span the full 
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range of propensity scores, while the degree of overlap on the estimated propensity 
score between the treated and untreated individuals is fairly high throughout most of 
the range of propensity scores. Only a very small fraction of the total sample have 
dropped out. For group 2, 4 and 6, as seen from the figures, there is a fairly acceptable 
overlap throughout most of the range of propensity scores, despite a small fraction of 
the total sample being thrown away. However, a problem arises in group 3 and 5, 
Figure 2.3 also shows that the PS for most of treated units is approaching 100% 
whereas that control units are most likely close to 0% and, therefore, both groups 
rarely overlapped throughout the horizontal axis. Since the treated and control units 
are almost not used as matches, large numbers of the off-support unit appear to drop 
out within the range of propensity scores.  
 
2.5.2 Return to HE  
The difference between the matching algorithms is insignificant. The estimated ATT 
from NN matching with replacement is very similar to the one from kernel matching, 
and both methods make use of more information by including more observations 
when produce matching. However, it is inclusive to say if one is overriding the other. 
There is, however, a trade-off between the lower variations, on the one hand, and 
biased estimates, on the other, if many observations are used several times. Although I 
am not able to conclude that one estimate is more correct than the other, I prefer to 
present the results obtained using one to one NN with replacement.   
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(i) Evidence at age 33 
Table 2.7 shows the impact of HE on individual earnings as compared to the base of 
obtaining various qualifications at the age of 33. I start by examining the magnitude 
of returns to HE over A-level attainment. The estimated ATT to a first degree is 16.61% 
on average when they are aged 33. In particular, having a degree seems to be a bigger 
advantage to females in the workplace than it is to males. Returns for females with 
HE are 23.28%% as much as those with at least one A-level. In comparison, male 
graduates earned just fewer than 13.82% extra. The evidence that the return gaps are 
more substantial for females than males is consistent with most of the literature 
reported in Section 2. However, the result from matching is lower than that from the 
analysis of Blundell et al. (2000) (17% for males and 37% for females, respectively) 
and of Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2003) (15% for males), both are based on the 
NCDS data. This finding is encouraging given the results reported by Blundell et al. 
(2005) and Massimiliano et al. (2005), who both find that the PSM estimated ATT 
coefficient is lower than that computed using OLS. Moreover, in Blundell et al. 
(2000), when controlling late personal ability (F91, specification 4), such as A-level 
scores and ability tests at age 16 to reduce the heterogeneous return, the returns to first 
degrees are reduced from 17.1% to 12.2% but are still statistically significant, which 
is much closer to my findings. Apart from the main differences that are explained in 
Section 2, the equation specification used in this paper is slightly changed compared 
with that used in Blundell et al. (2000), which excluded variables such as school 
attendance, employer characteristics. Secondly, my estimated sample is restricted in 
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the common support area; hence, the sample size is different from that of in Blundell 
et al.’s (2000) study (1097 in this study and 1252 in Blundell et al. (2002)). This is 
has forced me to trim the sample to only comparable individuals among treated and 
non-treated groups. Massimiliano et al. (2005) shows that the OLS estimates in the 
common support region are very similar to that computed using PSM.  
Not surprisingly, there is a substantial premium for people with HE over the other 
qualifications. Among the other sub-samples, when compared with people leaving 
school with no qualifications, the results show an approximately 12.6% incremental 
return from individual obtaining O-levels, a 33.3% incremental return from individual 
obtaining at least one A-levels, and a 49.8% premia for those achieving HE. Similarly, 
compared with people obtaining O-levels, the average return of a first degree is 
around 35.2% and people moving from O-levels to A-levels enjoyed a 20.2% return.  
In particular, the results also show that, for different comparisons of educational 
groups, women usually gain more in wages than men, while the return gap between 
males and females varies among educational groups. For model 3, there is a huge 
wage gap (almost 20%) between genders, with 39.74% for males and 58.06% for 
females, respectively. Compared with those who obtained O-levels to those with HE 
attainment in model 2, the gap of return on wages between genders is about 15% 
(25.05 % for males, 39.76% for females). For model 5, returns to males are significant 
lower than those of females, reported as 30.11% and 40.06%, respectively. When 
individuals move from O-levels to A-levels in model 4, the females (24.58%) enjoy a 
10% marginal return than males (15.33%). Moreover, for model 6, the wage gap is not 
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significant (12.99% for males and 12.19% for females).  
 
(ii) Evidence at age 42  
In Table 2.7 it summarises the estimated return to HE attainments for men and women 
at age 42 and 50, separately. I base my analysis on the specification from the previous 
section and only replace the outcome variable to natural logarithm of hourly wage at 
age of 42 and 50. There are significant incremental returns to most academic 
qualifications and these average returns tend to gradually increase somewhat over 
years in contrast to average return age 33. On average, university graduates enjoy a 
return of 24.92% (age 42) and of 28.21% (age 50) compared with leaving school with 
at least one A-level. The return to A-levels over O-levels is 25.92% and the return to 
HE over O-levels is 44.61% for age 42 and 29.05% and 50.09% for age 50, 
respectively. With respect to the population of interest relative to a control group of 
individuals with no qualifications, the estimated ATT to a first degree is 58.59% when 
they are aged 42, and 65.26% when they are aged 50 on average; while return to one 
A-level is 40.35% and 45.61% and the return to O-level is 15.86% and 17.14% with 
respect to different ages. 
As might be expected, females with HE attainments usually enjoy higher returns than 
males. At age 42, male degree graduates have a 17.33% return over people with 
A-level whereas return for females nearly doubles the figure to 31.10%. From age 33 
to 42, the magnitude of the return gap increased to 13% from 9%. A 4% margin for 
males over 10 years is reported, while the magnitude of increasing is nearly 8% for 
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females. When the caparison group turns to O-level, there is also a significant gap 
between genders of 11%: with 38.98% for males and 49.64% for females. The wage 
gap is relatively constant over the years. Furthermore, an increasing return gap (from 
20% to 24%) is seen when compared with people with non-qualifications. Males 
enjoy a return of 50.64% and females have a return of 74.86%.  
Nonetheless, the result is dramatically changed at age 42 when I focus on the lower 
quartile educational groups (model 4, 5 and 6). Comparing individuals A-levels over 
with individuals who attainted no qualifications, males (42.71%) enjoy a 6% marginal 
return than females (38.14%). When individuals move from O-levels to A-levels, 
returns to males are slightly lower than that to females with a 2% margin, reported as 
24.79 % and 26.48%, respectively. When comparing O-levels versus no qualifications, 
the wage gap is not significantly changed over 10 years (16.25% for males and 15.32% 
for females). 
 
(iii) Evidence at age 50 
At age 50 the largest premia appears when comparing people with HE degrees and 
A-levels. Male degree graduates have a 22.44% return over people with A-level 
whereas return for females doubles the figure to 35.35%, indicating a significant 13% 
gap between genders. The magnitude of gap from age 42 to 50 is almost identical to 
that from age 33 to 42. When an individual moves from O-levels to HE degree, the 
return gap between genders is around 11% between genders: 47.51% for males and 
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57.95% for females, respectively. In general, it appears to be continuously decreasing 
in model 2 (14% at age 33, 12% at age 42 and 11% at age 50). When comparing 
individuals with non-qualifications versus first degree graduates, the result shows a 
return gap of 21% between genders (59.01% for males and 80.14% for females).  
Among non-HE comparisons, the return gap for individual with O-levels versus 
A-levels is not significant at age 50: reported as 1%. Comparing individuals with 
non-qualifications versus A-levels, males enjoy a return of 42.71% while females 
enjoy a return of 38.14%, which indicates the gap (4%) narrowed in contrast to that 
reported for age 42. Finally, comparing individuals with non-qualifications versus 
O-levels, the returns are 17.14% and 16.98%, respectively.  
 
(iv) Analysis  
From the previous analysis, the findings from the separate matching equations based 
on ages suggest that a rise in wage is associated not only with the unit of education 
but also, apparently, with ages. The results reveal that females appear to experience a 
marginally higher return to HE than males. Even more striking is that return gaps 
between genders increase as age increases over 30 years. This is in the line with the 
findings of Makepeace et al. (2004), which only focuses on cohorts aged between 33 
and 42 in the 1990s. They explain that the widening gap occurred because as the 1958 
cohort grew older in the 1990s they experienced growing levels of unequal treatment. 
In addition, although females with HE obtained a higher pay premia than males, pay 
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discrimination still exits. For example, women with a first degree only earn 82% of 
the wages of men with first degrees.  
The increase in the gender wage gap among HE attainments seems to reflect a 
tendency for lower educated women to gain lower wage growth than men, particularly 
in their late thirties. For example, in the non-HE comparison groups, by looking at the 
A-levels and no qualifications comparison group between the ages of 33 and 42, the 
result shows strong evidence of a visible downward trend in the return gaps for 
women over men: a statistically significant drop in nearly 20 % points (from 15% to 
-5%); by looking at A-levels and O-levels comparison group, the drop is also 
calculated as 8%. A similar pattern is repeated from age 42 to 50, although the gap 
narrows compared at age 42 (8% and 1%, respectively). The profile of a return gap 
between genders for the bottom comparison group (O-levels versus no qualifications) 
is also investigated, which is relatively flat over years and the differences are 
statistically insignificant between males and females.  
It must be borne in mind when I compare the differences of earning returns at 
different ages that individuals who attended the interview at the age of 33 may not 
have attended the other two interviews at ages 42 and 50. The details of the new 
interviewees came into the dataset at different ages. In other words, the results of ATT 
for different age groups were taken by different samples but not from the same group 
of people. Errors may exist when I compare the changes of returns in a longer term 
over the lifetime, as well as by gender. Ascertaining the potential longer term returns 
to HE for individuals, who will be most affected by the labour market changes that 
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have taken place, is important from a policy perspective. The robustness of the results 
needs to be carefully considered. Results are even more important when establishing 
within the lifetime of a single cohort. I will then focus on the subset of participants 
who take part in the three follow-up surveys.  
Moreover, it is also noted that the standard errors arising from model 3 and 5 are 
dramatically large in three cases. The results also need to be carefully considered, 
because the pre-treatment characteristics of two comparison groups are radically 
different. As seen above, a large amount of treated and control units are dropped out 
of the common support region since combinations of characteristics cannot be 
matched between two comparison groups, and it is therefore not possible to construct 
a counterfactual to generate an accurately estimation. I will continue to this issue in 
the following testing section. 
 
2.5.3 Balance test 
Diagnosing the quality of the matches obtained from a matching method is of primary 
importance. I apply the tests in STATA based on pstest syntax written and updated by 
Leuven and Sianesi (2012), which examines the application of matching algorithms, 
including: the two sample t-tests and the SB test to the individual covariate, and 
pseudo    and likelihood ratio test to the joint equality of covariates 
For example, I will first discuss the results of the balance test for each individual 
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covariate dummy of the full sample at age 33 for group 1,
19
 as illustrated in Table 
2.12. Column 2 and 3 shows the P-value of two sample t statistics for the difference in 
the means of all variables before and after the NN matching. Column 4 and 5 presents 
the standardised difference bias between treated and control individuals before and 
after the matching. The result in column 5 indicates the reduction in SB that occurs 
after the matching. 
Before the matching, the numbers of covariates are imbalanced due to a relative low 
P-value below 0.05, indicating that there are statistically significant differences 
between covariate means with HE and with A-levels individuals. Most of these 
imbalanced variables are shown as personal ability dummies, such as math score. 
Others are shown as fairly well balanced based on obtaining a larger P-value. As seen 
from the table, column 3 demonstrates the improvement in balance relative to column 
2, and the differences between these covariates are not statistically significant when 
the P-value is less than 0.05. Therefore, it is found that the null hypothesis is rejected, 
which states that the matching is well balanced and most of the differences in 
covariate means between the two groups in the matched sample have been eliminated. 
Alternatively, the absolute value of SB result turns out the overall bias before 
matching lies between 0.7% and 41.5%. When the variation in the two groups is taken 
into consideration, the personal ability of the single dummies are mostly biased, 
normally around 20%. Once again, the after matching results clearly indicate that it is 
able to approach a state of balance in the treated and the matched comparison groups. 
                                                             
19
 I do not list all of the results for age 33 42 and 50 due to space considerations; however, I will conclude whether 
or not each group passes the balance test.  
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For most of the variables, the bias is generally decreased around 50% after matching. 
However, the null is only not rejected if all of the covariates are well balanced after 
matching. As long as any one variable is imbalanced, the balance property will be 
rejected.  
To test the joint equality of covariates, I also calculated the pseudo-R2 and the 
likelihood Ratio (LR) before and after matching (I do not present the whole table due 
to space consideration). Theoretically, after the matching, there should be no 
systematic differences in the distribution of covariates between treated and control 
groups, the pseudo    should be lower, and the LR ratio is therefore statistically 
insignificant at a 5% critical level.  
Table 2.8 summarises the balance test results after matching for both genders at 
different ages and all types of balance tests keep the null at the 5% level. P (pass the 
test) or F (failed to pass) in the table is based upon the different test results in detail 
disaggregated and is presented in the appendix. Of the six groups examined in three 
tests, it appears that all of the significant covariate differences disappear after 
matching in group 1 (for both genders) for all ages since none of the three tests 
suggested that the balancing property fails. Nevertheless, for all ages in comparison 
group 3 and 5, it failed to pass all three tests when using NN matching estimator 
because it detects large numbers of imbalances that are not eliminated by the 
matching algorithm. 
For ages 33 and 42 in group 2 and 6, even though the balancing property still holds 
based on the results of pseudo    and LR test, the rejection frequencies of the after 
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matching test are still higher among the individual covariates in the two sample t-tests. 
This consequently results in a failure in passing the t-test. Although the females at age 
50 in comparison group 2 hold the balance property when using NN matching, the 
overall performance is still far from being acceptable. It should also be noted that 
kernel matching performs than better NN matching based on the test result. This is 
more satisfactory in group 2 for both genders and in group 4 for females. Again, apart 
from group 3 in all ages, kernel matching yields a better balance based on the LR test.  
To sum up, it seems that the t-test and SB reject the null much too often whereas the 
LR test is fairly conservative for both genders. It appears that the t-test and SB test are 
too rigid since as long as I specified any one of full covariates, the null is still found to 
be rejected. Even if it would have succeeded to move the imbalance, an approach such 
as dropping covariates to obtain balance will result in a departure from the original 
CIA condition.  
 
2.5.4 Sensitivity analysis 
Table 2.9 shows the RB test results. Column 2 presents the   value. Under the 
assumption of no hidden bias caused by unobserved variables (  = 1), ATT is 
significant (P-value = 0). Assuming that the omitted covariates may result in larger 
differences existing in odds ratio between HE and non-HE groups, the   will then 
increase and the test statistic from column 3 to 8 for unobserved selection bias 
consequently largely increases. The bold cells in the table indicate that a statistically 
insignificant ATT appears as    increases. If P-value becomes greater than 0.05 
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as       , the individuals between two groups with the same covariates differ in 
their odds of participation by a factor of 25%.  
Among different ages, in group 1 and 2 for both genders, the ATT is statistically 
significant at 5% level even if I increase   up to 100% points (   ). This means that 
the three matching estimates seem to be robust to an unobserved selection bias in a 
relatively high degree. For the rest of the groups, three matching estimators perform 
relatively differently. For the NN matching estimator, it is prudent that the results for 
males in group 4 and for females in group 6 are fairly sensitive to an unobserved 
selection bias. In most cases, it takes a relatively low value of unobserved selection 
(   increases 25% to 1.25) to change a statistically significant ATT into a statistical 
insignificance. On the other hand, males in group 6 and females in group 4 are not 
largely affected by the unobserved bias, while the ATT are relatively significant 
as   changes. It would take much higher values of    , of up to 75%, to change an 
insignificant effect into a significant effect. However, among these groups, the result 
proves that a vast majority of the kernel matching ATT estimates are statistically 
significant for both genders as     changes. In most cases for both genders, the 
estimated treatment effect is significant at a 5% level until    increases up to 100 % 
points. It is not surprising that matching estimators in group 5 gives the worst 
scenarios, which shows that the ATT effect is completely insignificant, even 
when   equals to one. The lower bond P values are all insignificant for different value 
of    , which suggests that the ATT estimates are most likely downwardly biased.  
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2.5.5 Return of HE over lifetime 
To investigate the impact of education on earnings over a lifetime, from the original 
full sample I will consider the subset of full-time employed individuals observed in all 
three follow-up surveys until the age of 50. These participants can be thought of as 
having been employed continuously over nearly 20 years. The previous analysis 
suggests that models 3 and 5 are badly performed in terms of balance property and 
sensitivity assessment, and the estimation precision is also under criticism. Therefore, 
I will exclude these two models for accessing the lifetime return in this section. The 
result presented in Table 2.10 is relatively similar to that concluded in Section 2.5.2. 
This suggests that the theory that there has been an increase in earnings over time for 
individuals who attained a HE qualification is highly robust.  
The magnitude of increase for lifetime returns at different age levels and current time 
return at certain age vary across time. Return to males with HE against A-levels is 
slightly higher than the result from the current time return whereas returns to female 
are lower than that from current time analysis. Although it is not significant enough, 
there is still a gender effect. Comparing outcomes from age 33 and 42 would suggest 
that the gender premium for females has increased by 1 %, while comparing outcomes 
from age 42 and 50 would suggest that the average return has even decreased by 
0.6 %.  
Incremental returns between females with HE and without HE are not relatively large 
compared to that reported in Section 2.5.2. The reason why females without HE are 
lower paid is probably due to the numbers of females who re-enter into labour market 
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in their late thirties or early forties. Females without HE attainment are more likely to 
suffer from an interruption to employment for maternity and motherhood in their 
thirties.
20
 When they return to the labour market, they can hardly be paid relatively a 
fair and high due to their lack of working experience and they have fewer 
opportunities for promotion. However, if females who did not work as full 
employment from age 33 to 50 are excluded from the sample, then one can eliminate 
this impact and thus the gender gap narrows. Therefore, improvements in females’ 
human capital seem to be a factor in reducing the pay differentials between genders 
over time.  
The results for models 2, 3 and 4 shown in Table 2.10 are fairly consistent with the 
previous findings. Model 4 is likely to reflect a tendency for males with A-levels to 
experience more wage growth, increasing from 19.29% at age 33 (3
rd
 column) to 
28.62% at age 42 (5
th
 column), and to 34.64% (7
th
 column) at age 50, while females 
seem to obtain fewer pay rises and promotions, only increasing from 23.87% (4
th
 
column) at age 33 to 28.62% (6
th
 column) at age 42 and to 33.86 % (8
th
 column) at 
age 50. For model 6, the gender gap is also insignificant and returns for both genders 
are gradually increasing among ages.  
  
                                                             
20 “The careers of low-educated women were limited by being married, having children who were under the age 
of 16, or suffering from chronic diseases. Their family duties reduced their labour market participation and 
likelihood of working full-time.” Cited from: MRC National Survey of Health and Development, 1970 British 
Cohort Study, 1958 National Child Development Study 
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2.6 Summarising remarks, policy implications and conclusions 
This chapter looks at the effect that HE has on wages by comparing a group of British 
men and women born in March 1958 and who undertook some form of HE prior to 
1991. In order to tackle the issue of exogeneity of educational attainment, instead of 
applying OLS as used in most of the literature, I will use the PSM method for the 
estimation of the causal effects of education on earnings on current time and over the 
lifecycle for both genders. The PSM attempts to replicate a randomised experiment as 
closely as possible by obtaining treated and control groups with similar covariate 
distributions to minimise the selection bias in observational studies. As a researcher 
attempting to use PSM, one of the main issues that needs to be considered is that the 
sufficient pre-treatment covariates need to be include so that the CIA is fulfilled. The 
NCDS 1958 British birth cohort study contains extensive and commonly administered 
ability tests at early ages, as well as accurately measured family background and 
school type variables, which are all ideal for methods relying on the assumption of 
CIA. 
A number of important implications are derived from the preceding analysis. In 
general, HE has a substantial impact on earnings at different age levels. The return 
rises with the greater disparity of the educational groups. For example, the results 
showed that the estimated average returns to obtaining HE over A-levels are around 
16% for age 33, 24% for age 42 and 28% for age 50. For examination of the causal 
impact of other disaggregated qualifications, this finding is somewhat in line with the 
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findings of Blundell et al. (2005). It reports an average incremental return for males to 
O-levels of around 18%, to A-levels of 24%, and to HE of 48%, compared to leaving 
school without qualifications at age 33. My result is qualitatively lower than previous 
findings, reported as 14 %, 20%, and 40%, respectively. The difference probably 
arises because the education attainment observed in their study is the actual highest 
qualification and vocational equivalent achieved. However, in this study, I will only 
select the individual’s highest academic qualification in the sample.  
I have also attempted to investigate various subsidiary issues concerning the impact of 
HE on both genders and produced some findings. In particular, I find that the gender 
gap was higher at various levels of HE attainment than it was with non-HE attainment 
individuals, such as A-levels. HE normally has a greater impact on earnings for 
females than males, and the gender gap remains significantly constant throughout the 
period considered from 1991 to 2008; whereas, for non-HE groups, the gender gap is 
relatively insignificant.  
Another key contribution is that the application has also highlighted the importance of 
estimating return within the lifetime of a single cohort. In terms of educational 
outcomes, incremental returns to all HE qualifications have gradually increased over 
the years. This confirms that HE has not only a significant and robust educational 
effect but it also has a cohort effect on earnings over the lifecycle. The gender gap still 
remains but figures are slightly lower than that from current time analysis. This 
implies that HE attainment in females in their early thirties has the advantage that 
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cohorts have potentially been in the labour market long enough after graduation for 
their full returns to be measured. Non-HE females are more likely than men to suffer 
low labour market participation rate, possibly due to maternity duty or taking care of 
children and other dependants in their late thirties, and this may lead to attempts to 
renter the workforce in their forties. This ‘women returning’ effect will cause a gap 
since the average return for low-educated females will be under-estimated in current 
time analysis.  
In so far as education is treated as a human capital investment rather than a 
consumption decision. The extent to which education raises earnings is only the 
private financial return to education, hence information on returns to different degree 
programmes can make an important contribution to the educational decisions of future 
students. The result shows the private financial rate of return to HE in the UK is 
substantially high than that to non-HE. This implies that individuals would still be 
willing to invest in their own higher education, even if the government continuously 
cut subsidies and they are hence required to pay a greater cost.  
It has shown that UK government invests heavily in higher education, thereby 
shouldering an enormous burden. A continuing policy concern is whether subsides 
should be decreased and whether one form of subsidy should be favoured over 
another for any particular student. This argument was indeed used in the late 1990s to 
shift some of the burden of the costs of HE on to individuals via the introduction of 
tuition fees. Starting in 1998, a series of higher education reforms have aimed, first of 
all to shift a greater proportion of the cost of undergraduate teaching from tax-payers 
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to graduates, secondly to increase competitive pressure in the higher education sector 
to raise standards and efficiency, and to ensure that the system remains accessible to 
all qualified students regardless of ability to pay. In fact, according to Chowdry et al. 
(2012), up to 2012, the estimated total saving to the taxpayer of the reforms was 
around £760m. While that is a substantial amount of money, this represents just a 12% 
taxpayer saving on the previous system. 
However someone argue for equity justification for subsidies and other arguments are 
to support maintaining or even increasing government subsidies. One holds that 
benefits from such economics ‘externalities’ arises due to a large pool of HE 
graduates to make the possibility of more advanced and efficient production 
techniques which in turn improves economy and processes innovation.  
One of the policy implications can be drawn that a persistent high private financial 
return to HE allows a certain level of market failure: higher return should encourage 
more individuals to complete HE and hence compete for jobs. Job competition then 
would bring down the financial return to HE comparable to other alternative 
investments. In such case, public subsidies are justified to be called to encourage 
overcoming the barriers to HE that attributed to market failure and without financial 
incentives.  Psacharopoulos (2007) point out public subsidies for HE can be reduced 
while investment in higher education would still remain privately advantageous. On 
the other hand, the subsidies are justified only if such value added externalities 
exceeds the subsidies expenses. In practice, equity would be only served if students 
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unable to finance the costs were provided access to a student loan
21
 that would be 
repaid out of earnings after study.  
In addition to the policy-relevant suggestion, the evidence that relatively lower 
incremental financial returns to a given type of low qualification (individual with no 
qualifications or with O-levels) means that individuals do not expect a significant 
wage return to acquiring them. This might suggest that the academic knowledges and 
skills acquired from such level of qualification are not tailored to the requirements of 
firms and the labour market. However, this should not be taken to suggest that the 
overall rationale for investments in basic and compulsory education should be 
weakened. There are two reasons for this. First of all, in particular, these 
qualifications are often viewed as a way to certify existing academic knowledge and 
skills, rather than as equipping individuals with new skills and hence increased 
productivity, and it could be a necessary input into further levels of education which 
may have higher economic returns. Secondly, basic and compulsory education is 
valued not only for its economic benefits but also for its non-financial benefits 
including reductions in fertility and mortality, empowerment, better environment, 
lower crime, democratic participation, etc.  
Several limitations have been observed in this study. First, this study can only support 
the lifetime results for this special group of people who were born in the 1950s, it may 
not reflect the situation that followed. The climate in which today's school leavers 
have to make these decisions is dramatically different. For example, the maintenance 
                                                             
21 Such student loan schemes are discussed in-depth in Barr (2012)  
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grant provision has been removed. Since the late-1980s, around one in three young 
people now go into full-time HE in the UK, compared with one in eight in 1979. This 
means that there are now many more highly-educated workers entering the labour 
force every year than when the 1958 NCDS cohort went out to work out to work for 
the first time. Furthermore, UK education policy has experienced a steady shift in the 
burden of funding HE away from the government towards the students and their 
families. Since 2006, a regulated maximum university tuition fee has been paid by all 
full-time UK university students. It is, therefore, important to examine the magnitude 
of returns to HE and the extent to which they have changed over the generations in 
order to examine the effect of the government’s policy of HE. Research has recently 
been applied on cross-sectional data (e.g. O’Leary and Sloane, 2011), but there are 
still no lifetime results. There are also few cohort data, the most recently available is 
BCS70. It is of particular interest to address the question of how lifetime returns to 
HE vary for younger cohort generations. One might wait until BSC70 data has been 
updated when the cohorts are in their fifties.  
Second, neither NN nor the kernel matching estimator match on covariates, such as 
early ability scores and family background variables, perform well for calculating the 
ATT in model 3 and 5 due to failures of balance and RB test. Therefore, the estimated 
results might not be robust, and will be less precise and of limited use. Third, 
variation in returns by class of degree or subject of degree is not considered in this 
chapter and a narrow focus on the average return may be inadequate. Further research 
should also employ the combined use of PSM and difference-in-differences analyses 
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(Blundell and Costa, 2000) to examine ATT of different subject and class levels of HE 
attainment on earnings over the long term. In addition, in this chapter I have only 
considered the private financial returns to HE and have not asked whether other 
private returns or social returns may exist. The second chapter will be able to 
contribute towards asking if the cost of education still secures a health benefit.  
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APPENDIX A: Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1 Percentage returns to qualifications for men and women: LFS 1994Q1-2002Q4 
 Men Women 
 Markup SE Markup SE 
Higher degree 113.76 0.0111 131.52 0.0124 
First degree 96.70 0.0090 101.64 0.0096 
Degree 
equivalent 
65.20 0.0072 70.30 0.0066 
A-level (or 
equivalent) 
30.03 0.0050 25.33 0.0055 
O-level (or 
equivalent) 
27.01 0.0063 23.24 0.0047 
Other 6.85 0.0048 9.01 0.0039 
Notes: all returns are measured relative to no qualifications; 
Statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. 
Source: O’Leary and Sloane (2005) 
 
Table 2.2 NCDS 1958 British Birth Cohort 
Sweep Year Age (Years) 
0 1958 0 
1 1965 7 
2 1969 11 
3 1974 16 
4 1981 23 
5 1991 33 
6 1999-2000 42 
7 2004-2005 47 
8 2008-2009 50 
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Table 2.3 Percentage of Individuals Educational Qualifications 
Qualifications Sample 
No Qualifications 2,489 
(19.63%) 
GSE Grades 2-5 
 
2,003 
(15.00%) 
Good O-Levels 4,336 
(35.82%) 
At least one A-Level 1369 
(9.12%) 
Diploma 159 
(4.27%) 
Degree or PGCE 936 
(13.60%) 
Higher Degree 36 
(2.55%) 
Total 11,405 
(100%) 
 
 
Table 2.4 Percentage of individuals with highest academic qualification (full sample) 
 No 
qualifications 
Good  
O-levels 
1 or more 
a-levels 
HE  
degree 
Total 
Sample 
Men 41.90 
(2,349) 
35.23 
(1,975) 
13.34 
(692) 
9.75 
(547) 
100 
(5,606) 
Women 32.91 
(2,143) 
40.71 
(2,361) 
11.67 
(677) 
10.08 
(584) 
100 
(5,799) 
All 39.38 
(4501) 
38.02 
(4336) 
12.00 
(1,369) 
9.92 
(1,131) 
100 
(11,405) 
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Table 2.5 Percentage of individuals with highest academic qualification (subset for reporting the 
wages in age 33, 42 and 50) 
 No 
qualifications 
Good  
O-levels 
1 or more 
a-levels 
HE  
degree 
Total 
Sample 
Men 41.90 
(2,349) 
35.23 
(1,975) 
13.34 
(692) 
9.75 
(547) 
100 
(5,606) 
Women 32.91 
(2,143) 
40.71 
(2,361) 
11.67 
(677) 
10.08 
(584) 
100 
(5,799) 
All 39.38 
(4501) 
38.02 
(4336) 
12.00 
(1,369) 
9.92 
(1,131) 
100 
(11,405) 
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Table 2.6 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Real log (hourly wage)  Father’s age in 1974 46.641 6.39 
1991 2.063 0.481 Mother’s age in 1974 43.561 5.70 
1999-2000 2.260 0.413 Mother employed in 
1974 
0.657 0.475 
2008-2009 2.580 0.437 Father’s social class 
in 1974 
 
  Professional 0.034 0.181 
   Intermediate 0.132 0.338 
   Skilled Non-manual 0.063 0.244 
White 0.987 0.115 Skilled manual 0.298 0.458 
Mathematics ability at 
7 years 
 Semi-skilled 
non-manual 
0.010 0.010 
5th quintile (highest) 0.194 0.395 Semi-skilled manual 0.087 0.281 
4th quintile 0.114 0.318 Unskilled 0.036 0.185 
3rd quintile 0.271 0.445 Missing, or 
unemployed or no 
father 
0.340 0.474 
2nd quintile 0.141 0.348 Number of siblings in 
1974 
1.743 1.512 
1st quintile (lowest) 0.280 0.449 Father’s interest in 
education 
  
Reading ability at 7 
years 
 Expects too much 0.024 0.153 
5th quintile (highest) 0.192 0.394 Very interested 0.262 0.440 
4th quintile 0.132 0.339 Some interest 0.249 0.433 
3rd quintile 0.263 0.440 Mother’s interest in 
education 
  
2nd quintile 0.209 0.407 Expects too much 0.037 0.188 
1st quintile (lowest) 0.204 0.403 Very interested 0.349 0.477 
Mathematics ability at 
11 years 
 Some interest 0.346 0.476 
5th quintile (highest) 0.194 0.396 Bad finances in 1969 
or 1974 
0.114 0.317 
4th quintile 0.202 0.402 Region in 1974  
3rd quintile 0.171 0.376 North West 0.116 (0.320) 
2nd quintile 0.202 0.401 North 0.075 0.264 
1st quintile (lowest) 0.231 0.422 East and West Riding 0.087 0.281 
Reading ability at 11 
years 
 North Midlands 0.076 0.265 
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Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
5th quintile (highest) 0.159 0.365 East 0.086 0.280 
4th quintile 0.191 0.393 London and South 
East 
0.160 0.367 
3rd quintile 0.241 0.428 South 0.063 0.243 
2nd quintile 0.168 0.374 South West 0.068 0.251 
1st quintile (lowest) 0.241 0.428 Midlands 0.101 0.301 
Comprehensive school 
1974 
0.467 0.499 Wales 0.058 0.234 
Secondary modern 
school 1974 
0.170 0.376 Scotland 0.111 0.315 
Grammar school 1974 0.087 0.281 Other 0.100 0.299 
Private school 1974 0.060 0.214 Father’s years of 
education 
7.904 1.622 
Other school 1974 0.017 0.130 Mother’s years of 
education 
7.916 1.376 
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Table 2.7 Incremental treatment effects by highest qualification achieved by matching estimates 
at age 33, 42 and 50 
 
Models  Age 33   Age 42   Age 50  
  full  male female full  male female full  male female 
1 ATT 
(NN) 
Control 
Treated 
Support 
Total 
 
ATT 
(Kernel) 
 
0.1661 
(0.0371) 
445 
652 
1097 
1109 
 
0.1601 
(0.0312) 
0.1382 
(0.0485) 
233 
392 
625 
631 
 
0.1298 
(0.0345) 
0.2328 
(0.0605) 
211 
259 
470 
478 
 
0.2301 
(0.0601) 
0.2392 
(0.0500) 
460 
636 
1096 
1100 
 
0.2312 
(0.0454) 
0.1733 
(0.0715) 
208 
349 
557 
560 
 
0.1731 
(0.0671) 
0.3110 
(0.0863) 
238 
280 
518 
540 
 
0.3009 
(0.0764) 
0.2821 
(0.0907) 
458 
621 
1079 
1094 
 
0.2805 
(0.0866) 
0.2244 
(0.0887) 
203 
345 
548 
551 
 
0.2197 
(0.0773) 
0.3535 
(0.0925) 
255 
276 
531 
543 
 
0.3431 
(0.0906) 
2 ATT 
(NN) 
Control 
Treated 
Support 
Total 
 
 
 
ATT 
(Kernel) 
 
0.3520 
(0.0392) 
1538 
617 
2155 
2239 
 
0.3213 
(0.0301) 
0.2405 
(0.0500) 
737 
378 
1115 
1202 
 
0.2300 
(0.0354) 
0.3976 
(0.6401) 
754 
256 
1010 
1037 
 
0.3794 
(0.04965) 
0.4461 
(0.0731) 
1623 
625 
2248 
2299 
 
0.4221 
(0.06521) 
0.3898 
(0.0706) 
665 
344 
1009 
1096 
 
0.3663 
(0.0621) 
0.4964 
(0.0812) 
835 
268 
1103 
1203 
 
0.4644 
(0.0801) 
0.5009 
(0.0530) 
1538 
617 
2155 
2239 
 
0.5000 
(0.0511) 
0.4751 
(0.0713) 
737 
378 
1115 
1202 
 
0.4712 
(0.0700) 
0.5795 
(0.0843) 
754 
256 
1010 
1037 
 
0.5699 
(0.0837) 
3 ATT 
(NN) 
Control 
Treated 
Support 
Total 
 
ATT 
(Kernel) 
 
0.4987 
(0.0874) 
1006 
396 
1402 
1767 
 
0.4356 
(0.0739) 
0.3974 
(0.0848) 
518 
214 
732 
1040 
 
0.3331 
(0.0792) 
0.5806 
(0.0961) 
268 
105 
373 
727 
 
0.5712 
(0.0911) 
0.5859 
(0.1001) 
1006 
527 
1532 
1765 
 
0.5542 
(0.0933) 
0.5064 
(0.1394) 
502 
261 
763 
948 
 
0.4711 
(0.0896) 
0.7486 
(0.0857) 
190 
96 
286 
817 
 
0.7021 
(0.0801) 
0.6526 
(0.1378) 
1006 
527 
1532 
1765 
 
0.6337 
(0.1170) 
0.5901 
(0.1201) 
502 
261 
763 
948 
 
0.5821 
(0.1061) 
0.8014 
(0.1621) 
190 
96 
286 
817 
 
0.7787 
(0.1313) 
4 ATT 
(NN) 
Control 
Treated 
 
0.2022 
(0.0366) 
1563 
447 
2001 
0.1813 
(0.0497) 
801 
235 
1036 
0.2458 
(0.0544) 
666 
202 
868 
0.2592 
(0.0463) 
1660 
455 
2115 
0.2479 
(0.0690) 
745 
205 
950 
0.2648 
(0.0520) 
915 
250 
1165 
0.2905 
(0.0248) 
1660 
455 
2115 
0.2968 
(0.0238) 
745 
205 
950 
0.2884 
(0.0211) 
915 
250 
1165 
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ATT 
(Kernel) 
 
2024 
 
0.1904 
(0.0345) 
1043 
 
0.1881 
(0.0513) 
981 
 
0.2433 
(0.0543) 
2121 
 
0.2435 
(0.0494) 
954 
 
0.2247 
(0.0569) 
1167 
 
0.2438 
(0.0544) 
2121 
 
0.2871 
(0.0241) 
954 
 
0.2934 
(0.0207) 
1167 
 
0.2868 
(0.0198) 
5 ATT 
(NN) 
Control 
Treated 
Support 
Total 
 
ATT 
(Kernel) 
 
0.3331 
(0.1081) 
1000 
362 
1362 
1552 
 
0.2987 
(0.0961) 
0.2011 
(0.1900) 
572 
193 
765 
881 
 
0.1842 
(0.1354) 
0.3006 
(0.1761) 
460 
154 
614 
671 
 
0.2655 
(0.0438) 
0.4035 
(0.0947) 
1049 
409 
1458 
1587 
 
0.3699 
(0.0884) 
0.4271 
(0.1317) 
597 
186 
782 
806 
 
0.4033 
(0.1131) 
0.3814 
(0.0934) 
529 
119 
648 
781 
 
0.3557 
(0.0836) 
0.4561 
(0.0942) 
1049 
409 
1458 
1587 
 
0.3988 
(0.0716) 
0.4723 
(0.1001) 
597 
186 
782 
806 
 
0.4462 
(0.0846) 
0.4343 
(0.0901) 
529 
119 
648 
781 
 
0.3964 
(0.0793) 
6 ATT 
(NN) 
Control 
Treated 
Support 
Total 
 
ATT 
(Kernel) 
 
0.1261 
(0.0568) 
453 
1439 
1892 
1996 
 
0.1387 
(0.0669) 
 
0.1299 
(0.0704) 
259 
742 
1001 
1048 
 
0.1318 
(0.0814) 
 
0.1219 
(0.0718) 
184 
637 
821 
940 
 
0.1323 
(0.0728) 
 
0.1586 
(0.0587) 
472 
1589 
2061 
2084 
 
0.1575 
(0.0764) 
0.1625 
(0.0717) 
244 
693 
937 
974 
 
0.1489 
(0.0679) 
0.1532 
(0.0768) 
214 
766 
980 
1100 
 
0.1530 
(0.0705) 
0.1714 
(0.0597) 
453 
1439 
1892 
1996 
 
0.1881 
(0.0693) 
0.1845 
(0.0645) 
259 
742 
1001 
1048 
 
0.1996 
(0.0734) 
0.1698 
(0.0541) 
184 
637 
821 
940 
 
0.1783 
(0.0616) 
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Table 2.8 Summary of balance test results after different matching algorithms 
 
    Age 33   Models    
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
NN match       
T-test P/P F/F F/F F/F F/F F/F 
SB P/P F/F F/F F/F F/F F/F 
LR test P/P P/P F/F P/P F/F P/P 
Kernel match       
T-test P/P P/P F/F P/F F/F F/F 
SB P/P P/P F/F P/F F/F F/F 
LR test P/P P/P F/F P/P P/P P/P 
    Age 42       
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
NN match       
T-test P/P F/F F/F F/F F/F F/F 
SB P/P F/F F/F F/F F/F F/F 
LR test P/P P/P F/F P/P F/F P/P 
Kernel match       
T-test P/P P/P F/F P/F F/F F/F 
SB P/P P/P F/F P/F F/F F/F 
LR test P/P P/P F/F P/P P/P P/P 
    Age 50       
NN match       
T-test P/P F/F F/F F/F F/F F/F 
SB P/P F/P F/F F/F F/F F/F 
LR test P/P P/P F/F P/P F/F P/P 
Kernel match       
T-test P/P P/P F/F P/F F/F F/F 
SB P/P P/P F/F P/F F/F F/F 
LR test P/P P/P F/F P/P P/P P/P 
Note: The result for Males presents in former and Female in latter 
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Table 2.9   RBs analysis for different matching algorithm 
 
Models           NN   Kernel  
         
Age 33  Males  Females Males  Females 
1 1.0  .000  .000  .000  .000 
 1.25 0.001  .000  .000  .000 
 1.5 0.040  .000 0.033 0.000 
 1.75 0.390 0.001 0.108 0.000 
 2.0 0.794 0.016 0.431   0.000   
2 1.0 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.5 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.75 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 2.0 0.019 0.006 0.000 0.000 
3 1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 1.5 0.085 0.093 0.015 0.024 
 1.75 0.461 0.513 0.156 0.198 
 2.0 0.843 0.919 0.363 0.457 
4 1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.5 0.078 0.000 0.017 0.000 
 1.75 0.332 0.003 0.126 0.001 
 2.0 0.661 0.024 0.377 0.016 
5 1.0 0.240 0.231 0.225 0.235 
 1.25 0.782 0.751 0.767 0.748 
 1.5 0.977 0.970 0.974 0.986 
 1.75 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000 
 2.0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
6 1.0 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.009 
 1.25 0.000 0.652 0.000 0.228 
 1.5 0.048 0.994 0.025 0.742 
 1.75 0.622 1.000 0.127 0.912 
 2.0 0.969 1.000 0.543 0.998 
Age 42      
1 1.0  .000  .000  .000  .000 
 1.25 0.000  .000  .000  .000 
 1.5 0.000  .000 0.063 0.000 
 1.75 0.003 0.000 0.069 0.000 
 2.0 0.031 0.001 0.154   0.000   
2 1.0 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
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 1.25 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.5 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.75 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 2.0 0.042 0.002 0.000 0.000 
3 1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 1.5 0.056 0.105 0.037 0.048 
 1.75 0.246 0.813 0.178 0.246 
 2.0 0.789 0.999 0.567 0.678 
4 1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.5 0.104 0.060 0.017 0.000 
 1.75 0.573 0.115 0.126 0.001 
 2.0 0.979 0.545 0.377 0.016 
5 1.0 0.546 0.231 0.347 0.335 
 1.25 0.931 0.751 0.801 0.745 
 1.5 0.999 0.970 0.974 0.986 
 1.75 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 2.0 1.000* 1.000 1.000 1.000 
6 1.0 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.009 
 1.25 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.423 
 1.5 0.051 0.685 0.000 0.742 
 1.75 0.547 0.969 0.113 0.999 
 2.0 0.874 1.000 0.546 1.000 
Age 50      
1 1.0  .000  .000  .000  .000 
 1.25 0.000  .000  .000  .000 
 1.5 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.75 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 2.0 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000   
2 1.0 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.000  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.5 0.014  .000 0.000 0.000 
 1.75 0.028 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 2.0 0.096 0.016 0.000 0.000 
3 1.0 0.012 0.023 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.082 0.104 0.010 0.002 
 1.5 0.585 0.993 0.079 0.114 
 1.75 0.901 1.000 0.213 0.576 
 2.0 0.999 1.000 0.567 0.857 
4 1.0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.5 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 1.75 0.092 0.023 0.001 0.001 
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 2.0 0.561 0.095 0.012 0.019 
5 1.0 0.240 0.231 0.225 0.235 
 1.25 0.782 0.751 0.767 0.748 
 1.5 0.977 0.970 0.974 0.986 
 1.75 0.999 1.000 0.999 1.000 
 2.0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
6 1.0 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 1.25 0.012 0.015 0.000 0.000 
 1.5 0.198 0.124 0.025 0.042 
 1.75 0.856 0.644 0.456 0.912 
 2.0 0.999 1.000 0.865 0.998 
              * Bold number indicator P value > 5% 
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Table 2.10 Incremental treatment effects by highest qualification achieved by matching estimates 
(subset) 
  Age 33  Age 42  Age 50  
  male female male female male female 
1 ATT 
 
Control 
Treated 
 
0.1473 
(0.0485) 
184 
305 
489 
0.2073 
(0.0660) 
148 
191 
339 
0.1690 
(0.0652) 
 
 
 
0.2387 
(0.0660) 
 
 
 
0.2533 
(0.0715) 
 
 
 
0.3210 
(0.0863) 
 
 
 
2 ATT 
 
Control 
Treated 
 
0.2186 
(0.0521) 
584 
297 
881 
0.3664 
(0.0714) 
553 
180 
733 
0.3158 
(0.0787) 
 
 
0.4359 
(0.0745) 
 
0.4198 
(0.0706) 
 
 
0.5264 
(0.0812) 
 
 
 
4 ATT 
 
Control 
Treated 
 
0.1929 
(0.0456) 
608 
183 
791 
0.2387 
(0.0669) 
481 
134 
615 
0.2862 
(0.0700) 
  
 
0.3154 
(0.0669) 
 
0.3464 
(0.1394) 
 
0.3386 
(0.0857) 
 
6 ATT 
 
Control 
Treated 
 
0.1466 
(0.0704) 
165 
568 
733 
1048 
0.1435 
(0.0718) 
120 
409 
529 
940 
0.1805 
(0.0917) 
 
 
 
 
0.1720 
(0.0819) 
 
 
 
 
0.2079 
(0.0690) 
 
 
 
 
0.1948 
(0.0520) 
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Table 2.11 Disaggregated comparison group 
 
Comparison 
groups 
Educational 
Attainments 
1 HE vs A-levels 
2 HE vs O-levels 
3 HE vs No qualifications 
4 A-levels vs O-levels 
5 A-levels vs No qualifications 
6 O-levels vs No qualifications 
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Table 2.12 T-test and SB result for age 33 pooled sample 
Variable Average 
P-value of 
t-test 
before 
matching 
Average 
P-value of 
t-test after 
NN 
matching 
% standardised  
bias before 
matching 
% SB after NN 
matching 
% reduction of 
SB  
White 0.917 0.917 -0.7 0.0 100 
female 0.031 0.814 -14.5 -6.0 58.8 
Region dummy 
North 0.031 0.709 14.7 4.7 67.9 
North Midlands 0.588 0.169 3.7 8.2 -123.5 
Midlands 0.725 0.668 -2.4 -4.9 -106.6 
School type dummy 
Comprehensive 
school 1974 
0.006 0.691 -18.5 -8.4 54.8 
Grammar school 
1974 
0.001 0.179 21.8 14.0 36.0 
Secondary modern 
school 1974 
0.537 0.714 -4.1 -3.7 10.9 
Personal ability dummy 
Mathematics ability at 7 years 
1
st
 quintile  0.004 0.153 -19.2 -14.0 26.9 
2
nd
 quintile  0.636 0.767 -3.2 -0.9 71.9 
Mathematics ability at 11 years 
1
st
 quintile  0.063 0.351 -12.1 -8.8 27.2 
2
nd
 quintile  0.000 0.007 -29.6 -23.9 19.0 
3
rd
 quintile  0.115 0.731 -10.5 -4.1 61.2 
4
th
 quintile  0.018 0.657 -15.8 0.0 100.0 
5
th
 quintile 0.000 0.086 41.5 18.6 55.2 
Reading ability at 7 years 
1
st
 quintile  0.011 0.194 -16.5 -12.2 26.3 
2
nd
 quintile  0.653 0.995 -3.0 -1.6 47.8 
Reading ability at 11 years 
1
st
 quintile  0.005 0.086 -18.3 -15.1 17.6 
2
nd
 quintile  0.000 0.014 -25.2 -21.1 16.2 
3
rd
 quintile  0.000 0.174 -29.4 -15.2 48.3 
4
th
 quintile  0.825 0.103 1.5 9.5 -541.8 
Social class dummy 
Professional 0.009 0.862 18.0 1.6 90.9 
Intermediate 0.161 0.714 9.4 6.3 33.1 
Father’ interest to education dummy 
Expects too much 0.587 0.984 -3.6 0.0 100 
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Very interested 0.000 0.059 27.2 15.8 42.0 
Mother’ interest to education dummy 
Expects too much 0.322 0.898 6.7 1.2 82.5 
Very interested 0.000 0.041 24.7 17.0 31.1 
Number of 
siblings in 1974 
0.652 0.916 3.1 -0.4 86.4 
Mother’s years of 
education 
0.013 0.662 -16.7 -6.0 64.0 
Father’s years of 
education 
0.001 0.651 -22.3 -9.5 57.5 
Bad finances in 
1969 or 1974 
0.485 0.917 -4.6 0.0 100 
*  
Figure 2.1 Average earnings by gender and HE type 
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Figure 2.2 Average earnings by gender and degree classification 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Propensity score distributions and common support regions 
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Model 4 
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Model 6 
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APPENDIX B: Classification of educational qualifications 
B.1. The British educational system 
Progression at school beyond the minimum leaving age of 16 years is based on a 
series of nationally assessed examinations. The wide range of academic and 
vocational qualifications has been classified into equivalent National Vocational 
Qualification levels, ranging from level 1 to level 5. Until 1986, students at 16 years 
of age had to decide whether to apply for the lower level Certificates of Secondary 
Education (CSE) option or for the more academically demanding Ordinary level 
(O-level) route (the top grade (grade 1) achieved on a CSE was considered equivalent 
to O-level grade C).Whereas most CSE students tended to leave school at the 
minimum age, students who took O-levels were much more likely to stay on in school. 
(In 1986 CSEs and O-levels were replaced by General Certificates of Secondary 
Education.) Those staying on in school can then take Advanced levels (A-levels) at 
the end of secondary school (age 18 years). A-levels are still the primary route into 
HE. 
B.2. No qualifications 
The no qualifications group also includes very low level qualifications at National 
Vocational Qualification level 1 or less, that is: CSE grade 2–5 qualifications, other 
business qualifications, other qualifications not specified, and Royal Society of Arts 
level 1 qualifications. 
B.3. O-levels or equivalent 
The O-levels or equivalent group includes O-levels or CSE grade 1, but also a range 
of vocational equivalents to these academic school-based qualifications: Royal 
Society of Arts level 2 and 3; City and Guild operative, craft, intermediate, ordinary 
or part 1; Joint Industry Board, National Joint Council or other craft or technician 
certificate. 
B.4. A-levels or equivalent 
The A-levels or equivalent group includes at least one A-level, but also a range of 
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vocationally equivalent qualifications: City and Guild advanced, final or part 2, or the 
3-year or full technological certificate; the insignia award in technology; the Ordinary 
National Certificate or Ordinary National Diploma, the Scottish National Certificate 
or Scottish National Diploma, Technician Education Council (TEC) or Business and 
Technician Education Council (BEC) or the Scottish equivalent SCOTEC and 
SCOTBEC certificate or diploma. 
B.5. High Education 
The HE group includes the Higher National Certificate or Diploma, the Scottish 
Higher National Certificate or Scottish Higher National Diploma, TEC or BEC, or 
SCOTEC or SCOTBEC Higher or Higher National Certificate or Diploma, 
professional qualifications, nursing qualifications including National Nursery 
Examining Board, polytechnic qualifications, university certificates or diplomas, first 
degrees, postgraduate diplomas, and higher degrees. 
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Chapter 3: Estimating the non pecuniary benefits of higher 
education 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Although there is a rapidly evolving economic literature studying non-pecuniary 
returns to education, including health, crime, and marital outcomes (Oreopoulos and 
Salvanes, 2011), a large body of research is more concerned with returns in terms of 
health outcomes and health-related behaviours. In particular, educational attainment 
has been found to have a positive association with various health outcomes: the so 
called "health education gradient" in decades of research (see Grossman 2006 for 
extensive surveys). The wider interest stems from the fact if a true causal effect of 
education on health exists, then the individuals' educational attainments probably 
represent the most obvious means through which policy makers could affect their 
health (Braga and Bratti, 2012). Although health education gradient may result in part 
from reciprocal casual effects between educational attainment and health status, recent 
research suggests that education does indeed have a causal effect on health (Currie 
and Moretti 2003; Lleras-Muney 2005; Wolfe and Zuvekas, 1997). Individuals with 
high levels of education have made an investment in themselves to protect themselves 
by taking preventative measures to increase the probability of better health; hence, 
higher educated people tend to have better health than those with lower levels (Saxton, 
2000).  
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The standard OLS or Logit/Probit estimation may only represent simple correlations 
and face endogeneity (of education) problems, most scholars use instrumental 
variable (IV) strategies based on regression discontinuity (RD) designs to identify 
causal effects (Adams, 2002; Arendt, 2005; Clark and Royer, 2010; Glied and 
Lleras-Muney, 2003; Jürges et al.2009; Meghir et al., 2012; etc). These studies usually 
only differ in terms of econometric specifications and focus only on single or very 
few health outcomes and behaviours at a particular age. However, the causal effect of 
education on the various types of health outcomes has been rarely investigated by 
using other techniques.  
 
Therefore, the goal of this paper is to construct an estimation of the magnitude of the 
health returns to higher education (HE). I am not the first to investigate the causal 
effect of HE on health and health-related behaviours. However, in this paper, I seek to 
add contributions to the existing literature in three main respects. First, I identify and 
estimate the treatment effect of HE on health and health-related behaviours by using 
the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology, which has been intensively 
discussed in Chapter One. The causal effect of the treatment is usually defined as the 
change in health outcomes caused by a potential move from untreated to treated status, 
or vice versa.  Here, I only focus on assessing the average treatment effects on 
treated assignment (ATTs); in other words, the premium if individuals have been 
obtained HE attainment relative to their counterparts (non- HE attainment). It 
facilitates comprehensive evaluations of employing balance test to check the 
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satisfaction of CIA assumption, a “thick-support” region test (Black and Smith, 2004) 
to check the estimates robustness, and associated Rosenbaum Bounds (R-bounds) to 
check the satisfaction of selection on observable assumption.  
Second, most existing studies generally consider a restricted number of health 
outcomes. However, since the National Child Development Survey (NCDS) I used in 
this study can provide richer data source on health and health-related variables, it is 
considered to investigate the causal effects on a wider set of health variables. In 
particular, I consider: (i) general health outcome: self-assessed health; (ii) body 
weight health outcomes: Body Mass Index (BMI) and threshold of obesity; (iii) 
health-related damaging behaviours: frequency of smoking and drink alcohol; (iii) 
mental health outcome: depression based on malaise score. All of these health and 
health behaviours outcomes together enable me to provide a more general assessment 
of the effect of education on health. The last innovation is the measurement of an 
individual’s health outcomes over an extended period of time from age of 33 to 50. By 
including extensive controls for family background characteristics, personal abilities 
and health status in childhood and adolescence, I characterise effect commonalities 
and compare differences between genders up to the age of menopause.  
 
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. The following section reviews the 
background empirical models and related literature, with a special focus on papers 
seeking to estimate causal effects. Section 3 describes the details of each health and 
health-related behaviour indicator, and the potential covariates are included in the 
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specification to calculate the Propensity score (PS). Section 4 briefly present the 
empirical model used. The main results are reported and corresponding test results are 
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 highlights the main findings and concludes 
this paper. 
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3.2 Literature review 
 
The non-monetary benefits to education were posited in the very earliest work on 
human capital (Schultz 1961, Becker 1964). From an education perspective, the 
strength of this relationship suggests that health could be one of the most important 
sources of non-monetary returns to education (Adams, et al. 2003). Health outcome is 
an area where there has been a significant body of research literature on the impact of 
HE in recent years. There is a substantial body of literature examining the 
well-established yet striking correlation between education and health,
22
 but few 
studies have addressed whether this relationship depends on a causal mechanism since 
the associations between health and education are not always clear-cut. The available 
evidence on the causal effect of education on health under controversial and covers a 
small numbers of countries. Some studies conclude education has a positive effect on 
health, such as: Adams (2002), Mazumder (2008), and Oreopoulos (2007) for the US; 
Arendt (2008) for Denmark, Jürges et al. (2011) for Germany; and, Silles (2009) and 
Oreopoulos (2007) for the UK. On the other hand, some find little or no effects, such 
as: Clark and Royer (2010), Braakmann (2011), Jürges et al. (2009, 2011) for the UK; 
Albouy and Lequien (2009) for France; Arendt (2005) for Denmark; Kempter et 
al.(2011) for German; and, Meghir et al. (2012) for Sweden. 
 
Theoretically, education could improve health through at least the following 
                                                             
22
 As shown in Banks et al. (2006) and Cutler & Lleras-Muney (2007), even at lower levels of education in the 
UK, these correlations are still strong. 
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channels
23
 that have been proposed in the existing literature: 
(a) Raising efficiency in health production, or the productive efficiency argument (Grossman, 
1972).  The main idea is that education directly affects the health production function. 
Given the same quantity of inputs, more educated individuals produce a higher stock of 
health than less educated ones. For example, education may impart direct knowledge 
about health and health behaviours, thereby shifting the health production function. 
(b) Changing inputs in health production, or the allocative efficiency argument (Grossman, 
2005, Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983). This proposes the idea that education will have no 
impact on health unless it changes inputs in the health production function. The main 
mechanism through which education can affect the inputs is by increasing health-related 
knowledge (e.g. harmful effects of smoking, harmful effects of heavy drink).  
(c) Changing time preference (Fuchs, 1982, Becker and Mulligan, 1997), which can be 
explained that individuals with a high discount rate are likely to be impatient, more likely 
to invest less in education, and more likely to engage in health-damaging behaviour. 
Hence, from the this point of view, there could be a negative correlation between 
education and smoking which stems from an unobserved variable that does not reflect a 
true causal relationship. 
(d) Changing economic factors (e.g. labour market opportunities and income) (Feinstein , 
2003, Lochner, 2011) may result in higher levels of income, which encourages 
individuals to engage in healthy activities and eat more nutritious food. In addition, 
                                                             
23
 Lochner (2011) lists the channels through which education may improve health with other identifications: stress 
reduction, better decision making or better information gathering, higher likelihood of having health insurance, 
healthier employment, better neighborhoods and peers and healthier behaviors. 
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higher labour market opportunities allow individuals to work in less stressful jobs.(Case 
and Deaton, 2005; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2010) and more highly educated people 
may tend to work in safer environments (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008).  
(e) Changing behavioural patterns including diet, smoking, obesity, patterns of alcohol 
consumption, preventative care and so on (Huisman et al. 2005; Mackenbach et al. 
2008).  
Among the existing literature, education is reported to have both direct and indirect 
effects on health. The first two factors (i.e. (a) and (b)) are considered as a direct 
effect, whereas the others are indirect. These channels provide evidence of the causal 
effects of an individual's education on a very wide set of health variables investigated 
in the literature. In what follows, I will summarise these main findings in terms of the 
health outcome considered. 
 
3. 2.1 General health indicator 
Some papers focus on an individual’s general health status, which is usually measured 
through self-reported heath (SRH) measures 
24
 or biomarker indicators
25
. 
Lleras-Muney (2005) tests the causality of education effects on mortality in the US 
using instrumental variables estimation techniques. By using OLS estimation, the 
author finds that an additional year of schooling lowers the probability of dying in the 
                                                             
24 It is argued self-reported measures may suffer from a variety of biases. An alternative unbiased measure is to 
use the objective biomarker indicator.  This is because biomarker is a medical indicator allowing characterizing 
a biological processes as normal or pathological or requiring a pharmacologic intervention.  
25 However, in practice, such information is rarely available. Researchers usually use other health indicator as 
biomarker indicator, such as BMI, hypertension or chronic conditions.  
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next 10 years by 1.3 %. By using the IV method, an additional year of schooling is 
estimated to reduce the probability of dying in the next 10 years by 3.6 %. Lundborg 
(2008) estimates the health returns to education using data on identical twins in the 
US for eliminate any unobserved factors that may simultaneously affect education 
(e.g. family backgrounds) and health (e.g. genetic traits). This study uses both SRH 
and the number of chronic conditions experienced in an attempt to eliminate any 
misreporting of health outcomes, and controls for income as a mediating variable. The 
results suggest there is a causal effect of education on health. Individuals with college 
levels are found to be positively related to SRH than with high school levels but 
negatively related to the number of chronic conditions. It seems that education does 
not always generate benefits, while more education could be associated with negative 
effects on some aspects of health (e.g. chronic conditions). 
 
In the UK, using compulsory schooling law changes as instruments, Oreopoulos 
(2006) applies an IV regression approach
26
 based on the General Household Surveys 
(GHS) and identifies a positive and significant effect of education on SRH. This study 
also reports a negative effect of education (using age left full time education as the 
measurement) on physical and mental disability in the US. Similarly, Silles (2009) 
using the same method based on data from Health Surveys of England (HSE) and 
finds a positive causal effect of education (year of schooling) on SRH, which is much 
larger than the OLS estimates. The author further indicates that the strong health 
                                                             
26  In particular, the author adopts the regression discontinuity method involving comparisons at the 
quarter-of-birth level. A regression discontinuity design can mitigate policy changes concerns by exploiting 
sharp changes in educational attainment. 
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gradient is observed for other health measures, such as SRH and smoking behaviour. 
Using British Household Panel Survey, Contoyannis et al (2004) applied Maximum 
Simulated Likelihood (MSL) for a multivariate Probit model and find that educational 
attainment to self-rated health gradient remains significant, even after the inclusion of 
controls for lifestyles in the estimation and controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
The researchers divide participants into 4 groups (degree, A-level, O-level, no 
qualification) by their maximum educational attainment. 
 
By contrast, Jürges et al. (2013) assess the causal link of compulsory schooling and 
health using two nationwide law changes in the minimum school leaving age in the 
UK as exogenous variation for education. Their result shows there is no causal effect 
between compulsory schooling and the two biomarkers.
27
 The impact of education on 
SRH is only significantly positive among the older female cohorts, but was negative 
among younger female cohorts. The effect is insignificant among men across ages. 
Clark and Royer (2010) study the changes in the duration of compulsory schooling in 
the UK and find insignificant evidence of health returns in terms of improved health 
outcomes or changed health behaviours. The health outcomes they used are objective 
health measures, such as blood pressure, BMI, and levels of inflammatory blood 
markers. 
 
                                                             
27  They are blood fibrinogen and blood C-reactive protein, respectively.  
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3.2.2 Health-damaging behaviours 
The evidence on health-damaging behaviours is also mixed. De Walque (2004) 
investigates a negative effect of tertiary education on smoking rates in US.  He uses 
retrospective data from the National Health Interviews Surveys from1940 to 2000. On 
average, the results from the OLS suggest that one additional year of college 
education reduces smoking prevalence by 4% and increases the probability of 
smoking cessation by 4%. When controlling for family income, the IV estimates are 
very close to the OLS estimates, decreasing smoking prevalence by 3.8 % and 
increasing the probability of smoking cessation by 5 %. 
 
Other studies have come to similar conclusions; for example, Feinstein, et al (2008) 
find that UK graduates tend to be the healthiest and longest-living members of society. 
In particular, less educated individuals are 75% more likely to become smokers at age 
30. Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) report that by controlling for age, gender, and 
parental background, higher educated individuals in the US and UK
28
 are less likely 
to smoke, less likely to be obese and less likely to be heavy drinkers; on the other 
hand, they are more likely to drive safely, more likely to live in a safe house, and 
more likely to use preventative care. In particular, for the UK, individuals with an 
A-level qualification are 12 % less likely to be smokers than less educated individuals 
and 4 % less likely to become obese. Jürges et al. (2011) identify the effect of 
schooling on two main health-damaging behaviour outcomes in Germany: smoking 
                                                             
28 In the UK case, they use data from Health & Retirement Study (HRS), Survey on Smoking (SOS), and NCDS 
to collect different health outcomes, and demographic and economic controls.  
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and obesity. Education is negatively related with smoking for both males and females. 
However, there is no causal effect of education found on reducing overweight and 
obesity. Kuntsche et al. (2006) confirms that educational attainment has an influence 
on drinking behaviour among young people in Holland. Individuals with lower 
educational attainment are reported to be almost three times more likely to start 
excessive alcohol consumption than those with a university degree. Le Tien et al. 
(1998) apply logistic regression analysis and report that years of schooling are 
negatively related with extreme alcohol use controlling for gender and age. Arendt 
(2005) using the Danish school reforms of 1958 and 1975 as an instrument for 
educational effects, and estimates the effects of education on obesity (BMI). The 
results from their OLS estimation suggest that an additional year of education is 
associated with a decrease of 0.207 and 0.173 in BMI for both genders, whereas when 
using IV estimates they found that education has a causal and significant impact on 
reducing BMI by 0.355 for men but was not significant for women.  
 
In contrast, Lundborg (2008) finds insignificant effects of education on smoking and 
obesity. The author further attempts to investigate whether overall health is affected 
through lifestyle, but he cannot establish a causal relationship. Lifestyle factors, such 
as smoking and overweight, are found to contribute little to the ‘education to health 
gradient’. In addition, this raises the issue of the mechanisms through which education 
affects health. For example, it can be argued that smoking behaviour is a health 
outcome which may be directly influenced by education, but indirectly through peer 
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effects or through occupational choice by way of network effects. In this case, 
smoking will affect overall health later in life. 
 
3.2.3 Health preventative behaviours 
Education to some extent induces individual to have healthy lifestyles. Feinstein and 
Sabates (2004) propose a probit model based on data from British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) to assess the relationship between education and health, particularly 
the uptake of health services in UK. The evidence finds that education has a direct 
effect on preventative health by raising awareness of the importance of undertaking 
periodic health tests. It favours a mechanism by which education increases the 
individual’s self-efficacy and confidence, while also improving access to health 
services by increasing the individual’s patience and motivation. The impact is still 
significant and robust after controlling factors such as income, social economic status, 
and personal life circumstances. The same conclusion is reached by Fletcher and 
Frisvold (2009), who report spill over effects of increased education on preventative 
health care choice based on Wisconsin Longitudinal Study in the US. College 
graduates are associated with approximately 5–15 % increase in the likelihood of 
using several types of preventative care. However, Clark and Royer (2010) show no 
evidence that education improves behaviours in terms of dietary regime and regular 
physical activity in the UK.  
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3.2.4 Mental health 
From the point of view of HE participants, I personally suppose that the positive 
effect of education may be counteracted somewhat by the increased pressure and 
stress caused by the expectations that individuals may place on them.  A higher 
occupational grade is associated with greater income, more control over the working 
life, and with more varied and challenging work, and thus reduced morbidity (Marmot 
et al., 1991) but also higher levels of stress (Rose, 2001). 
 
Bynner et al. (2002) study a wide range of benefits of HE based on NCDS and BCS. 
They find that graduates are generally less depressed and present a higher sense of 
wellbeing than those with lower educational attainment. Feinstein (2003), using data 
from the NCDS and BCS and matching methods, shows that controlling for childhood 
abilities, health and family background factors, women from the 1958 cohort with 
lower secondary education have a 6% lower likelihood of depression than women 
with no qualifications, while these effects for men are weaker. In general, the results 
show that differences between individuals with different qualifications are 
substantially eroded when the selection bias is dealt with using matching methods. 
Chevalier and Feinstein (2006) rely on NCDS dataset to control for childhood 
determinants and measures of mental health over the individual’s life span to account 
for possible endogeneity of education. Using PSM, they estimate that individuals with 
at least O-levels reduce their risk of adult depression by 6 %. This effect is similar for 
men and women. However, Russell and Shaw (2009) focus on HE students in the UK 
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and point out that a significant proportion of students studying in higher education 
present social anxiety, of which 10% students are marked to have severe social 
anxiety. Nonetheless, this study does not identify a casual effect.  
I summarise the existing evidence as follows. First, the existing evidence on the 
causal effect of education on health is inclusive and contains a small numbers of 
countries. Second, besides methods of standard OLS and probit model, large numbers 
of studies apply IV regression method with RD design for identification, while the 
compulsory schooling age reforms are a very common instrument. Third, there are a 
very limited number of studies investigating the effect on mental health and 
depression. 
 
3.2.5 Matching related literatures  
Studies of effect of education to health status disparities have rarely been found in 
literatures by adopting PSM or matching related approaches. Only two studies are 
related to the application of matching mechanism. Rosenbaum (2012) used data from 
the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health to compare young adults ages 
26 to measure the effect of highest degrees on measures of hypertension, obesity, 
smoking, sleep problems, and depression. The method they applied is the 
nearest-neighbour mahalanobis matching within propensity score calipers. After 
matching, they found participants with baccalaureate degrees were 60% less likely to 
smoke daily, 14% less likely to be obese, and 38% less likely to have been diagnosed 
with depression. 
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On the other hand, Conti et al (2010) go beyond the existing literature which typically 
estimates mean effects to compute distributions of treatment effects and apply the 
matching method to show how the health returns to education can vary among 
individuals who are similar with respect to their observed characteristics. Based on a 
positive correlation between health and schooling conclusion, they then estimate 
causal effects of education (year of schooling) on adult health and healthy behaviors 
in a form of matching using the British Cohort Study in 1970. They conclude 
education has an important causal effect in explaining differences in many health 
behaviors, (such as smoking and regular exercise) as well as on a number of other 
outcomes (such as obesity poor health and depression). Besides that, they also show 
that family background characteristics, and cognitive, non-cognitive, and health 
endowments developed by early ages, are important determinants of labour market 
and health disparities at age 30. 
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3.3 Data 
The data used in this paper came from the British NCDS, which is identical to 
Chapter One. The reason why I have continued to use the NCDS data is because I can 
utilise the panel feature of the NCDS in order to examine changes in educational 
attainment, and health indicator and health behaviours between the waves. 
 
3.3.1 HE attainment  
Simiar to Chapter One, I classify treatment group (HE) as an invidual’s entry to all 
forms of higher education, including diploma, degree level, and higher degree level, 
and a control group (non-HE) who obtained one or more A-levels but who did not 
proceed into HE. I will not present descriptive information on HE attainment here 
because it has been described in detail in Chapter One.  
 
3.3.2 Dependent variables  
Six health-related outcomes are chosen across different ages, including: two 
indicators of general health status - self-reported health and measured BMI; three 
indicators of healthy behaviours - alcohol drink frequency, smoking frequency, and 
obesity; and, one indicator of mental health status - Malaise score.
29
 Among these 
variables, self-assessment of health self-reported health, frequency of drinking alcohol, 
smoking frequency and Malaise score are directly collected from NCDS. BMI is 
                                                             
29 Malaise score is calculated from 24 questions on various aspects of well-being and somatic conditions. Since 
the questions do not directly ask about mental health, the malaise score is likely to be less biased by stigma and 
misreporting than other more direct measures. In this paper, I use derived score directly from NCDS.  
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measured based on an individual’s height and reported weight. Obesity is categorised 
by BMI. Since most of the health indicators and health behaviours are ordered and 
categorical variables, instead of reporting the descriptive statistics I will present the 
distributions of each indicator (expect for measured BMI and Malaise score).  
 
(a) Self-assessment of health 
The first general health indicator is presented as the self-reported health (SRH) made 
by individuals. It is a subjective indicator of health that individuals assess relative to a 
representative person of the individual’s own age. In NCDS, it measures how they 
feel about their health by using four categories: excellent, good, fair, and poor. I 
recode self-reported health so that a higher number corresponds to better SRH (i.e. 1 
= poor, 4 = excellent). In Table 3.1 it can be seen that 35% of the participants have 
excellent health at the age of 33. This falls to 31% at the age of 42, and is less than 20% 
at 51 years old. Over half of the participants assess themselves to have good health 
after the age of 33. Only 2% of the respondents reported as having poor health at the 
age of 33. However, this increases to 3% at the age of 42 and was about 6% for the 
group of 51 year olds. The women with poor health is greater than men for all age 
groups. For both men and women, over 50% report themselves as having good health 
when they are younger, and this rises to over 60% at 51 and above. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 
illustrate the distribution of SRH for different age levels by genders. Table 3.2 shows 
that the self-reported health conditions across different qualifications over lifetime.  
It can be seen more directly of the differences of health conditions across different 
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qualifications through lifetime. More participants with HE always reported good 
health conditions than other participants without HE. Better educated people always 
have better self-reported health conditions. Moreover, at younger age of 33, over 45% 
of participants with HE reported having an excellent health condition. It declined to 
40% at their middle age of 42 and even only about 29% after 50 year-old. However, 
more participants without HE qualification (e.g:None qualification and GSE) always 
reported poor health condition compared to those with higher qualifications (e.g: at 
least 1 A level and HE). For example there is more than 10% of participants with none 
qualification reported poor health at age of 50, which is 7% higher than that at age of 
33. Thus, more people reported poor health when they are getting older. Better 
educated people still have a large proportion of having a good health compared to 
others with low qualifications. 
 
However, the SRH seems to suffer various biases. In NCDS, the childhood health 
indicator relies upon objective medical examinations, while the data in adulthood 
health is self-reported. It is argued that individuals with disadvantaged socioeconomic 
characteristics tend to have a more negative view of their health status, and are more 
likely to report a poorer health condition (Marsh et al. 1999). In this case, I chose data 
at age 42 as an example and apply a correlation analysis to assess the association 
between self-reported and chosen variables. This suggests increasing correlations 
between self-reported health status (Health 42) and a monotonic increase in an 
individual’s social class, but the correlation coefficients are relatively small. However, 
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self-reported health is highly correlated with long term limiting health and hospital 
admission, and the correlation in SRH among three periods ranges from 0.46 to 0.55. 
These high correlations highlight the persistence of SRH over time and suggest that 
this indicator truly captures some permanent features of an individual’s general health 
status. All of the aforementioned correlation analysis is reported in Table 3.3. Hence, 
categorical measures of SRH are still considered to be an adequate indicator of 
general health status and are widely used in many studies.
30
  
(b) BMI 
Since general biomarkers such as blood C-Reactive protein, blood Fibrinogen, Von 
Willebrand factor are only available in NCDS Biomedical survey in 2002 (age 42), 
the second general health indicator is considered to use the BMI, which is usually 
seen as an objective health measure in the literature. BMI is a useful measure of being 
overweight and obese, it is an estimate of body fat and is a good gauge of the risk of 
diseases that are associated with more body fat. The higher the BMI, the higher the 
risk for certain diseases, such as coronary heart disease, high blood pressure, type 2 
diabetes, gallstones, stroke, breathlessness, hypertension, depression, arthritis and 
cancers.
31
  
I use the following formula to calculate the respondents’ BMI: 
    
          
            
  or      
          
               
     
                                                             
30
 For example, van Doorslaer et al. 2000,Manor, Matthews & Power, 2000, Graham & Power (2004), Hertzman 
& Power (2004), Power & Elliott (2006) 
31
  Detailed complications of obesity can be found on the NHS website, available at : 
http://www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Obesity/Pages/Complications.aspx 
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The NCDS records the height and weight of the respondents at all sweeps, except for 
Sweep 7 in 2004. In Sweep 6 (age 42) and Sweeps 8 (age 51), weight and height are 
self-reported, whereas in Sweep 5 (age 33) they were measured by the interviewers. It 
is then argued that substantial measurement errors exist in self-reported height and 
weight (Rothman 2008). For instance, overweighed responders may under report their 
weight. Several variations based on the BMI have been suggested in order to tackle 
this measurement error problem in many science studies.  For example, Burkhauser 
and Cawley (2008) use a prediction equation
 32
 to produce a more accurate BMI to 
correct classical measurement errors. However, due to the data limitation, I cannot 
tackle the measurement error in this case. Table 3.4 and Figure 3.3 summarise the 
descriptive statistics and distributions of BMI. The individual’s BMI gradually 
increases with age. It should be noted that BMI figures are all above 25.5 when 
individuals become middle-aged. Furthermore, BMI figures are almost normally 
distributed and do not need to be log-transformed. 
 
The measures of BMI can also be used to construct an indicator of being overweight 
or obese. According the classification from World Health Organization (WHO), I 
place measured BMI into four categories, which are: under weight, normal weight, 
overweight, and obesity (see Table 3.5).
33
  It should be noted here that being obese is 
a health behaviour rather than a general health indicator.  
                                                             
32 This require triceps skinfold thickness, waist-to-hip ratio, and bioelectrical impedance analysis to calculate 
Total Body Fat (TBF) and Percent Body Fat (PBF). Again, these data are only available in the 2002 Biomedical 
Survey.  
33 WHO classification can be found at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/ 
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Table 3.6 shows the percentages of BMI categories by gender. Among the 33 year 
olds, about 50% of males have a normal weight and more than 60% of females have a 
normal weight. Men tend to be more overweight (40%) and obese (10%) than women. 
Only 24% of women were measured as overweight and 8% were obese. Overall, for 
the group aged 33, over half of the respondents had a normal weight. However, this 
changes after 10 years. Among 42 year olds, nearly 46% of men were measured as 
overweight and 15% were obese. The percentage of people with normal weight falls 
to 45% compared to 55% at age 33. About 10% of the males w ho had a normal 
weight at 33 became overweight or even obese at 42. The majority of men at 42 were 
overweight (46%) but most women (53%) still had a normal weight. At 51 years old, 
the percentage of men and women with a normal weight falls sharply. Only 27% of 
men stayed at a normal weight in this category. The percentage of men who are 
overweight at 51 rises to 46% and obesity rises to 25%, which more than doubled 
when compared to the age of 33. Overall, about 40% of older people were overweight 
compared to those with a normal weight at 33. The majority of women kept a normal 
weight at different age groups. However, men changed from a majority having a 
normal weight at 33 years old, to the majority becoming overweight and obese after 
42 years old. For the 51 year olds, over 70% of men in total were suffering some kind 
of weight problem. Figure 3.4 exhibits the distribution of obesity by ages while figure 
3.5 illustrates the distribution of obesity by educational attainment. At 33 years old, 
there are over 60% of both participants with and without HE having a normal weight. 
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However, there is a further 4% more for participants with HE compared to those 
without HE. The proportion of overweight for participants without HE is about 28% 
and slightly higher than those with HE (26%). For the obesity category, participant 
with HE is always less than those without HE over time. It can be seen a similar trend 
for both age 42 and 50 above. Better educated people are more likely to have a normal 
weight over life time. However, people without HE are more likely to have 
overweight and obese problem. As participants getting older, there is about 10% 
changing to overweight and obese from normal weight. 
 
 
(c) Frequency of drinking alcohol 
Table 3.7 describes the frequency of drinking alcohol by gender at three different age 
groups. At a younger age, 36% of men and 30% of women drink 2 to 3 days a week. 
There are about 25% of men drinking on most days, which is 10% higher than women. 
In the category of “never had an alcoholic drink”, there are always more women than 
men. The total percentage of participants who drink more than “once a week” is about 
72% at age of 33, and it goes up to 74% at 42 years old. When the respondents were 
at 51 or above, it goes down to 71%. Less than 30% have good drinking behaviour. 
Comparatively, the women drink less than the men. Figure 3.6 presents the 
distribution of alcohol drink frequency by ages.  
(d) Smoking frequency 
In Table 3.8, I find that over 45% of participants were non-smokers. At of the age of 
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33, about 26% of people in total smoke every day, women were slightly more inclined 
to smoke than men. At 42 the numbers of both men and women who never smoke 
cigarettes increased by 2%. The percentage of respondents who smoke every day 
dropped by nearly 4% compared to 26% at age of 33. This continues going down by 2% 
at 51 years old and above. This means that more smokers turn into non-smokers as 
they age. The percentage of women who were non-smokers is always greater than 
men in all age groups. Figure 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the distribution of smoking 
frequency by ages and by qualifications, respectively. Better educated people always 
smoke less than Non-HE group. Thus, participants with HE had a better sense of 
having a good living style. 
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(e) The depression indicator 
Some research argues that the better educated are substantially less likely to report 
themselves as suffering from anxiety or depression (Culter and Lleras-Muney 2006). 
Hence, I use an objective indicator that reflects mental health. The malaise score was 
designed to identify depression in non-clinical settings and has been found to be a 
good indicator of depression (Rutter et al., 1970). It is widely used as a broader 
measure of the mental health and depression (chevalier and Feinstein, 2006). In 
NCDS, the malaise score is calculated from the Malaise Inventory (Rutter et al, 1970), 
which is a set of 24 self-completion questions combined to measure levels of 
psychological distress, or depression. The 24 ‘yes-no’ items of the inventory cover 
emotional disturbance and associated physical symptoms, thus the score ranges from 
0 to 24. Figure 3.11 illustrates the distribution of malaise score at different ages. The 
distribution is very positively skewed, making the mean a less desirable basis for 
comparison. 
 
According to the classification defined in NCDS, individuals responding ‘yes’ to eight 
or more of the 24 items (i.e. malaise score = 8) are considered to be at risk of 
depression. Hence, I separated the responders into two groups, individuals with and 
without the risk of depression based up on measured malaise score. As seen from 
Table 3.8, the gender difference is obvious and women were more likely to feel 
depressed than men. At 33, only 3.9% of males felt depressed compared to 6.8% of 
female participants. Individuals at a younger age are comparatively more optimistic 
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and tend to think positively about their current status and future life. However, the 
percentage of respondents with depression at 42 years old rises to 7.7% for men and 
12.4% for women. At age 50, it only falls by about 1% for both males and females, 
reported as 7.1% and 11.3%, respectively. It can be concluded that middle-aged 
participants are more likely to feel depressed than other age groups due to the stress 
from work and family. Figure 3.9 and 3.10 exhibit the distribution of depression by 
ages and by qualifications respectively. It shows that more participants reported of 
having depression when they grow older for the Non-HE group. It increased from 
only 9% at a younger age to 17% at mid-age and nearly 20% at 50 and above. For the 
HE group, only 7% of participants reported to have depression at age of 33. It starts to 
rise to 15% at age of 42 but declined to 14% at 50 and above. Hence, better educated 
people are less likely to be depressed over lifetime. It has an increasing trend at 
mid-age for the HE group but declining when they grow older. 
 
3.3.3 Potential confounding variables 
Now I turn to consider which potential confounders should be included for calculating 
the PS. Chandola, et al (2006), following Blane (2003) and Feinstein (2002), 
summarise the links between education and health investigated in the previous 
literature and highlighted six plausible pathways for which evidence has been 
consistently found.
34
 The first pathway is cognitive ability in childhood. This may 
                                                             
34
 The six pathways include: (a) cognitive ability in childhood; (b) childhood socio-economic circumstances; (c) 
childhood and adolescent health (d) adult socio-economic circumstances; (e) adult socio-economic 
circumstances; (f) individual’s sense of controls 
131 
 
confound the association between education and health because it affects both 
educational attainment and adult health outcomes, and education exerts direct effects 
on heath by improving cognitive ability. Therefore, cognitive ability may be directly 
linked to health behaviours and improved decision-making skills.  
 
Second, childhood socioeconomic circumstances may confound the education-health 
association because it influences educational attainment as well as health. Higher 
parental social class is strongly associated with greater parental interest in the child's 
education and, consequently, better educational attainment (Feinstein and Symons, 
1999). Lower parental social class in childhood has also been strongly associated with 
greater morbidity in adulthood (Power and Hertzman, 1997). The association between 
education and health could therefore arise from the effect of parental social class on 
educational attainment and adult health.  Third, childhood and adolescent health may 
confound the association between education and health (Grossman, 1976)
35
 because 
it could influence a individual's educational achievement and attainment (Conley and 
Bennett 2000; Jackson 2009) and later, adulthood health (Jefferis et al., 2002) and 
mortality (Bengtsson and Lindstrom 2003). 
 
The other pathways are mediators which should not be included in the confounder 
                                                             
35
 Grossman (1976) uses a recursive system of equations to formulate and estimate health-schooling relationships. 
He found that schooling has a positive effect on health by controlling the past health in his model. His findings 
indicate that a one-year increase in schooling brings a 3.5 percent increase in health capital when only keeps age 
constant. The increase in health capital declines to 1.2 percent when all of the relevant variables are held constant; 
for example age, ability levels, wage rates, background characteristics.  
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pools. For example, adult health behaviours may mediate the effect of education on 
health because education might affect a person’s receptivity to health education 
messages which could have a beneficial influence on their health through health 
promoting behaviours and lifestyles (Fuchs, 1979; Keneckel, 1991). An individual’s 
sense of control over their life may mediate the association between education and 
health. Education increases the sense of personal control by developing analytic and 
communication skills (Mirowsky and Ross, 1998). The sense of personal control may 
also improve health through enhancing healthy behaviours by controlling one’s 
immediate addiction for future long term health benefits (Folkman, 1984), whereas 
the lack of personal control may be a stressor with consequent adverse physiological 
consequences (Ross and Wu, 1995).  
Therefore, I summarise that an individual’s personal ability, family background36 and 
childhood health variables are chosen as potential confounders that affect both 
adulthood health and educational attainment, thus potentially confounding the 
association between education and health. The NCDS contains rich information on 
health issues, including the individual’s initial health assets, the socioeconomic status 
during early childhood, and cognitive ability during childhood. Since the descriptive 
statistic for personal ability and family background variables have been presented in a 
previous chapter, here I only list the information on childhood health status.  
 
I first measure child health before age 7 (educational entrance) with a measure of the 
                                                             
36  Also used as covariates in Chapter 2.  
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infants’ low birth weight and maternal behaviour; that is, whether the 
mother smoked after the fourth month of pregnancy. A widely accepted cut-off as 
being low birth weight is responders for whom a birth weight of less than 2515g. 
Secondly, an individual’s childhood physical and mental conditions are diagnosed and 
reported in a medical examination from each Sweep.
37
 The medical examination is 
considered as a relatively unbiased measure since it reflects the condition impeding 
normal functioning, rather than self-evaluation. I create global measures of childhood 
general health status by separating physical and mental impairments. There are two 
reasons to construct this measure. First, it attempts to focus on persistently poor 
general health. I create variables indicating if there is a diagnosis that the child has 
had health problems during childhood and adolescence (i.e. ages 7, 11, 14 and 16). An 
individual with childhood health problems at a single age stage will not necessarily 
have the same problem across their entire childhood. Second, there are 18 category 
variables to indicate an abnormal health condition during childhood, which in turn 
would generate 18 dummies to present such attributes thereafter. However, some 
dummies may be omitted when calculating the PS.
38
  
 
Instead of using a mental health indicator derived from medical examination, I will 
use the Rutter behaviour score, which is an alternative measure that is widely 
accepted and used in health economics studies. The Rutter Behaviour Scores reported 
                                                             
37
 Physical health conditions include genetic conditions, physical abnormalities (e.g., spinal or limb disfiguration) 
and systemic abnormalities (e.g., heart, respiratory, blood conditions). Mental health conditions include mental 
retardation, emotional and behavioural problems. 
38
 This happens when there are only a few attributes in such a dummy variable.  
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in NCDS is an index for assessing a participant’s behavioural difficulties in childhood 
(Rutter, 1967, Rutter et al, 1970).
39
 Here, I use the overall score measured based on 
the responder' mother’s report.  Figure 3.12 illustrates the distributions of the total 
Rutter score across three childhood ages. Again, all of the distributions depict a 
property of positive skewness. Therefore, categorical ratings are re-calculated 
dividing scores into three levels of severity: “normal” scores of less than the 80th %; 
“moderate problem” scores between the 80th and 95th %; and, “severe problem” 
above the 95th %. The missing and incomplete values of health and mental measures 
are due to non-participation in one particular Sweep, which are also included in a 
separate category. The descriptive statistics of childhood health indicator are 
summarised in Table 3.10 
 
3.4 Methodology  
To document the basic correlations between education and health, I estimate the 
following regression: 
                                           (3.1) 
where Hit is a measure of individual’s general health, mental health and health 
behaviours. Ei stands for whether individual i has done any kind of HE attainment. In 
this model, Ei only contains two values, which are 0 and 1, and represent individuals 
with or without HE respectively.     is a vector of individual characteristics prior to 
                                                             
39 The definition is from ‘Teaching students quantitative methods using resources from the British Birth Cohorts” 
Available at : http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/shared/get-file.ashx?id=528&itemtype=document 
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HE decision. In this study, it includes race, region, personal innate ability, type of 
schooling, family background etc.;     is a set of variables presenting childhood and 
adolescence health characteristics before the HE decision that may potentially depend 
on    . c is a constant term and ε is the error term. The coefficient on education    
(also referred to as the health education gradient) is the object of interest, and it 
measures the effect to HE on the particular measure of health status and health-related 
behaviour.  
In this Chapter, I continue to use the PSM method to assess the casual effect of HE on 
health outcomes. Since PSM approach, and its corresponding matching algorithm and 
test have been discussed in Chapter 2, section 3, I will not present them again and 
hence go straight to the results.  
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3.5 Empirical result 
 
Table 3.11 reports results for the Probit selection models (with HE to 1 in the binary 
dependent variable) that are used to generate the PS matched estimates. The estimated 
coefficients exhibit their expected signs. For example, variables such as parental years 
of education, father’s social class with ‘professional’ are expected to have a positive 
effect on the treatment variable: HE. On the other hand, financial difficulties are 
expected to be negatively associated with HE.  
 
I will first report the results for the entire sample, and will then report the results for 
males and females separately. I estimate the return on health by PSM in order to 
control the selection bias problem, for example an individual’s ability and family 
background. The treated group includes the individuals who had completed some 
form of HE attainments. For the control group, the individual’s highest education 
qualification is at least one A-level.  
 
Before commenting on the results of the PSM, I will report a baseline model based on 
OLS estimates for male, female and pooled samples in Table 3.12. The aim of the 
baseline model is to assess whether HE is associated with changes in different 
indicators of adult health and mental outcome, and to find how the health behaviours 
change overtime with full controls of covariates, and the estimated result is not used 
for analysing. However, the OLS estimates are not appropriate for the nature of the 
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outcome variables and most likely to be affected by the bias due to the endogeneity of 
education. Consequently, in the remainder of this section I will report and comment 
on the PSM estimation while controlling for a rich set of personal and family 
background, and individual characteristics in childhood and adolescence. The PSM 
estimates based on two different matching algorithms are presented in Tables 3.13.  
 
In addition, histograms displaying the distributions of PSs for the treated and control 
groups are displayed in Figure 3.13. They are used to assess whether the overlap 
assumption was met in this study, and it clearly shows a complete overlap in the 
distributions of PS. The PS distributions and common support regions are illustrated 
in Figure 3.13.  
 
3.5.1 General health indicators 
I first examine the casual relationship between education and self-reported health 
outcome. The OLS result from Table 3.11 shows positive effects. The estimated 
coefficient for the age group of 33 is about 0.064 for pool sample, 0.037 for male, and 
0.079 for female participants. In general, the effect for age 42 and 50 are somewhat 
similar to that of age 33. By gender, education has a greater effect for women rather 
than men.  
However, once I include a full set of covariates, the effect of HE slightly increases in 
size, while this result is still robust and significant. As shown in Table 3.13 panel A, 
all of the estimated ATTs are statistically significant at 90% level. The effects on the 
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pooled sample across ages have no significant differences: 0.08 point at age 33, 0.08 
point at age 42, and 0.09 at age 50. Furthermore, once I allow for gender 
heterogeneity, the effect shows a monotonic increase with the increase of ages. 
Sub-sample analysis by gender further indicates that this result is significant for 
females where the effect size has a 0.03 margin more than that of the male group at all 
ages. For males, individuals with HE attainment at age 33 enjoy an extra 0.079 
margin on SRH, 0.09 at age 42, and 0.1 at age 50, respectively. Females enjoy an 
extra 0.04 margin at age 33, 0.045 at age 42, and 0.067 point at age 50. The results 
seem to stress the importance of taking sex heterogeneity into account since the 
results from pooled estimates might be misleading, particularly for SRH.  
 
Because the outcome variable SRH is an ordered categorical variable, it may not 
appropriate to show the percentage change from the estimated ATT results.  I 
therefore compare the fraction of each group with the potential outcomes based on 
matched samples for both HE and non-HE subjects. This seems to be a relatively 
straight forward measure of the impact of HE to health status. By doing this, I first 
tabulate the matched sample size for both treated and control groups, then I calculate 
the different fraction of each outcome variable based on total matched sample size. 
The first panel in Table 3.17 indicates the consequent results for SRH. For example, 
41.9% males with HE attainments of the total treated sample size are categorised as 
excellent, whereas that of non-HE males are computed as 32.5% of the total untreated 
sample. This implies the impact of a HE is to increase the incidence of good health by 
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30%. On the other hand, when measuring the risk of poor health status, the risk is 
more than double from 0.9% (with HE) to 2.6% (with non-HE). For females, the 
fraction of ‘excellent’ category are relatively close (38.4% and 37.0%), whereas the 
risk of having poor health status also doubles from 1.3% to 2.8% if females do not 
obtain a HE attainment. The rest of the results also show substantive evidence to 
suggest that HE has a significantly positive impact on an individual’s general health 
status in terms of SRH condition over the age. Higher educated participants have 
better general health conditions and this impact increases as cohorts getting older. The 
results are somewhat consistent with previous finding by Ross and Wu (1995), and 
White et al. (1999), which suggest that education has a strong and positive effect on 
adult self-assessed health.  
 
 
3.5.2 BMI and obesity 
I will next investigate the association between education and BMI and obesity. The 
baseline estimates shows HE has a strong and negative associate with BMI. This 
suggests a massive decrease in BMI for obtaining HE attainment. Estimates are 
almost significant at age 42 and 50, but insignificant at age 33. The size of the 
association for males is larger than females in absolute values. However, it is striking 
that in pooled sample, the overall impact increase at age 42 but decreases 8 years later  
in the absolute value. 
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When turning to PSM estimation with the inclusion of full controls for covariates, 
estimated coefficient from PSM has no large difference comparing to OLS result 
(-0.297 compare to -0.259) at age 33 in the case of pooled samples. It should be noted 
here that although the PSM results support the OLS results, they are not directly 
comparable because the latter only provides an estimate of premiums based on whole 
sample in question while PS estimates are restricted to the area of common support. In 
terms of gender, participating in HE also appears to have a larger effect on reducing 
the BMI figure for males (0.356) than females (0.136) at age 33. However, except for 
males, none of these estimated coefficients is statistically significant at a moderate 
level. The HE educational reduces BMI figure up to 0.472 at age 42 and 0.617 at age 
51 in the case of pooled samples. The decreased effects at age 51 in baseline model 
are not observed here. As the cohorts grow older, males still get more benefit from 
being highly educated to control the BMI figures. The figures are reduced by 0.529 at 
age 42 and 0.856 at age 50, respectively, almost twice as large as that of females.  
 
BMI figure can be used to reflect a relatively objective health status and it is likely to 
be normal distributed. It used to access the impact of HE on overall health status. 
Obesity measures is a threshold value that derived from BMI, it is considered to 
mainly access whether HE can reduce the risk of being obesity. I therefore 
consider the effects of HE on the threshold of obesity. The estimated effect is still 
insignificant when the cohorts are aged 33 (a 0.064 margin for males and 0.015 for 
females). Once cohorts grow to age 42, the marginal effects become -0.123 for males 
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and -0.107 for females, both significant at 95 % confidence level. The magnitude of 
the effect continues to slightly increase when individuals are aged 50, which accounts 
for -0.136 (males) and -0.114 (females). This implies that HE attainment have a 
significant but small restraining effect on obesity growth for individuals from age 42 
to 50.  
Moreover, being ‘overweight’ and ‘obesity’ in this study is based on an ordered 
categorical measure; therefore, males are conclude to be nearer ‘overweight’ and 
‘obesity’ category than women for all age groups. According to what reported in the 
second panel in Table 3.17, the portion of ‘under’ and ‘normal’ weight are relatively 
close when comparing treated and control group for both genders. However, the risk 
of being obesity is increased by 38% (6.6% to 9.1%) at age 33, 75% at age 42 (8.1% 
to 14.0%) and 23.4% (15.4% to 19.0%) on average, if males do not obtain HE 
attainment; on the other hand, if females are only with non-HE qualifications, the risk 
of being overweight is brought up by 23.9% at age 33, 17.4% at age 42 and 48.2% at 
age 50.  
 
3.5.3 Health behaviours 
Panel B in Table 3.13 shows the results of the effect to HE on drinking alcohol by 
gender. As seen from this panel, all of these effects on health behaviour are relatively 
large. However, it is worth noting that these health behaviours only explain some but 
not all of the differences in general health. For example, in the famous Whitehall 
study of British civil servants (Marmot 1994), smoking, drinking, and other health 
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behaviours can explain only one-third of the difference in mortality. Third (drinking 
frequency) and fourth (smoking frequency) panel in Table 3.17 report the fraction of 
each categorical outcome based on matched sample.   
(a) Drinking alcohol 
For baseline OLS result, there is a negative effect of HE on alcohol drinking 
frequency. The absolute values of coefficients increase as age increases. This indicates 
that individuals with HE attainments lead to a gradual reduction in alcohol 
consumption frequency from 33 to 50. However, when I split the sample by gender 
and run separate OLS analysis, one can see that this effect is only significant for 
females.  
 
The PSM estimates somewhat confirm the result getting from OLS. Compared to the 
results obtained by using PSM, the OLS approach again underestimates the education 
effects. By gender, HE also has a larger impact on females than men. The estimated 
effect for males at age 33 is insignificant whereas it shows a -0.255 margin for 
females. It indicates higher educated females are likely to drink less alcohol. As the 
participants grow older, the marginal effect for men dramatically goes up to 0.156 at 
age 42 and -0.201 at 50, both statistically significant at 90% level. For women, the 
parameter of interest also has a remarkable increase to 0.416 at age 42 and 0.474 at 
age 50. Overall, both male and female respondents are likely to drink less as they 
grow older.  
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When looking at the fraction changes, for males are not obtaining HE attainment, the 
fraction of drinking frequency as ‘once a day’ is increased by 15% (from 26.5% to 
30.5%) at age 33, 21% at age 42 (from 29.9% to 36.1%) and 23.4% (from 15.4% to 
19.0%) on average, if males do not obtain HE attainment; on the other hand, if 
females are only with non-HE qualifications, the drinking frequency as ‘once a day’ is 
then increased by 35 % (from 14.6% to 19.8%) at age 33, 15% at age 42 and 5% (25.2% 
to 26.4%) at age 50. The impact of education seems to be decreasing as the age for 
females.  
 
(b) Smoking frequency 
The OLS results briefly show a positive impact of HE on the incidence of smoking. 
Individual with HE attainment reduces ranges from 0.07 to 0.15 on average and the 
effect on smoking steadily decreases in the long term for both genders. The results for 
PSM estimates are mixed. The parameter of interest that shows the impact of HE on 
smoking at age 33 is reported about 0.15 for the pooled sample. Meanwhile, higher 
educated women are nearer to “never smoke” when compared to men. Attending HE 
can significantly gain a 0.204 for females, as suggested by the estimated coefficients. 
By contrast, the effects are observed to be insignificant for males. When participants 
grow older, the impact goes down by 0.05 at age 42 for the pooled sample. On the 
female sub-sample, the marginal effect only accounts for 0.106, or almost half the 
figure compared to that when they were 9 years younger. This effect for males is still 
insignificant. Furthermore, I do not find any significant effects of HE on reducing the 
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frequency of smoking behaviour when the participants enter their fifties, for males or 
females, although the coefficients appear to be negative.  
 
Turning to the fraction changes of each category, the results shown in fourth panel in 
Table 3.17 are interesting. At age 33, males with HE are more likely to quit smoking 
(18.7%) than the ones without HE (15%). Occasional smoking frequency for HE 
participants (6.0%) is less than that for Non-HE participants (8.2%), whist daily 
smoking frequency for both groups are almost same (16.2% and 17.2%). For females, 
daily smoking frequency for HE group (17.0%) is higher than that for non-HE group 
(17.0%), but the occasional smoking frequency does not have significant differences. 
Moreover, the quit-smoking fraction of non-HE group (24%) is higher than HE group 
(21%) is possibly because people in HE group are more likely to be a non smoker.  
As the participants getting older, the differences between the two groups become less. 
It is found that at age 50, the fraction of four categories for both treated and control 
group are almost same.  
Overall, these findings reinforce the findings by a number of previous studies which 
have found a negative correlation between smoking and education (Feinstein et al., 
2008), and between drinking alcohol and education in the case of the UK (Cutler and 
Lleras-Muney, 2010). More educated young adults tend to hold risk perceptions more 
closely related to the actual risks of these behaviours. However, the impact of HE is 
decreasing as the people are getting older. In particular, HE does not effectively affect 
the smoking behaviour as the results tell. 
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3.5.4 Depression 
The final panel in Table 3.13 shows the impact of education on depression for pooled 
male and female samples. The baseline results find that HE has a negative relationship 
with depression. a positive effect of enrolling in HE on BMI, but the education effect 
is not significant different form zero. These associations vary significantly for 
individuals of different ages. Based on the OLS estimation, education has a larger 
impact on depression for females at age 33 than for males. The effect starts increasing 
to about 0.03 until middle-age, and is 0.04 after 50 and above for females.  
 
However, the result is not robust to the above conclusion once I allow for the 
inclusion of the full set of covariates in the analyses and apply the PSM estimation. 
Although all of the estimated coefficients appear to be small and negative, the effect is 
only significant at 90% level for females at age 33. The descriptive statistics in 
Section 3.4 suggest a general increase in the malaise score and depression indicator 
over time for both genders, but it appears that participation in HE does carry some 
potential effects. Therefore, the PSM results suggest that most of the 
depression-education gradient in OLS comes from selection rather than causation.  
On the other hand, the results shown in last panel in Table 3.17 are slightly different. 
There are no large differences between the treated and control groups expect for male 
participates are in their mid ages. The risk of being depression for non-HE group is 
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increased by 72% ( from 3.9% to 6.7%) at age 42 and by 48% at age 50 (6.4% to 
9.5%), respectively, although the fraction margin is relatively small.  
Contrary to previous research (Bynner et al., 2003; Feinstein et al., 2002), my finding 
does not suggest a significant impact of HE on the reduction in depression. The result 
of insignificant effect of HE on reducing the likelihood of depression in the UK is 
new to the literature. This possibly arises because these papers mainly focus on those 
participants with lower or no qualifications. Lower educated individuals can benefit 
from education, and they may acquire better labour market opportunities or higher 
wages in return. As a result, they are more likely to work and have a better lifestyle 
and will be less likely to suffer from depression. However, the casual effect of HE on 
depression is ambiguous since there may be contrasting mechanisms. HE attainment 
may be associated with more control over working standards and thus has a positive 
effect on mental health and reduces rates of morbidity; on the other hand, higher 
occupational attainment also leads to higher levels of stress. It is believed that there 
may be important trade-offs between stress and satisfaction that may lead to a 
complex and non-linear relationship between educational success and mental health 
(Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1998).  
 
3.5.5 ‘Thick-support’ robustness test  
Making causal claims about effects are considered to satisfy three assumptions: 
overlap, covariate balance, and conditional independence or unconfoundness (Imbens 
& Wooldridge, 2009). Hence, to further test the credibility of the estimated results, I 
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conduct a ‘thick region’ test and balance test, and examine the sensitivity of the 
results due to unobserved heterogeneity by Rosenbaum Bounds (R-bounds), which 
will be discussed in the following subsections. 
 
To test the robustness of the estimates, I follow Black and Smith (2004) and estimate 
the ATTs on the region of ‘thick-support’, which is defined as the region with an 
estimated PS in the interval by                 . The authors adopted this 
approach based on two reasons. First, the fact that individuals with high estimated PSs 
observed at low levels of treatments may actually represent a measurement error in 
the treatment variable. Second, there may be a residual selection on unobservables 
which will have a large effect on the bias for values of the PS in the tails of the 
distribution. In practice, the ‘thick-support’ region is characterised by having a 
substantial number of observations in both the treatment group and the comparison 
group, which means that the average frequency with which a comparison observation 
is used as a match is comparatively low.  
 
The estimated effects for the thick-support region thus refer to samples that, in terms 
of sheer size, are very different to those on the entire common support. For example, 
imposing the thick-support condition leads to a drop of roughly one-third of the 
observations in the pooled samples (i.e. 741 out of 1858). However, as presented in 
Table 6, the thick-support estimates in the majority of the cases seem fairly robust 
compared to the estimates based on the entire common support reported in Table 3.14. 
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Although the estimates generally indicate a slight increase in the HE impact of health 
and health-related indicators, according Black and Smith (2004), the estimated effects 
on the thick-support are similar to those on the entire common support, which is an 
indication of effect homogeneity over different values of the PS. 
 
3.5.6 Balance test for matching quality 
According to the conclusion in Chapter One, the t-test and SB of balance are too rigid 
to reject the null too often. In this thesis, the adequacy of the matching process was 
evaluated by assessing covariate balance using mean absolute bias and Pseudo-R
2
, as 
advocated Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). 
 
Table 3.15 presents the covariate balance statistics concerning the joint quality of the 
matching before and after matching. The overall mean absolute bias before matching 
lies between 10 to 30 %. The matching generates a reduction in mean bias by 
approximately six times. After matching, the bias is significantly reduced for the NN 
and kernel matching estimators, ranging from 2 to 8 %. In particular, Kernel matching 
provides the better result and shows that all after matching covariates display a mean 
absolute lower than that from NN matching. On the other hand, Pseudo-R
2
 indicates 
how well the covariates explain the probability of receiving treatment. The reported 
Pseudo-R
2
 before matching is normally around 15 to 30 % whereas after matching it 
drops to roughly about 3 %. This indicates that there are fewer systematic differences 
in the distribution of covariates between the treatment and the control groups. These 
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results clearly show that the matching procedure is fairly successful in terms of 
balancing the distribution of covariates between the two groups. 
 
 
3.5.7 Sensitivity analysis for unobserved heterogeneity 
Although Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistics
40
 for checking the hidden bias 
are generally preferred for dichotomous outcomes (Becker and Caliendo, 2007), this 
procedure has not been adapted to the Stata13 program. Therefore, I still apply 
sensitivity analysis based on Rosenbaum Bounds (R-bounds) method to test the 
robustness of the results, as displayed in Table 3.15. The increasing bound parameter 
Γ would result in a statistically insignificant treatment effect if there is an unobserved 
heterogeneity. As discussed in Chapter One, starting from Γ= 1, i.e. there is no hidden 
bias.  
 
I first assessed the effects on general health indicator in Panel A, and some problems 
arose. The sensitivity analysis shows that for effect on SRH, through the increase of Γ 
up to 1.10, the upper bound
41
of the p-value exceeds the 5%-level, and this occurs to 
all matching algorithms. This indicates that the result is relative vulnerable to 
unobserved bias, while it only requires a 10% increase in the odds of selection to 
negate the effect. Similarly, for effects on BMI and obesity, it would also generally 
take relatively low Γ values of unobserved selection (about 1.15 on average for the 
                                                             
40  See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a detailed description for non-parametric Mantel and Haenszel test 
statistic.  
41
  Since the estimated coefficient is positive 
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former and about 1.10 on average for the latter) to make the treatment effect 
statistically insignificant. Moreover, when I considered adding economics factors into 
covariates (log wage), the results were not improved significantly. For example, the 
P-value exceeds the 5%-level when Γ≈1.15 in the case of SRH. Therefore, the 
robustness of the effect on general health indicators may be of interest for further 
investigation. 
 
When turning to health behaviour outcomes in Panel B, the treatment effect would 
have been insignificant when Γ≈1.31 to 1.45. It is at this value that the treatment 
effect is no longer statistically significant at 5 %. This suggests that having matched 
on observed covariates, any unobserved confounding variables would have to increase 
the likelihood of selection by around 35 %. This is considered a fairly large value. In 
addition, in common with health behaviour outcomes, any unobserved confounding 
variable would have to increase the odd ratio by over 50% (Γ≈1.50) to overturn the 
causal effects on depression, as shown in Panel C. Therefore, apart from the general 
health indicator, the estimated causal effects appear robust to the unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
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3.6 Conclusion and policy implication 
This survey adopts a quasi-parametric approach (PSM) to estimate the causal effects 
of HE attainment on a very wide range of individual’s health-related outcomes across 
different age levels. I have used five waves of a longitudinal survey data for UK 
gathering a wealth of information on an individual’s general health, mental health, and 
health-related behaviours and I draw the following conclusions from the reviews of 
the evidence:  
(a) In general, the non-pecuniary benefits to HE attainments on health are substantial, 
implying that attending the HE may be a relatively effective way to improve 
population health. Educated men and women are more likely to report better 
health, are less likely to be obesity, more likely to be non-smokers and to have a 
higher sense of control on drinking alcohol, which in turn is associated with better 
health.  
(b) Some of effects fall continuously with age (such as smoking), while others 
increase with age (e.g. SRH, BMI, drinking alcohol). Gender has an influence on 
the effects. HE has a larger effect on BMI and likelihood of being obesity for men, 
while for women HE has greater effect on SRH and health-damaging behaviours, 
such as frequency of drinking alcohol and smoking. 
(C) Furthermore, I find no significant evidence that HE reduced the likelihood of 
depression, for males or females.  
According to Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), education-health gradients 
arise or increase when there is knowledge and technology available to prevent or treat 
152 
 
disease (a similar theory is tested in Link and Phelan (1995), and Glied and 
Lleras-Muney (2003)), because there is a universal demand for better health and those 
with more education (or more income, or more power) are likely to use new 
knowledge and new techniques more rapidly and more effectively. This idea is 
consistent with the fundamental causes of disease hypothesis (Link and Phelan 1995), 
which suggests that education gives an individual a wide range of serviceable 
resources, including money, knowledge, prestige, power and beneficial social 
conditions, which can be used to one’s health advantage. Thus, a higher effect on an 
individual’s health outcomes and health-related behaviours over time may be caused 
by the benefits of new effective techniques and the individual’s confidence in curing 
disease, which has been built by having more knowledge. I support the view that 
education has a positive effect on an individual’s health outcomes and reduces 
damaging health behaviours. 
The causality is important not only for determining the exact relation between 
education and health, but also from a policy point of view. Public expenditures would 
only be effective in improving the health of the population if in fact HE causes health. 
We control the family background and individual characteristics for estimating the 
impact of HE.  Adding these measures are expected to lowered the effect of 
education, but it generally remains large and significant in most cases.   
There appear to be significant benefits attached to HE that contributes to better health 
status and less unhealthy behaviour. Nevertheless, these social benefits of HE play 
only a minor role in policy making. Much of the policy discussion about reducing 
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health disparities across socioeconomic groups has focused on improving health 
insurance coverage and access to health care. The importance of higher education 
seems to be underestimated. During the past decades in UK, public expenditures on 
NHS and health care have increased more than that on HE. On the other hand, the 
policy maker may try to remedy the negative effects and social costs of a relatively 
lower educated population by increasing unemployment benefits and by increasing 
health care budgets to counter the detrimental effects of unhealthy behaviour. 
Spending on HE could consequently yield savings in health care and unemployment 
benefits. This makes that the causal relation between education and health has 
important implications for public policy. 
However, even if it accepts positive impact of increasing expenditures on HE, two 
important questions remain before I can conclude an appropriate policy response. 
Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 2, it would sorely call for education subsidies to the 
extent there is a market failure, otherwise Individuals would base their education 
decisions on the health benefits along with the financial benefits. Secondly, 
understanding the mechanism by which education affects health is also important for 
policy maker consideration. Education might matter for health not just because of 
acquisitions of healthy information and behaviour, but rather because education 
improves incomes and hence improves health status and behaviours. In that case, it 
would possibly be less expensive to increase income directly, rather than to subsidise 
HE.  
 
154 
 
In my point of view, if it is proved that individual decisions to invest in HE are based 
only on the financial returns and individuals may be unaware of the health benefits of 
education when they make their education decisions, possible rationales for HE 
subsidies can be introduced. In addition, HE subsidies may be considered as the last 
resort if there is no alternative less expensive method to acquire the skills that 
ultimately affect health. 
 
The findings of this study should be interpreted in the context of several limitations. 
Firstly, although I am able to control for many more factors than some of the literature, 
the estimates of the effect to HE on health may nonetheless not be fully identified. A 
review of the research literature on education and health has suggested a causal 
relationship from education to health, while conceding that the direction of causality 
may be reversed.  In this paper, an individual’s childhood cognitive ability, regions, 
secondary school types, parental information, health status in childhood, and 
adolescence have been taken into account as control variables to reduce the 
measurement errors. However, the R-bound result shows that the treatment effect on 
SRH is relatively sensitive to the unobserved heterogeneity. In other words, there may 
exist other unobservables that were not included in this analysis but which could drive 
the association between education and health. The economics literature suggests that a 
‘third variable’ determines both education and health, and this drives their correlation. 
For other outcomes examined in my analysis, the PSM already does a good job of 
explaining the causal effects. 
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Another potential limitation of this study was its focus on British data. 
Country-specific cohort effects may have been observed in this study. For example, 
the participants were all born in 1958. The educational attainments of this cohort may 
have uniquely affected the estimated effects on their health outcomes. The association 
between education and health may differ in other groups of people or in groups that 
were born in different years, although the mechanisms underlying the association 
should be similar. However, the results in this paper can only represent this unique 
group of 1958 cohorts. 
 
 
  
156 
 
Appendix C Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1  Distribution of SRH by gender 
Age 
Group 
Gender General Health Condition Total 
  Excellent Good Fair Poor  
Age 33 Men 
 
1571 
(36.11) 
2221 
(51.04) 
488 
(11.22) 
71 
(1.63) 
4351 
(100) 
 Women 1500 
(33.22) 
2391 
(52.93) 
545 
(12.66) 
81 
(1.79) 
4517 
(100) 
 Total 3,071 
(34.63) 
4612 
(52.01) 
1033 
(11.65) 
152 
(1.71) 
8868 
(100) 
Age 42 Men 1365 
(31.00) 
2260 
(51.33) 
634 
(14.40) 
144 
(3.27) 
4403 
(100) 
 Women 1376 
(30.29) 
2345 
(51.62) 
658 
(14.48) 
164 
(3.61) 
4543 
(100) 
 Total 2741 
(30.64) 
4605 
(51.48) 
1292 
(14.44) 
308 
(3.44) 
8946 
(100) 
Age 51 Men 723 
(19.23) 
2363 
(62.86) 
475 
(12.64) 
198 
(5.27) 
3759 
(100) 
 Women 768 
(19.61) 
2422 
(61.85) 
487 
(12.44) 
239 
(6.10) 
3916 
(100) 
 Total 1491 
(19.43) 
4785 
(62.35) 
962 
(12.53) 
437 
(5.69) 
7675 
(100) 
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Table 3.2 General Health Indicator by Qualifications 
Age 
Groups 
Health 
Categories 
Qualifications 
  None GSE O Level At least 1 
A Level 
HE Total 
Age 33 Excellent 300 
24.81 
350 
27.80 
1,063 
36.16 
294 
40.11 
715 
45.28 
2,722 
Good 636 
52.61 
707 
56.16 
1559 
53.03 
378 
51.57 
743 
47.06 
4023 
Fair 234 
19.35 
171 
13.58 
286 
9.73 
53 
7.23 
113 
7.16 
857 
Poor 39 
3.23 
31 
2.46 
32 
1.09 
8 
1.09 
8 
0.51 
118 
Total 1209 1259 2940 733 1579 7720 
Age 42 Excellent 362 
20.65 
340 
25.37 
997 
31.15 
298 
36.52 
733 
40.23 
2730 
Good 871 
49.69 
733 
54.70 
1709 
53.39 
418 
51.23 
873 
47.91 
4604 
Fair 389 
22.19 
216 
16.12 
417 
13.03 
87 
10.66 
181 
9.93 
1290 
Poor 131 
7.47 
51 
3.81 
78 
2.44 
13 
1.59 
35 
1.92 
308 
Total 1753 1340 3201 816 1822 8932 
Age 51 Excellent 140 
11.48 
151 
14.31 
492 
18.64 
176 
25.62 
453 
28.84 
1412 
Good 702 
57.59 
689 
65.31 
1744 
66.06 
430 
62.59 
944 
60.09 
4509 
Fair 248 
20.34 
151 
14.31 
286 
10.83 
54 
7.86 
128 
8.15 
867 
Poor 129 
10.58 
64 
6.07 
118 
4.47 
27 
3.93 
46 
2.93 
384 
Total 1219 1055 2640 687 1571 7172 
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Table 3.3  Correlation analysis for self-reported health at age 42 
 Health 
42 
Professional Intermediate Skilled 
non-manual 
Skilled 
manual 
Semi-skilled 
non-manual 
Semi-skilled 
manual 
Unskilled 
Health 42 1.00 0.0292 0.0287 0.0198 -0.0129 0.0069 -0.0166 -0.0129 
Professional - 1.00 -0.0828 -0.0541 -0.1330 -0.0200 -0.0620 -0.0373 
Intermediate - - 1.00 -0.1139 -0.2800 -0.0421 -0.1304 -0.0785 
Skilled 
non-manual 
- - - 1.00 -0.1830 -0.0275 -0.0853 -0.0513 
Skilled 
manual 
- - - - 1.00 -0.0677 -0.2096 -0.1261 
Semi-skilled 
non-manual 
- - -  - - 1.00 -0.0315 -0.0190 
Semi-skilled 
manual 
- - - - - - 1.00 -0.0587 
Unskilled - - - - - - - 1.00 
         
 Health 
42 
long term 
limiting 
health  
Hospital 
admission 
     
Health 42 1.00 0.5562 0.1172      
Log wage 42 - 1.00 0.1057      
Working 
Hour 
- - 1.00      
         
 Health 
33 
Health 42 Health 50      
Health 33 1.00 0.5042 0.4313      
Heatlh 42 - 1.00 0.5497      
Health 50 - - 1.00      
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Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics of BMI by gender over time 
 
  Mean S.D 
Age 33 Men 25.39 4.01 
 Women 23.68 4.38 
Age 42 Men 26.28  4.21 
 Women 25.27 5.08 
Age 50 Men 27.52  4.63 
 Women 25.50 4.77 
 
Table 3.5 Categories of BMI 
Categories BMI 
Under Weight < 18.5 
Normal Weight 18.5-24.9 
Overweight 25-29.9 
Obesity BMI of 30 Or Greater 
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Table 3.6 Distribution of being obesity at age 33, 42, and 51 by gender 
Age 
Group 
Gender BMI Total 
  Under 
Weight 
Normal 
Weight 
Overweight Obesity  
Age 33 Men 90 
(2.09) 
2,066 
(47.91) 
1,726 
(40.03) 
430 
(9.97) 
4,312 
(100) 
 Women 332 
(7.41) 
2,745 
(61.26) 
1,057 
(23.59) 
347 
(7.74) 
4,481 
(100) 
 Total 422 
(4.80) 
4,811 
(54.71) 
2,783 
(31.65) 
777 
(8.84) 
8,793 
(100) 
Age 42 Men 77 
(1.78) 
1624 
(37.64) 
1973 
(45.72) 
641 
(14.86) 
4315 
(100) 
 Women 133 
(2.96) 
2363 
(52.65) 
1352 
(30.12) 
640 
(14.26) 
4488 
(100) 
 Total 210 
(2.39) 
3987 
(45.29) 
3325 
(37.77) 
1281 
(14.55) 
8803 
(100) 
Age 51 Men 55 
(1.77) 
852 
(27.40) 
1431 
(46.01) 
772 
(24.82) 
3110 
(100) 
 Women 175 
(5.30) 
1477 
(44.77) 
1082 
(32.80) 
565 
(17.13) 
3299 
(100) 
 Total 230 
(3.59) 
2329 
(36.34) 
2513 
(39.21) 
1337 
(20.86) 
6409 
(100) 
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Table 3.7 Frequency of Drinking Alcohol by ages 
Age 
Group 
Gender Frequency of Drinking Alcohol Total 
  On 
most 
days 
2 to 3 
days a 
week 
Once a 
week 
2 to 3 
times a 
month 
Less 
often or 
only on 
special 
occasions 
Never 
nowadays 
Never 
had an 
alcoholic 
drink 
 
Age 
33 
Men 1087 
(24.72) 
1597 
(36.31) 
793 
(18.03) 
374 
(8.50) 
372 
(8.46) 
143 
(3.25) 
32 
(0.73) 
4398 
(100) 
 Women 689 
(15.18) 
1346 
(29.65) 
906 
(19.96) 
543 
(11.96) 
787 
(17.34) 
196 
(4.32) 
72 
(1.59) 
 
4539 
(100) 
 Total 1,776 
(19.87) 
2,943 
(32.93) 
1,699 
(19.01) 
917 
(10.26) 
1,159 
(12.97) 
339 
(3.79) 
104 
(1.16) 
8,937 
(100) 
Age 
42 
Men 1040 
(28.49) 
1330 
(36.44) 
590 
(16.16) 
249 
(6.82) 
278 
(7.62) 
132 
(3.62) 
31 
(0.85) 
3650 
100 
 Women 748 
(19.25) 
1185 
(30.49) 
678 
(17.45) 
400 
(10.29) 
598 
(15.39) 
218 
(5.61) 
59 
(1.52) 
3886 
100 
 Total 1,788 
(23.73) 
2,515 
(33.37) 
1,268 
(16.83) 
649 
(8.61) 
876 
(11.62) 
350 
(4.64) 
90 
(1.19) 
7,536 
(100) 
Age 
51 
Men 1034 
(27.49) 
1257 
(33.42) 
 643 
(17.10) 
255 
(6.78) 
405 
(10.77) 
152 
(4.04) 
15 
(0.40) 
3761 
(100) 
 Women 734 
(18.74) 
1157 
(29.55) 
640 
(16.34) 
643 
(16.42) 
764 
(19.51) 
246 
(6.28) 
51 
(1.30) 
3916 
(100) 
 Total 1,768 
(23.03) 
2,414 
(31.44) 
1,283 
(16.71) 
579 
(7.54) 
1,169 
(15.23) 
398 
(5.18) 
66 
(0.86) 
7,677 
(100) 
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Table 3.8 Frequency of smoking by gender 
Age 
groups 
Gender Frequency of smoking Total 
  Never 
smoked 
cigarettes 
Used to 
smoke 
but don’t 
at all now 
Smoke 
cigarettes 
occasionally 
Smoke 
every day 
 
Age 33 Men 1927 
(43.82) 
1137 
(25.85) 
206 
(4.68) 
1128 
(25.65) 
4398 
(100) 
 Women 2069 
(45.58) 
1102 
(24.28) 
186 
(4.10) 
1182 
(26.04) 
4539 
(100) 
 Total 3,996 
(44.71) 
2,239 
(25.05) 
392 
(4.39) 
2,310 
(25.85) 
8,937 
(100) 
Age 42 Men 1669 
(45.71) 
1053 
(28.84) 
160 
(4.38) 
769 
(21.06) 
3651 
(100) 
 Women 1859 
(47.81) 
1006 
(25.87) 
141 
(3.63) 
882 
(22.69) 
3888 
(100) 
 Total 3,528 
(46.80%) 
2,059 
(27.31%) 
301 
(3.99%) 
1,651 
(21.90%) 
7,539 
(100%) 
Age 51 Men 1662 
(44.19) 
1268 
(33.71) 
116 
(3.08) 
715 
(19.01) 
3761 
(100) 
 Women 1877 
(47.93) 
1124 
(28.70) 
128 
(3.27) 
787 
(20.10) 
3916 
(100) 
 Total 3,539 
(46.10%) 
2,392 
(31.16%) 
244 
(3.18%) 
1,502 
(19.56%) 
7,677 
(100%) 
 
 
Table 3.9 Distribution of depression risk by gender 
  Risk of depression  
(Malaise score >=8) 
No Risk of depression 
(Malaise score <8) 
Age 33 Men 3.9% 96.3% 
Women 6.8% 93.2% 
Age 42 Men 7.7% 92.3% 
Women 12.4% 87.6% 
Age 51 Men 9.69% 90.31% 
Women 14.5% 85.5% 
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Table 3.10 Summary of childhood health indicators 
Variable Mean (%)  Mean(%) 
Birth weight  (<2500g) 6.4   
Mother smoking during pregnancy   Behaviour Score  7  
Non-smoker 66.4 Normal  60.84 
Medium smoker 15.7 Moderate problem 8.64 
Heavy smoker 12.3 Severe problem 4.09 
Variable smoker 5.6 Missing or Incomplete 26.44 
General health at age 7  Behaviour Score  11  
Good 78.0 Normal  55.39 
Abnormal  6.7 moderate 7.73 
Missing Value 15.3 Severe problems 3.76 
General health at age 11  Missing or Incomplete 33.13 
Good 70.5 Behaviour Score  16  
Abnormal  9.4 Normal  48.58 
Missing Value 20.1 moderate 9.80 
General health at age 11  Severe problems 2.99 
Good 69.3 Missing or Incomplete 38.63 
Abnormal  10.6   
Missing Value 20.1   
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Table 3.11 Probit model for PS estimations 
     
Ethics (non-White) 0.025  Number of siblings in 
1974 
-0.054  
Mathematics ability at 
7 years 
  Father’s interest in 
education 
  
5th quintile (highest) 0.194  Over concerned 0.596 
4th quintile -0.014 Very interested 0.181  
3rd quintile -0.156  Some interest 0.055  
2nd quintile -0.354  Mother’s interest in 
education 
  
1st quintile (lowest) -0.254  Over concerned 0.198  
Reading ability at 7 
years 
 Very interested 0.068  
5th quintile (highest) 0.045  Some interest 0.007  
4th quintile 0.022  Bad finances in 1969 
or 1974 
-0.112  
3rd quintile -0.263  Region in 1974   
2nd quintile -0.209  North West -0.175  
1st quintile (lowest) -0.204  North 0.198  
Mathematics ability at 
11 years 
 East and West  -0.008  
5th quintile (highest) -0.466  East -0.448  
4th quintile -0.402  London and South 
East 
0.249  
3rd quintile -0.171  South -0.345  
2nd quintile -0.002  South West 0.037  
1st quintile (lowest) 0.231  Midlands -0.148  
Reading ability at 11 
years 
 Wales omitted  
5th quintile (highest) 0.159  Scotland -0.560  
4th quintile 0.068    
3rd quintile -0.110     
2nd quintile -0.298  Father’s years of 
education 
0.275  
1st quintile (lowest) -0.505  Mother’s years of 
education 
0.387  
Comprehensive school 
1974 
0.193    
Secondary modern 
school 1974 
0.112  Birth weight  
(<2500g) 
0.086  
Grammar school 1974 0.387  Mother Smoking   
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During Pregnancy  
Private school 1974 0.560  Non smoker 0.002  
Other school 1974 -0.017  Medium smoker 0.041  
Father’s social class in 
1974 
  Heavy smoker 0.012  
Professional 0.474  Variable smoker 0.058  
Intermediate 0.234  General health at age 
7 
  
Skilled Non-manual 0.182  Good 0.100  
Skilled manual -0.063  Abnormal  0.090  
Semi-skilled 
non-manual 
0.008  Missing Value 0.121  
Semi-skilled manual -0.025  General health at age 
11 
  
Unskilled -0.287  Good 0.045  
Missing, or 
unemployed or no 
father 
Omitted  Abnormal  0.025  
   Missing Value 0.097  
Behaviour Score  7   General health at age 
11 
  
Normal  0.015  Good 0.067  
Moderate problem -0.012  Abnormal  0.045  
Severe problem -0.045  Missing Value 0.089  
Missing or Incomplete 0.025  Behaviour Score  16   
Behaviour Score  11   Normal  0.045  
Normal  0.044  moderate -0.001  
moderate 0.065  Severe problems -0.094  
Severe problems -0.058  Missing or Incomplete 0.056  
Missing or Incomplete 0.045     
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Table 3.12 Returns to HE on Health and Health related conditions, OLS results 
 Full Male Female 
Panel A    
Self-Reported Health 
Age 33 0.0639** 
(0.142) 
0.0365 
(0.105) 
0.0786 
(0.134) 
Age 42 0.0653 
(0.034) 
0.0521 
(0.053) 
0.0832 
(0.045) 
Age 50 0.0671 
(0.054) 
0.0590 
(0.083) 
0. 0856 
(0.072) 
BMI 
Age 33 -0.2591 
(0.165) 
-0.3424 
(0.229) 
0.1023 
(0.108) 
Age 42 -0.5462** 
(0.181) 
-0.5497** 
(0.24) 
-0.4820** 
(0.147) 
Age 50 -0.3304 
(0.206) 
-0.4671* 
(0.279) 
-0.6318** 
(0.273) 
Obesity 
 Full Male Female 
Age 33 -0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.071* 
(0.040) 
-0.041 
(0.044) 
Age 42 -0.075** 
(0.029) 
-0.108** 
(0.039) 
-0.087** 
(0.433) 
Age 50 -0.065* 
(0.035) 
-0.116** 
(0.047) 
-0.079* 
(0.049) 
Panel B    
Drinking Frequency 
Age 33 Full Male Female 
 -0.1779** 
(0.069) 
-0.0317 
(0.096) 
-0.2864** 
(0.099) 
    
Age 42 -0.2321** -0.1384 -0.2615** 
 (0.076) (0.104) (0.111) 
    
Age 50 0.2631*** 
(0.034) 
0.1298 
(0.106) 
0.3615*** 
(0.113) 
    
Smoking Frequency 
Age 33 Full Male Female 
 -0.141** -0.134** -0.150** 
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(0.041) (0.050) (0.057) 
    
Age 42 -0.101** -0.093* -0.129** 
 (0.042) (0.058) (0.058) 
    
Age 50 -0.098** 
(0.039) 
-0.073* 
(0.041) 
-0.116** 
(0.053) 
     
Panel C    
Depression 
Age 33 Full Male Female 
 0.097** 
(0.034) 
0.080** 
(0.052) 
0.113** 
(0.044) 
    
Age 42 0.082** 0.078** 0.120** 
 (0.050) (0.045) (0.097) 
    
Age 50 0.104** 
(0.084) 
0.094** 
(0.072) 
0.123** 
(0.094) 
    
Note ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.13  Returns to HE on Health and Health related conditions, PSM results 
  PSM 
(Nearest Neighbour) 
  PSM  
(Kernel) 
 
Panel A        
Self reported health 
Age 33 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
 0.081* 
(0.049) 
0.078* 
(0.070) 
0.118** 
(0.075) 
 0.078* 
(0.034) 
0.0704* 
(0.054) 
0.111** 
(0.067) 
        
Age 42 0.085* 
(0.051) 
0.090** 
(0.057) 
0.135** 
(0.074) 
 0.081* 
(0.045) 
0.090** 
(0.050) 
0.131** 
(0.071) 
        
Age 50 0.091* 
(0.070) 
0.102* 
(0.075) 
0.167** 
(0.076) 
 0.090* 
(0.072) 
0.100* 
(0.064) 
0.165** 
(0.069) 
        
BMI 
Age 33 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
 -0.297 
(0.192) 
-0.355* 
(0.152) 
-0.136 
(0.362) 
 -0.301 
(0.114) 
-0.360* 
(0.140) 
-0.138 
(0.245) 
        
Age 42 -0.472** 
(0. 031) 
-0.529** 
(0.040) 
0.377** 
(0.035) 
 -0.475** 
(0. 15) 
-0.528** 
(0.40) 
0.376** 
(0.30) 
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Age 50 -0.617** 
(0.242) 
-0.859** 
(0.364) 
-0. 481*    
(0.127) 
 -0.601** 
(0.211) 
-0.821** 
(0.301) 
-0. 424*    
(0.114) 
        
Obesity 
Age 33 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
 -0.026 
(0.032) 
-0.064 
(0.076) 
-0.015 
(0.060) 
 -0.024 
(0.029) 
-0.060 
(0.070 
-0.015 
(0.060) 
        
Age 42 -0.110** 
(0.052) 
-0.123** 
(0.051) 
-0.107** 
(0.046) 
 -0.101** 
(0.050) 
-0.119** 
(0.049) 
-0.100** 
(0.042) 
Age 50 -0.124** 
(0.064) 
-0.136** 
(0.059) 
-0.114** 
(0.045) 
 -0.118** 
(0.061) 
-0.130** 
(0.048) 
-0.109** 
(0.039) 
        
Panel B        
Alcohol Drinking Frequency 
Age 33 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
 -0.231** 
(0.034) 
-0.073 
(0.053) 
-0.255** 
(0.045) 
 -0.214** 
(0.031) 
0.067 
(0.050) 
-0.245** 
(0.038) 
        
Age 42 -0.301** 
(0.041) 
-0.156* 
(0.024) 
-0.416 
(0.044) 
 -0.294** 
(0.034) 
-0.148* 
(0.014) 
-0.409* 
(0.039) 
        
Age 50 -0.358** 
(0.034) 
-0.201* 
(0.025) 
-0.474** 
(0. 048) 
 -0.345** 
(0.028) 
-0.194* 
(0.025) 
-0.456** 
(0.040) 
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Smoke Frequency 
Age 33 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
 -0.145** 
(0.072) 
-0.082 
(0.070) 
-0.204** 
(0.101) 
 -0.141** 
(0.072) 
-0.080 
(0.070) 
-0.200** 
(0.101) 
        
Age 42 -0.093** -0.053 -0.106**  -0.088** -0.048 -0.101** 
 (0.048) (0.109) (0.051)  (0.048) (0.109) (0.051) 
        
Age 50 -0.074 
(0.034) 
-0.046 
(0.057) 
-0.097 
(0.064) 
 -0.071 
(0.034) 
-0.039 
(0.057) 
-0.089 
(0.064) 
         
Panel C        
Depression 
Age 33 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
 -0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.026* 
(0.013) 
 -0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.021* 
(0.013) 
        
Age 42 -0.011 
(0.049) 
-0.006 
(0.026) 
-0.073 
(0.093) 
 -0.010 
(0.049) 
-0.006 
(0.026) 
-0.070 
(0.093) 
        
        
Age 50 -0.018 
(0.064) 
-0.012 
(0.053) 
-0.107 
(0.105) 
 -0.015 
(0.064) 
-0.010 
(0.053) 
-0.102 
(0.105) 
Note **significant at the 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
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Table 3.14  Returns to HE on Health and Health related conditions, PSM results 
               (the thick support region) 
  PSM 
(Nearest Neighbour) 
  PSM  
(Kernel) 
 
 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
Panel A        
Self reported health 
Age 33 0.097* 0.082* 0.132**  0.091* 0.079* 0.125** 
Age 42 0.106* 0.115** 0.153**  0.101* 0.109** 0.151** 
Age 50 0.111* 0.125* 0.199**  0.107* 0.120* 0.185** 
BMI 
Age 33 -0.356* -0.400** -0.213  -0.323* -0.390** -0.203 
Age 42 -0.511** -0.598** 0.412**  -0.505** -0.590** 0.400** 
Age 50 -0.679** -0.899** -0. 513**     -0.661** -0.873** -0. 507*    
Obesity 
Age 33 -0.036 -0.098 -0.026  -0.035 -0.097 -0.0234 
Age 42 -0.156** -0.175** -0.154**  -0.149** -0.169** -0.150** 
Age 50 -0.187** -0.201** -0.181**  -0.180** -0.197** -0.173** 
        
Panel B        
Alcohol Drinking Frequency 
Age 33 -0.270** -0.113 -0.295**  -0.250** 0.107 -0.282** 
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Age 42 -0.352** -0.200* -0.470  -0.343** -0.194* -0.459 
Age 50 -0.358** -0.201* -0.474**  -0.345** -0.194* -0.456** 
Smoke Frequency 
Age 33 -0.198** -0.145 -0.281**  -0.189** -0.143 -0.265** 
Age 42 -0.135** -0.083 -0.139**  -0.128** -0.078 -0.135** 
Age 50 -0.114 -0.069 -0.121  -0.110 -0.063 -0.116 
        
Panel C        
Depression 
Age 33 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
 -0.012 -0.003 -0.036  -0.010 -0.003 -0.034 
Age 42 -0.017 -0.011 -0.082  -0.016 -0.010 -0.080 
Age 50 -0.022 -0.017 -0.110  -0.015 -0.015 -0.106 
Note **significant at the 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.15 Joint quality of matching indicators 
 PSM 
(Nearest Neighbour) 
  PSM  
(Kernel) 
Panel A        
Self reported health 
Before match 
 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
Mean absolute 
bias 
13.82 12.44 18.55     
Pseudo R
2
 0.11 0.10 0.19     
After match        
Age 33        
Mean absolute 
bias 
4.84 4.56 6.27  3.75 3.96 5.15 
Pseudo R
2
 0.02 0.02 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.03 
Age 42        
Mean absolute 
bias 
3.65 4.74 5.96  3.57 4.29 5.57 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.03  0.01 0.02 0.03 
Age 50        
Mean absolute 
bias 
3.22 3.45 3.25  2.45 2.84 2.67 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 
        
BMI 
Before match       
 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
Mean absolute 
bias 
26.12 27.45 30.12     
Pseudo R
2
 0.31 0.29 0.34     
After match        
Age 33        
Mean absolute 
bias 
7.84 6.56 6.27  5.49 5.79 5.87 
Pseudo R
2
 0.05 0.04 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.03 
Age 42        
Mean absolute 
bias 
6.29 7.14 7.45  6.22 6.80 6.45 
Pseudo R
2
 0.03 0.04 0.04  0.02 0.02 0.02 
Age 50        
Mean absolute 7.46 8.01 7.12  6.45 5.78 5.49 
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bias 
Pseudo R
2
 0.05 0.05 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.02 
        
Obesity 
Before match       
 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
Mean absolute 
bias 
10.13 9.46 9.65     
Pseudo R
2
 0.07 0.07 0.06     
After match        
Age 33        
Mean absolute 
bias 
2.13 2.07 2.04  1.98 1.54 1.45 
Pseudo R
2
 0.005 0.005 0.005  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age 42        
Mean absolute 
bias 
3.45 3.78 2.98  2.82 2.62 2.97 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.005 0.005 0.005 
Age 50        
Mean absolute 
bias 
3.79 4.02 4.14  3.76 3.67 3.46 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01 
        
Panel B        
     Alcohol Drinking  Frequency 
Before match     
 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
Mean absolute 
bias 
12.41 11.16 11.97     
Pseudo R
2
 0.12 0.11 0.12     
After match        
Age 33        
Mean absolute 
bias 
4.84 4.56 6.27  3.75 3.96 5.15 
Pseudo R
2
 0.02 0.02 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.03 
Age 42        
Mean absolute 
bias 
4.87 4.13 4.41  3.13 2.45 3.01 
Pseudo R
2
 0.02 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01 
Age 50        
Mean absolute 
bias 
3.79 4.02 4.14  3.76 3.67 3.46 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01 
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                Smoke Frequency 
Before match        
 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
Mean absolute 
bias 
14.17 13.64 13.75     
Pseudo R
2
 0.12 0.11 0.12     
After match        
Age 33        
Mean absolute 
bias 
8.41 8.45 8.17  6.13 6.47 6.97 
Pseudo R
2
 0.05 0.06 0.05  0.01 0.01 0.03 
Age 42        
Mean absolute 
bias 
7.16 7.57 7.13  7.01 6.13 6.48 
Pseudo R
2
 0.04 0.04 0.04  0.04 0.03 0.03 
Age 50        
Mean absolute 
bias 
3.79 4.02 4.14  3.76 3.67 3.46 
Pseudo R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.01 
         
Panel C        
Depression 
Before match        
 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
Mean absolute 
bias 
12.16 11.71 12.23     
Pseudo R
2
 0.11 0.10 0.11     
After match        
Age 33        
Mean absolute 
bias 
6.18 5.39 6.40  5.56 4.79 5.57 
Pseudo R
2
 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.03 0.02 0.03 
Age 42        
Mean absolute 
bias 
7.16 7.57 7.13  7.01 6.13 6.48 
Pseudo R
2
 0.04 0.04 0.04  0.04 0.03 0.03 
Age 50        
Mean absolute 
bias 
7.64 7.24 7.61  7.12 6.97 7.00 
Pseudo R
2
 0.04 0.03 0.04  0.03 0.03 0.03 
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Table 3.16 Rosenbaum Bounds for PSM estimation on different health outcomes. 
 PSM 
(Nearest Neighbour) 
  PSM  
(Kernel) 
Panel A        
Self reported health 
 Full Male Female  Full Male Female 
Age33        
Γ cut-off  1.08 1.09 1.10  1.12 1.10 1.12 
P value 6.0% 5.6% 6.0%  5.5% 5.4% 5.7% 
Age 42        
Γ cut-off  1.06 1.05 1.06  1.11 1.08 1.09 
P value 5.6% 5.5% 5.4%  5.5% 5.2% 5.4% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.07 1.07 1.08  1.11 1.10 1.11 
P value 6.2% 5.4% 5.2%  5.6% 5.7% 5.6% 
BMI 
Age33         
Γ cut-off  1.14 1.16 1.13  1.16 1.16 1.16 
P value 6.2% 6.4% 5.8%  5.4% 5.2% 5.1% 
Age 42        
Γ cut-off  1.12 1.13 1.12   1.11 1.08 1.09 
P value 5.5% 5.4% 5.8%  5.1% 5.3% 5.4% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.07 1.07 1.08  1.11 1.10 1.11 
P value 5.2% 5.4% 5.4%  5.2% 5.7% 5.4% 
Obesity 
Age33         
Γ cut-off  1.09 1.08 1.09  1.13 1.15 1.14 
P value 8.2% 7.2% 8.4%  6.7% 5.8% 5.4% 
Age 42        
Γ cut-off  1.12 1.13 1.12   1.11 1.08 1.09 
P value 8.7% 9.2% 7.5%  6.2% 5.7% 5.9% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.07 1.07 1.08  1.11 1.10 1.11 
P value 7.5% 6.5% 5.8%  5.9% 5.4% 5.7% 
        
When adding log wage in covariates  
Self reported health 
Age33         
Γ cut-off  1.15 1.16 1.14  1.16 1.17 1.16 
P value 12.0% 11.6% 12.0%  11.5% 12.4% 10.7% 
Age 42        
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Γ cut-off  1.06 1.07 1.07  1.15 1.12 1.10 
P value 9.6% 10.2% 11.1%  9.5% 11.2% 12.4% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.13 1.15 1.12  1.11 1.10 1.11 
P value 11.2% 12.4% 10.2%  10.2% 9.7% 11.3% 
BMI 
Age33         
Γ cut-off  1.24 1.20 1.23  1.25 1.26 1.25 
P value 6.2% 6.4% 5.8%  5.4% 5.2% 5.1% 
Age 42        
Γ cut-off  1.19 1.20 1.22   1.21 1.22 1.21 
P value 5.5% 5.4% 5.8%  5.1% 5.3% 5.4% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.17 1.18 1.17  1.20 1.21 1.24 
P value 5.2% 5.4% 5.4%  5.2% 5.7% 5.4% 
Obesity 
Age33         
Γ cut-off  1.13 1.12 1.11  1.15 1.17 1.18 
P value 8.2% 7.2% 8.4%  6.7% 5.8% 5.4% 
Age 42        
Γ cut-off  1.13 1.13 1.12   1.12 1.11 1.12 
P value 5.1% 6.3% 504%  5.2% 5.2% 5.3% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.12 1.11 1.13  1.15 1.16 1.12 
P value 5.2% 5.1% 5.2%  5.5% 5.8% 5.9% 
        
Panel B        
     Alcohol Drinking  Frequency 
Age33         
Γ cut-off  1.42 1.41 1.40  1.43 1.45 1.41 
P value 6.2% 5.2% 5.4%  5.7% 5.8% 5.4% 
Age 42        
Γ cut-off  1.40 1.43 1.42   1.44 1.45 1.44 
P value 5.2% 5.6% 5.5%  5.2% 5.2% 5.8% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.40 1.37 1.38  1.45 1.42 1.41 
P value 5.5% 5.7% 5.8%  5.4% 5.8% 5.5% 
        
                Smoke Frequency 
Age33         
Γ cut-off  1.32 1.31 1.37  1.38 137 1.39 
P value 5.2% 5.2% 5.4%  5.7% 5.8% 5.4% 
Age 42        
Γ cut-off  1.35 1.34 1.32   1.38 1.37 1.38 
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P value 5.1% 5.2% 5.4%  5.2% 5.2% 5.1% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.35 1.35 1.35  1.40 1.40 1.41 
P value 5.1% 5.1% 5.2%  5.4% 5.3% 5.2% 
         
Panel C        
Depression 
Age33         
Γ cut-off  1.54 1.57 1.58  1.62 1.64 1.61 
P value 5.2% 5.2% 5.4%  5.1% 5.3% 5.4% 
Age 42        
Γ cut-off  1.61 1.59 1.54  1.65 1.67 1.68 
P value 5.1% 5.2% 5.4%  5.2% 5.2% 5.1% 
Age 50        
Γ cut-off  1.55 1.58 1.61  1.65 1.66 1.68 
P value 5.1% 5.1% 5.2%  5.4% 5.3% 5.2% 
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Table 3.17  Fraction of each outcome variable based on total matched sample size 
Male                   Female 
 HE Non HE HE Non HE 
Self Reported Health     
Age 33     
Excellent  257 (41.9%) 77 (32.5%) 229 (38.4%) 107 (37.0%) 
Good  321 (52.4%) 122 (51.4%) 323 (54.2%) 147 (50.9%) 
Fair 29 (4.8%) 32 (13.5%) 36 (6.1%) 27 (9.3%) 
Poor 6 (0.9%) 6 (2.6%) 8 (1.3%) 8 (2.8%) 
 613 237 596 289 
Age 42     
Excellent  228 (44.3%) 63 (32.1%) 182 (35.8%) 78 (32.9%) 
Good  241 (46.8%) 99 (50.5%) 241 (47.4%) 110 (46.4%) 
Fair 37 (7.2%) 25 (12.7%) 63 (12.4%) 29 (12.2%) 
Poor 8 (1.7%) 9 (4.7%) 22 (4.4%) 10 (8.5%) 
 515 196 508 237 
Age 50     
Excellent  135 (26.9%) 37 (18.4%) 97 (20.3%) 40 (17.3%) 
Good  205 (40.7%) 83 (41.3%) 208 (43.5%) 91 (38.8%) 
Fair 125 (24.8%) 60 (30.0%) 132 (27.6%) 64 (27.3%) 
Poor 39 (7.6%) 21 (10.3%) 41 (8.6%) 39 (16.6%) 
 504 201 478 234 
Obesity      
Age 33     
under  15 (2.9%) 5 (2.3%) 37 (6.9%) 15 (5.4%) 
normal 248 (48.2%) 106 (48.4%) 371 (70.1%) 187 (67.8%) 
over 223 (43.3%) 88 (40.2%) 82 (15.5%) 53 (19.2%) 
obesity 29 (6.6%) 20 (9.1%) 39 (7.4%) 21 (7.6%) 
 515 219 529 276 
42     
under  11 (2.1%) 4 (1.7%) 30 (5.7%) 12 (4.3%) 
normal 204 (40.2%) 98 (43.0%) 333 (63.5%) 166 (60.3%) 
over 251(49.5%) 94 (41.2%) 102 (19.5%) 63 (22.9%) 
obesity 41 (8.1%) 32 (14.0%) 59 (11.3%) 34 (12.4%) 
 507 228 524 275 
50     
under  4 (0.9%) 2 (1.0%) 8 (1.7%) 4 (2.2%) 
normal 172 (38.6%) 50 (27.2%) 291 (62.6%) 130 (56.5%) 
over 212 (47.4%) 97 (52.7%) 89 (19.1%) 65 (28.3%) 
obesity 59 (15.4%) 35 (19.0%) 62 (13.3%) 31 (13.4%) 
 447 184 465 230 
Drinking Frequency     
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Age 33     
Once a day 143 (26.5%) 105 (30.5%) 65 (14.6%) 85 (19.8%) 
2 to 3 days a week 253 (46.9%) 173 (50.3%) 207 (46.5%) 199 (41.7%) 
Once a week 57 (10.6%) 28  (8.1%) 72 (16.2%) 65 (15.2%) 
2 to 3 times a month 46 (8.5%) 16 (4.7%) 51 (11.5%) 17 (4.0%) 
Less often or only on 
special occasions 
30 (5.6%) 16 (4.7%) 30 (6.7%) 45 (10.5%) 
Never nowadays 7 (1.3%) 3 (0.9%) 15 (3.3%) 9 (2.9%) 
Never had an alcoholic 
drink 
3 (0.5%) 3 (0.9%) 5 (1.1%) 9 (2.9%) 
 539 344 445 429 
Age 42     
Once a day 141 (29.9%) 104 (36.1%) 104 (24.6%) 110 (28.3%) 
2 to 3 days a week 203 (43.0%) 126 (43.8%) 162 (38.3%) 147 (37.8%) 
Once a week 67 (14.2%) 31 (10.8%) 70 (16.5%) 60 (15.4%) 
2 to 3 times a month 22 (4.7) 19 (6.6%) 27 (6.4%) 25 (6.4%) 
Less often or only on 
special occasions 
34 (7.2%) 6 (2.1%) 37 (8.7%) 25 (6.4%) 
Never nowadays 3 (0.6%) 1 (0.3%) 18 (4.3%) 17 (4.4%) 
Never had an alcoholic 
drink 
2(0.4%) 1 (0.3%) 5 (1.2%) 5 (1.3%) 
 472 288 423 389 
Age 50     
Once a day 181 (39.2%) 133 (43.8%) 106 (25.2%) 99 (26.4%) 
2 to 3 days a week 147 (31.8%) 91 (30.0%) 145 (34.4%) 137 (32.4%) 
Once a week 62 (13.4%) 34 (11.1%) 64 (15.2%) 53 (12.6%) 
2 to 3 times a month 17 (3.7%) 13 (4.3%) 52 (12.4%) 25 (6.0%) 
Less often or only on 
special occasions 
52 (11.3%) 28 (9.2%) 40 (9.5%) 45 (10.7%) 
Never nowadays 2 (0.4%) 1 (0.3%) 13 (3.1%) 12 (2.8%) 
Never had an alcoholic 
drink 
1 (0.2%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.2% ) 4 (0.9%) 
 462 304 421 422 
Smoking Frequency     
Age 33     
Never smoke 359 (60.0%) 139 (59.6%) 355 (60.2%) 155 (54.8%) 
Used to smoke 112 (18.7%) 35 (15.0%) 124 (21.0%) 68 (24.0%) 
Smoke occasionally 36 (6.0%) 19 (8.2%) 20 (3.4%) 12 (4.3%) 
Smoke everyday 97 (16.2%) 40 (17.2%) 91 (15.4%) 48 (17.0%) 
 598 233 590 283 
Age 42     
Never smoke 310 (60.0%) 116 (58.6%) 310 (59.8%) 128 (54.2%) 
Used to smoke 104 (20.1%) 40 (20.2%) 110 (21.2%) 60 (25.4%) 
Smoke occasionally 42 (8.1%) 17 (8.6%) 39 (7.5%) 21 (8.9%) 
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Smoke everyday 61 (11.8%) 25 (12.6%) 59 (11.4%) 28 (11.9%) 
 517 198 518 236 
Age 50     
Never smoke 313 (61.2%) 110 (59.3%) 296 (59.3%) 130 (54.6%) 
Used to smoke 118 (23.1%) 48 (23.5%) 151 (29.3%) 64 (33.6%) 
Smoke occasionally 35 (6.9%) 16 (7.8%) 13 (2.6%) 6 (2.5%) 
Smoke everyday 45 (8.8%) 19 (9.3%) 44 (8.8%) 22 (9.2%) 
 511 204 499 238 
Depression     
Age 33     
No  711 (98.9%) 311 (98.8%) 725 (96.7%) 376 (95.5) 
Yes 8 (1.1%) 4 (1.2%) 25 (3.3%) 18 (4.5%) 
 719 315 750 394 
Age 42     
No 697 (96.1%) 294 (93.3%) 709 (91%) 354 (89.8%) 
Yes 28 (3.9%) 21 (6.7%) 69 (9%) 40 (10.2) 
 719 315 778 394 
Age 50     
No 631 (93.6%) 248 (89.5%) 588 (86.1%) 285 (84.5%) 
Yes 43 (6.4%) 29 (9.5%) 95 (13.9%) 52  (15.4%) 
 674 227 683 337 
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Figure 3.1 SRH for Men by different ages
 
 
Figure 3.2 SRH for Women by different ages 
 
  
36.11 
51.04 
11.22 
1.63 
31 
51.33 
14.4 
3.61 
19.23 
62.86 
12.64 
5.27 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Excellent 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Age 50-Men 
Age 42-Men 
Age 33-Men 
33.22 
52.93 
12.66 
1.79 
30.29 
51.62 
14.48 
3.61 
19.61 
61.85 
12.44 
5 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Excellent 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
Age 50-Women 
Age 42-Women 
Age 33-Women 
183 
 
Figure 3.3 BMI distribution across different ages 
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Figure 3.4  Comparisons of obesity by age (include men and women) 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Percentages of obesity by qualifications 
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Figure 3.6 Percentages of drinking alcohol by age 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Frequency of smoking by age 
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Figure 3.8 Percentages of smoking by qualification 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Sample of depression by gender 
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Figure 3.10 Percentages of depression by qualification 
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Figure 3.11 Distribution of the malaise score at different ages 
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Figure 3.12 Total Rutter behaviour score 
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Figure 3.13 Propensity score distributions and common support regions 
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Chapter 4: Testing the model of demand for higher 
education by Indirect Inference method 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The quality of the labour force is the key issue in the aim of improving economic 
growth. One of the main paths is to increase in the educational attainments, especially 
higher education (HE). As discussed in Chapter two, HE enhances both individual’s 
capacities to work and their opportunities in the labour market. However, questions 
about access to and the impact of HE have long occupied the attention of labour 
economists and sociologists. In the rational behavioural model for the choice of 
attaining HE qualifications common to the economics literature, individuals normally 
make decisions about whether or not to continue HE is normally on the basis of 
cost-benefit analyses. The students choose to participate HE if it enables them to earn 
more lifetime earnings, at least in expectation, or demand for education can also be 
driven by students' and parents' perception of education as an investment in future 
income earning capacity. (Becker, 1962; Card, 1995; Mincer, 1974; Willis and Rosen, 
1979). In other words, individuals choose HE versus non-HE according to their 
expected economic returns such that they attain HE only if the economic returns 
outweigh the costs. However, the mechanism influencing HE attainment may differ 
by other determinates. Quite a few researchers have asked whether family attributes 
(e.g. parental educational attainment, family socio-economic) are the causal effects on 
HE participation (Shavit and Blossfeld, 1993; Lauer, 2003; Dustmann, 2004).  
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Other researchers have analysed how personality traits can influence educational 
attainment obtained. (Almlund et al, 2011, Vignoles, 2005). All these authors argue 
that for individual with advantaged backgrounds, attending HE is an expected 
outcome. The likelihood of attending HE and earnings prospects are relatively high. 
In contrast, the earnings prospects for lower educated individuals are bleak, 
particularly if they come from disadvantaged backgrounds, which in turn result in 
lower HE participations.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, instead of exploring the 
direct associations between HE participation and other determinants found in most of 
the studies, the principal aim of this chapter is to study the role of expected returns to 
HE itself and of perceived returns to HE - expected returns are endogenously formed 
by family socio economics characteristics or personal cognitive, as determinants of 
HE participations. Figure 4.1 describes the hypothesised mediation effect. An 
individual’s family social-economic characteristics and innate ability at early ages 
contribute to determining expected wage return, which in turn has an influence on the 
likelihood of HE participation. Such mediated or indirect effects add to the direct 
effect of wage return on HE decision.  
On the other hand, most of the existing microeconomics literatures related to HE 
decisions use standard Direct Inference estimation
42
. By contrast, I adopt a relatively 
advanced type of method, Indirect Inference (II, thereafter) (Smith. 1993; Gourieroux, 
et.al 1993 and Gourieroux and Monfort 1995) that widely used in macroeconomics 
                                                             
42 This includes OLS, IV, Probit model, Sequential logit response model, Ordered Logit model, etc. discussed in 
Section 2.  
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(Le et al, 2011, 2015, Minford et al, 2012). Method based on II usually attempts to 
test or re-estimate a calibrated or already estimated Macroeconomic model (Le et al, 
2011). However, II method is barely applied in microeconomic model and on 
cross-sectional or panel data. In general, models assessing HE participation is usually 
based either on a country macro level data or on an individual micro level data. In this 
chapter I will attempt to investigate the micro level determinants of HE participation 
by II method based on a longitudinal and cross-sectional data in the UK.  
Applying econometric method that widely used in macro-econometrics on 
microeconomics has several advantages. The primary advantage is its generality. 
Unlike other estimation methods, the II method calibrates the bias function through 
simulation/bootstrapping and then does not require an explicit form for the bias 
function. Therefore, II is applicable in a broad range of model specifications. For 
example, in microeconomics, II have a promising advantage to least square estimation 
when applied on Panel data estimation. Panel data model are two dimensional (time 
series and cross section dimensions) in sample size, applying least square estimation 
method on demeaned data is inconsistent when supposing the time dimension is short. 
On the other hand, if observed data are with measurement error or if there is 
unobserved cross-section dependence, the least square estimates are inconsistent even 
if both the time and cross-section dimension are large. Komunjer and Ng (2010) prove 
that II can use the estimates of an auxiliary model that are known to be inconsistent to 
obtain consistent estimates of the original model. Secondly, in contrast to 
conventional test and estimates procedure applied in microeconomics, test power of 
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the II (using Wald test) is substantially greater than that of the Direct Inference (LR 
test) and test the power of II tends to rise as the number of variables increases (Le et 
al, 2015). Thirdly, Wald test override the LR test is that latter one is based on model’s 
in-sample current forecasting ability rather than its ability to mimic data behaviour 
such as whether the model’s causal structure is also found in the data (Minford et al, 
2012). Furthermore, II takes advantage of a simplified auxiliary model that is easier to 
estimate than a proposed structural model.  
 
Figure 4.1 Direct and Indirect effect to HE participations 
 
                         
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literatures. 
The model and empirical methodology are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 I 
describe the dataset used and characteristics of the variables chosen. The empirical 
result of testing and re-estimating are listed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes 
and raises some general points on further researches. 
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4.2 Background and related literature  
Following Becker (1962), the current studies use the human capital theory to model 
the education decision in terms of the expected value of educational investment. They 
typically conceptualise returns to education as labour-market or earnings returns. 
Willis and Rosen (1979) are among the earliest and most influential studies that 
attempt to solve self-selection bias resulted in the estimation of participation 
equations. The researchers allow the demand for college education depended on 
expected future earnings, and examine the role of earnings expectations and family 
background in the schooling decision, particularly in the decision to go to college and 
equivalent. Using a switching regression, they extend the Roy model to allow for 
endogenous self-selection into college education, with the difference in expected 
utility between college education and high school education affecting the likelihood 
of college education and estimates take accounts for earnings expectations and for 
heterogeneity in ability levels, in tastes, and in capacity to finance schooling 
investments. They found evidence for this selection bias because individuals who 
attended college would have earned less as high school graduates than observably 
similar persons who stopped schooling after high school, and individuals who did not 
attend college would have earned less as college graduates than observably similar 
persons who did attend. 
 
The papers that study educational attainment have recently been becoming broader. 
One of the branches has recognised the sequential nature of educational decisions. For 
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example, Mare’s (1980) model of educational transitions represents one of the major 
methodological contributions to the literature on family background and educational 
success. Mare (1980) extends the contribution from Boudon (1973) and suggests to 
treat educational attainment as a sequence of discrete transitions from lower to higher 
educational levels and to develop a sequential logit response model to school 
continuation, restricting the individual sample for each successive transition to those 
who had completed the prior educational transition. He estimated the effect of family 
background characteristics on the transition probabilities. A main result in his paper is 
that the effect of parental characteristics decline as the grade levels increase. Hence, 
one of the consistent findings from applied research using the Mare model suggests 
that the effect of family background variables tends to decrease across successive 
educational transitions (e.g. Merz and Schimmelpfennig, 1998; Couch, 1994; 
Buechtemann et al., 1993).  
 
Cameron and Heckman (1998) criticised Mare’s transition model because it 
empirically reduces the impact of family background across transitions. They 
characterise a source of strong attenuation bias on the role of parents’ wealth or 
education in the schooling decision in upper grades. The main argument is that 
educational decisions should originate from the long-term effects of family 
characteristics on ability, motivation, and other unobserved characteristics in contrast 
to short run credit constraints. They propose an alternative choice-theoretic model for 
educational attainment that can be implemented empirically using an Ordered Choice 
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Model that deals with the presence of endogeneity of education decision model 
caused by unobserved individual heterogeneity. Evidences can be found by Cameron 
and Heckman (2001), Ermisch and Francesconi (2001), Keane and Wolpin (2001), 
Cameron and Taber (2004), Todd and Wolpin (2006), etc.  
 
4.2.1 Causal effects on Educational attainments: Evidences in UK 
Compared to the vast literature within the economics of education that is concerned 
with returns at different levels of qualifications, empirical research into the decision to 
educational attainment associated with return to education and other factors is fairly 
sparse. Empirical studies mainly have assessed the relative contributions of family 
background, prior educational attainment and attributes of schools. Educational 
attainment also differs across socio-economic groups, and the existing literature has 
documented a strong relationship between individual’s educational attainment and 
family background. However, whether both parents’ education causally affects their 
children’s own educational attainment is controversial.   
In empirical the microeconomic literature for the UK, early studies on observed HE 
decision of high school graduates, the interest of parameters is usually estimated using 
Probit model analysis. Rice (1987) develops a Probit model of post-compulsory 
schooling using data from the 1976 Family Expenditure Survey. The result reveals 
that family income has an insignificant effect in the decision to continue in 
post-compulsory education for males, while for females it is significant. However, the 
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socio-economic background of individual has an influence on the probability of 
undertaking post-compulsory education. Blundell et al. (1997) state that individuals 
without a ‘father figure’ at age 16 has little impact on the probability of achieving an 
A-level or HE, whereas the indicator of bad financial status has a strong negative 
effect on A-level attainment.  
 
Ermisch and Francesconi (2001), following Cameron and Heckman (1998), try to 
identify causal effects of family background on educational attainment using data 
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). They apply an Ordered Logit 
Model and suggest that family background has causal effects on children educational 
attainment if, and only if, family background affects the cost of schooling. They 
report that when family background affects the cost of education, the relation between 
parents and children education represents a causal effect. In particular, for individuals 
belonging to the group of “poor parents” both family structure and parental education 
have a positive causal effect on the children’s educational attainment. For example, 
the parental qualification level increases from less than O-level to above degree 
qualifications, the probability of their child achieving degree qualifications level 
increases dramatically from -5% for father and 40% for mother (less than O-level) to 
61% for father and 78% for mother (degree qualifications), respectively. Experiencing 
a single parent family has a significant negative effect on an individual’s educational 
attainment, which accounts for -0.323. Individuals with more brothers and sisters also 
have lower education attainments (-0.159 and -0.261, respectively). Individuals whose 
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parents are in the bottom quartile of the family income distribution have lower 
educational attainments while the negative impact of being from a family that 
experienced financial difficulties also has a negative effect (-0.528) on education. In 
addition, for ethnic minorities, individuals with Indian or Chinese parents have 
significantly higher educational attainments (1.02 and 0.85, respectively). This is in 
the line with the sense that Asian parents usually encourage their offspring to obtain 
HE.    
 
Chevalier and Lanot (2002) propose a strategy separating the relative effect of 
financial situation from family characteristic effects in educational attainments using 
NCDS and BSC data. They apply an ordered Probit model to estimate the leaving 
school decision from age 16 to 20 and present a similar result with Harmon and 
Walker (2000) in that poorer families that are financially constrained are less likely to 
invest in the human capital of their offspring. However, they also argue that the family 
characteristic effects dominate the financial constraint effects, mainly the parental 
education because it is evident that a financial transfer would not lead to a significant 
increase in educational investment.  
Valbuena (2011) adopts an Ordered Logit Model to analyse the relevance of family 
background and education attainment of offspring use BHPS. In particular, the author 
finds that parental educational attainment is a strong predictor of the education of 
their offspring, while the mother’s education is the main determinant on the decision 
of whether to go beyond compulsory education.  
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Galindo-Rueda et al. (2005) use data from the Youth Cohort Survey (YCS) and the 
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) to examine how individuals from 
households with different levels of income have varied in their HE participation 
likelihood over time. Their results suggest that wealthier areas experience a more 
rapid increase in the number of students choosing to participate in HE at age 18 
between 1996 and 2000. They also conclude that before the introduction of 
undergraduate tuition fees in 1996, there was a significant class divide in participation 
which largely reflected pre-existing patterns of educational attainment and economic 
background. 
 
Chowdry et al. (2010) use a student-level dataset to explore patterns of participation 
among people from different socio-economic backgrounds in the UK. They use a 
micro-level linear Probit model with school fixed effects controlling for selection bias 
of participation in HE. Their result suggests that male/female students from the 
poorest socio-economic quintile are 40.7% /44.6% less likely to participate in HE than 
students from the top quintile, respectively.  
 
Other studies have come to similar conclusions. For example, Gayle et al. (2002) 
using YCS data find that parental education, socio-economic class and State-school 
attendance all affect HE participation probabilities. Blanden and Machin (2004) find 
that the expansion of HE in the UK has disproportionately benefited students from 
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wealthier backgrounds after controlling for individual characteristics and prior 
academic achievement. 
 
4.2.2 Intergenerational educational mobility  
The transmission of parental education across generations is also an important related 
field of the literature. Such education mobility seems to be influenced to a greater 
extent by levels of educational attainment across generations (Solon, 2002). The issue 
of intergenerational mobility was raised in UK by Blanden et al (2005), who argue 
that children from rich families receive the most benefit from the expansion of the HE 
system. Meanwhile, the gap between children coming from rich and poor 
backgrounds has widened over time. Recent studies use twins as parents, adoptees 
method, and instrumental variables to identifying the intergenerational transmission of 
human capital from parents (Björklund and Salvanes, 2010). Behrman and 
Rosenzweig (2002) is one of the first papers to use a sample of twin mothers in order 
to estimate causal effects of parental education on children’s education, controlling for 
confounding genetic bias. However, there is no evidence of an effect between the 
mother’s education and the child’s education. Holmlund et al (2008) studying 
dizygotic twins for mothers and fathers, and find that there is no significant effect of 
the mother’s education on child education outcomes, whereas they do find an effect of 
the father’s education.  
 
206 
 
The identification of causal effect has also been solved using ‘adoptee’ approaches, 
for example: Dearden, Machin and Reed (1997) in the UK; and, Sacerdote (2004) and 
Plug (2004) in the US. Such studies design a natural experiment that adoptees must be 
randomly assigned to adoptive families to control for heritable effects. This happens 
because if the adoptees are randomly placed, the causal effects of parental education 
can be estimated since there is no relation between the biological and adoptive 
heritable endowments of the adoptees. Sacerdote (2004) and Plug (2004) find a strong 
positive effect for mother’s education on the child’s highest education attainment. 
Sacerdote (2004) finds little evidence for a direct effect of parental income on 
adoptees’ income and education. Björklund et al (2006) and Björklund Jäntti and 
Solon (2007) investigate a significant positive effect of adoptive father’s education on 
their child’s education whereas the effect of mother’s education becomes relatively 
small.  
 
Other studies also create exogenous variation in the form of rules regarding age at 
school entry rules or compulsory schooling laws in estimating the parameter of 
interest. The empirical finding is somewhat mixed. Chevalier (2003) uses the change 
in the compulsory schooling laws in Britain in 1957 as an instrument and finds a large 
positive effect of a mother’s education on her child’s education but no significant 
effect of father’s education. Chevalier et al. (2005) further adopt schooling reforms as 
an instrument using UK LFS data. Their results are in contrast to the previous 
research and they find that the effect of parental education is insignificant when 
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income measures are included; in other words, family income instead, which turns out 
to be a stronger effect on the children’s educational attainment.  
 
Chevalier et al. (2002) use the UK Labour Force Survey to examine the impact of 
parental education and income on the probability of a child remaining in school 
post-16 and also on the probability of attaining five or more GCSEs graded A to C (a 
standard measure of educational achievement in the UK). Despite large effects of 
parental education on the children’s educational outcomes in the OLS, when 
instrumenting both education and parental permanent income, the parental education 
effects become non-significant. Both of these studies are limited by the child outcome 
variables available in the respective datasets. More evidence applying the IV approach 
can be found in: Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens (2006) in the US; Carneiro, Meghir 
and Parey (2007) in the UK; and, Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005), Holmlund, et 
al (2008) in the Nordic countries.   
4.2.3 Family income and other family background effects  
The relationship between parental income and the level of educational attainment is 
controversial. The fundamental question is whether it is money itself that makes the 
difference to individual’s human capital opportunities. Some argue that a direct 
relationship exists and others that unobserved factors correlated with both income and 
attainment drive the relationship. For instance, parental income might indicate the 
eventual effects of family background on cognitive and non-cognitive ability, and on 
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the parents’ tastes for education. 
 
Cameron and Heckman (2002, 2003) use US data to provide empirical evidence 
suggesting that long-term family permanent income is much more important for 
individual’s educational attainment than short-term credit constraint. 43  Family 
permanent income actually turns out to be an important predictor for college 
enrolment. Parents with low education and income are less likely to provide 
appropriate environment for motivating the young ending secondary school to apply 
for university education in the long run. Aakvik Salvanes and Vaage (2005) use 
Norway data and find only a small effect of short-term credit constraints on 
educational attainment. Even though family income is significant in determining the 
educational attainment, parental education turns out to be the most important factor. 
For example, either father or mother with a college degree increases the probability of 
the child having a college degree by more than 20%. 
 
Although there remain controversies over the effectiveness of family income, other 
existing literature provide relatively sound evidence from the UK. Gregg and Machin 
(2000) indicate that low family income does have an independent effect on the 
children’s educational outcomes when controlling for family background and personal 
ability aspects. Levy and Duncan (2001) using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
adopt sibling variation to eliminate family fixed effects and find that parental income 
                                                             
43 They argue that the short-term income constraints facing parents at the time of their child’s potential enrolment 
in college have no significant effect on child enrolment once the longer-term constraints are controlled.  
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has an impact on child’s educational outcomes in late years but that the magnitudes of 
effect are small. Blanden and Gregg (2004) adopt variety of approaches controlling 
for family background and heterogeneity, and find evidence that family income does 
have a causal impact on educational attainment, using NCDS, BSC and BHPS data 
 
There are also some literature about family size and birth order (i.e. how many elder 
siblings), which possibly have effects on educational achievement. For example, 
family size may have an impact because there is a trade-off between child quantity 
and quality, while siblings may not receive an equal share of resources devoted to 
their education. 
 
Black et al. (2005) shows that that educational attainments decline with family size 
and birth order. Moreover, recent statistical studies also highlight that social class is 
the strongest predictor of educational attainment in the UK (Cassen and Kingdon, 
2007; Dyson et al., 2010). 
 
4.2.4 Personal attributes  
More able individuals attempt to signal their ability by acquiring more education than 
less able individuals (Lang and Kropp, 1986) and an individual’s academic ability is 
an important determinant of enrolment decision of post-secondary graduates (Fuller, 
Manski, and Wise, 1982).  
210 
 
 
A number of studies highlight that a variety of cognitive (such as verbal and numeracy 
ability) and non-cognitive (such as self discipline and perseverance) personal ability 
and characteristics influence educational attainment and choices. Heckman and 
Rubinstein (2001) and Heckman et al. (2006) find that non-cognitive skills are 
quantitatively important determinants of post-secondary educational attainment in the 
US. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) compare the cohort from NCDS in 1958 and 
BCS in 1970 to find that the role of early cognitive ability to determine educational 
attainment. Although the authors argue that cognitive ability has declined in 
importance while family background has become a more important determinant of 
educational success, it confirms that, for both cohorts, early ability is still a good 
predictor of educational attainment.
44
 Chowdry et al. (2010) state that nearly 40% of 
the variation of the gap in educational attainment for individuals from different 
backgrounds at the end of compulsory schooling can be accounted for by prior 
educational attainment. Collier, Valbuena and Zhu, (2011) use the data from 
Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) and find all family 
background variables explain no more than 14% of the variation in the decision to 
pursue an academic qualification upon completion of compulsory education at age 16. 
By contrast, educational attainments at the end of the compulsory schooling stage are 
much powerful predictors for post-compulsory educational choices. 
 
                                                             
44 They estimate the probably of attaining a qualification at degree level or higher of males by using cognitive 
ability index at age 10. The index is constructed by principal components analysis to each cohort survey.  
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4. 3 The model and methods 
 
4.3.1 The model  
In this section I will provide a simple framework that will shed light on decision 
process of HE attainment in terms of expected return to education. Assuming that the 
individual deciding whether to go to university is an adult person (age 18) who is 
endowed with the full ability to commit himself or herself to the effort required by the 
education system. Consider that each individual lives two periods, and makes the 
decision of whether attending HE in the first period of his life. At the end of the 
period, this individual obatined either a HE degree or non-HE qualification (i.e. only 
A-level qualification). The utility of individual i is given as: 
                (4.1) 
In period 1, each individual chooses how much to consume     of labour income 
   , how much to invest in HE  , and how much to save   :  
               (4.2) 
In Period 2, each individual can consume future expected wage income that depends 
on how much he/she spends on HE and gross return on savings that he/she brought 
from the first period: 
                 (4.3a) 
                 (4.3a) 
where    is the return to education. Therefore, the decision problem of each individual 
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is to maximise (4.1) with respect to T,     and     subject to budget constraint: 
                           (4.3c) 
The optimal schooling decision must be a solution to the following maximisation 
problem:  
                                              (4.4) 
  
   
             
The FOC implies the corner condition where T is either zero or full cost of becoming 
a university graduate. One important feature of this decision rule is that a greater 
premium as captured by    (i.e. gross interest rate) will encourage HE attainment, 
whereas the higher interest rate r will discourage HE attainment. Hence the decision 
to HE is pursued to the point where its marginal rate of return to education equals the 
rate of interest. 
Assuming that there are HE alternatives, the individual makes the decision of 
attending HE (T=1) only if expected return to education    has to exceed the 
expected real rate of interest   , since the individual enrolls with a university which 
can accommodate with the model result, and vice versa. However, if individual’s   
  
is greater than  , but he/she does not go for HE (T=0), there must be an error term, 
since it contradicts the model’s result. In other words, the error term    is the missing 
valuation of such individual against going to HE. Hence, the error term can be 
calculated as follows:  
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                        (4.5) 
 
Therefore, I can write out the structural model that generates a prediction of 
individual’s decision to HE as follows: 
    
            
              
       
                (4.6A) 
Where    is the threshold value of decision function that determined by difference in 
rate of return in education and interest rate plus the error term. Hence, if d > 0, 
individual choose to go for HE.  
I set three research questions to test the association between the determinants of HE 
participation and other variables. A special focus is paid to the determinants that are 
related to the individual and family characteristics. First of all: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Individual’s decision to go to HE depends only on their expected 
return to HE. It is not related to personal and family characteristics.  
 
According to ex-post rationalization of HE enrolment, the only reason to attend 
college is the premium betwwen expected return to eduaction and interest rate. 
Hypothesis 1 is only formulated in terms of the model results. On the other hand, 
family background has been prominent in models of educational attainment or HE 
decision. In large number of studies, family background has been measured by family 
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socio-economic indicators. Prior studies indicate that parents with more education and 
higher income presumably provide more human and material resoureces that could 
benefit the offspring’s academic ability and orientations. Hence, the sencond 
hypothesis states that: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Individuals’ decision to go to HE depends not only on their 
expected returns to HE, family characteristics also have an impact. 
 
As a result, in addtion to the expected return to education, I also take into account the 
possibility that the perceived return to education can be defined by some sociological 
model, as  follows:  
    
            
              
       
                 
  
           
         (4.6B) 
where    is the vector of family socio-economic variables. As in this case, I 
obviously expect   
    
, the return to HE assoicated with family socio-economic 
background, is perceived by the individual to can sucessfully explain the decision to 
attend HE. According to the finding of previous studies, measures of family 
socio-economic background are expected to be positively associated with perceived 
return to education, and in turn affect decision to HE indirectly.  
Furthermore, one can argue that HE is just a filter that sorts on variations in 
intelligence. Personal cognitive ability is one of the main reasons why HE is rewarded 
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in the labour-market. Individuals with higher cognitive ability will get higher wage 
returns provided that they participate in HE because HE study acts as a signal that 
they are worth a higher wage. Therefore, I proposed the third hypothesis:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: More intelligent individuals attempt to signal their cognitive 
ability by acquiring more education than less able individuals. An individuals’ 
decision to go to HE depends on their perceived return to HE that associated with 
their cognitive ability.  
In this case, the perceived return to education can be modeled as: 
    
            
              
       
     
           
  
       
            (4.6C) 
where    is the vector of personal cognitive variables. 
 
4.3.2 Indirect Inference  
II was first introduced by Smith (1993), Gregory and Smith (1991 and 1993), and 
Gourieroux et al. (1993), and was surveyed by Gourieroux and Montfort 1995. II is a 
simulation-based method for evaluating or making inferences about the parameters of 
economic structural models with intractable likelihood functions. It is widely applied 
in modern economic analysis, including nonlinear dynamic models, and models with 
latent variables, missing or incomplete data. 
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When using II for evaluating a structural model, it would bootstrap from the original 
data or simulate the data from the model when given the set of parameter values and 
the distributions of the errors. The idea behind II is to obtain a set of auxiliary 
parameters by estimating an approximate or auxiliary model to form a criterion 
function. The auxiliary model serves as a window through which to view both the 
observed data and the simulated data generated by the structural or economic model, 
and is also characterised by a set of parameters which can be estimated using either 
observed or simulated data. Therefore, II is to optimally choose the parameters for the 
auxiliary model so that two sets of the parameter estimations of the auxiliary model 
are as close as possible. 
 
To be more specific, assume that a set of observations          is generated from a 
structural model and denoted by the probability density function           . Suppose 
that one can specify an auxiliary model defined by a conditional probability density 
function             , which can be estimated by the quasi (pseudo) maximum 
likelihood method. The parameter is estimated by maximising a criterion function 
using the observed data. The auxiliary model can be estimated by maximising the log 
of the likelihood function to obtain parameter estimates: 
               
 
    
            (4.7) 
where    serves to capture certain features of the observed data.    in general is an 
inconsistent estimator of  . Using the model under            to simulated paths of 
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length   by drawing independently   times and generate pseudo observations   
 . 
One in turn applies the estimation procedure and the likelihood function based on the 
simulation given by:  
                                 
 
   
 
       (4.8) 
 
4.3.3 Model evaluation  
The model evaluation procedure is concluded in four steps, as follows: 
Step 1: Calculate the errors from the structual model 
The idea of PSM methodology is to attempts in non-experimental context to replicate 
the setup of a randomised experiment. This refers to pair treatment and control units 
with similar values on the propensity score. It invokes strong ignorability assumptions 
in order to recover the missing counterfactual so that the outcome would have resulted 
if an individual had made an alternative choice (i.e. if individual had chosen not to go 
for HE). For each treated unit (with HE attainment) and control unit (without HE 
attainment), I calculate the expected return in terms of the difference between actual 
wage and its counterfactual wage estimated from PSM.:               
         , where           is the counterfactual log wage.  
 
According to the theory, PSM tackles endogeneity bias problem and yields a 
consistent estimate of the treatment impact conditional on observed covariates. In 
other words, it computes the return to higher education only owing to HE attainment 
reasons after controlling other factors including the personal ability and family 
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characteristics. Therefore, idiosyncratic errors    can also be calculated based on the 
equation (3.5) presented in Section 4.3.1. Moreover, I set a vector    that include 
chosen family background variables, and let      and    are assumed to be 
uncorrelated because      computes the return to HE due to 'professional' reasons 
after adjusting for the personal and family characteristics. 
 
Step 2: Derive the data by bootstrapping 
The next step is to draw pseudo samples, and the number of independent draws, S, is 
set to be 1000. In practice, first of all, I specify a vector    to capture family 
characteristics including family social class, parental education attainment, parents’ 
interest to education and finance constraint. Secondly, I randomly resample the   
 ,   , 
   with replacement from the orginal order, and the size of the resample data equals 
to the size of the actual data. I repeat this routine by 1000 times. According to 
Hypothesis 1, the decision to attend HE is entirely based on the ex ante return to 
education and interest rate: whether   
      45  or otherwise. Thus, with 
bootstraping, each individual from random family backgroud will have decisions only 
based on expected ruturn to education and repeat this decision process by 1000 times. 
This assumes that the input variables    
 ,    and    are not correlated across people 
in the true population and gives a sample set of outcomes for T. Lastly, I then estimate 
the chosen auxiliary regression on this bootstrap sample. 
 
Step 3: Choose the Auxiliary regression 
                                                             
45 r is the nominal interest rate. By running the model, I set r equals to 5%.  
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I classify the individual’s qualification into two groups: non-HE and HE. Given the 
binary nature of the dependent variable decision to enroll HE, I employ a 
binary probit model that defines where the dependent variable can only take two 
values: 1 if the individual participated in higher education after A-level and 0 
otherwise. Therefore, the probability of participating in HE can be modelled as a 
function as: 
          
                (4.9) 
  is the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the standard normal 
distribution. The vector X contains a number of control variables that are likely to 
affect the HE decision, ranging from measures of individual ability, parental 
background characteristics to regional characteristics and financial constraints, and   
denotes the vector of correspounding parameters.  
 
Step 4: Compute the Wald statistic 
Deciding whether to reject or not reject the null hypothesis requires the estimation of 
the auxiliary model with simulated data. Here, a Wald test statistic is chosen to be the 
test statistic.              is defined as      vector of observed data and     is 
an      vector of simulated observations generated from the structural model. The 
sample size of simulated data and the actual data has to be consistent. Under the null 
hypothesis, the true economic model is the structural model with the given estimates. 
 
I apply the GLS estimates to the auxiliary probit model and compute both coefficients 
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from the actual data and the set of coefficients of pseudo samples and to obtain their 
distribution, from which we obtained corresponding estimated coefficient    and   , 
respectively. I also define    as the average value that is computed from   : 
   
 
    
   
    
      
The Wald statistic is chosen as a metric for measuring the distance between the 
auxiliary model parameters estimated using the observed data and the simulated data, 
respectively. The Wald statistic uses the distribution of         and the formula of 
the Wald statistic is specified as: 
                                        (4.10) 
Where   the variance and covariance matrix of the distribution of        . This 
process measures the distance that the actual estimated coefficient are from the 
average of the simulated ones.  
 
The following step is to access the combinations of all estimated coefficient the model 
can fit. For the model to fit the data at the 95% confidence level, it requires the Wald 
statistic for the actual data to be less than the 95% confidence level of the Wald 
statistics from the simulated data. Here, transforming the Wald result for the actual 
data into a normalised t-statistic is recomanded. The transformed Mahalanobis 
distance can be computed as: 
        
        
         
    (4.11) 
where    is the Wald statistic on the actual data and     is the Wald statistic for 
the 95% of the simulated data. If the null hypothesis has not been rejected by the data, 
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the transformed Mahalanobis distance should be less than 1.645. The way is 
normalised following Le et al. (2012), and Meenagh and Le (2013), so that the 
resulting t-statistic is 1.645 at the 95% point the distribution, and thus anything falling 
beyond would lead to the rejection of the model. 
 
4.3.4 Model estimation 
Using the notation above, the II estimator is then defined by the solution of:  
           
 
 
               
 
    
 
 
                (4.12)  
Where  is a given symmetric positive definite matrix. It chooses the parameters of 
the underlying economic model so that these two sets of estimates of the parameters 
of the auxiliary model are as close as possible. 
 
In order to find the minimised distance of those two estimates of the coefficients in 
the quadratic form (4.2), I use the algorithm based on Simulated Annealing
46
 (SA) in 
which search takes place over a wide range around the initial values, with optimising 
search accompanied by random jumps around the space
47
.  
 
The use of SA attempts to imply the II estimation into practice. It exploits an analogy 
between the way in which a metal freezes into a minimum energy crystalline structure 
and search for a minimum in a more general system. Such process in SA can be 
                                                             
46 The estimation is mainly based on Matlab code file ‘run_CalcWald_SA’ but only change the up and lower 
bounds of each coefficient. The file can be easily downloaded from website.  
47 The state in an II estimation procedure can be considered as the set of structural parameters. 
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considered as the way of finding the minimum Wald statistics implied by the observed 
and simulated data. At each step, the SA heuristic considers some neighbouring states 
of the current states, and decides between moving the system to other states or staying 
in states. These probabilities ultimately lead the system to move to states of lower 
Wald statistics. Typically this iteration until the quadratic form is minimised, or until a 
given computation budget has been exhausted.  
 
SA’s major advantage over other methods is its ability to avoid becoming trapped at 
local minima. It then loops over the testing procedure to search for the global minima 
of Wald statistic. Under the SA algorithm, an initial choice of parameter vector is 
chosen, and the Wald at that point is evaluated by running through steps 1- 4 above. 
The algorithm then moves randomly to try a new point in the parameter space. When 
a new point in the parameter space is found to have a smaller Wald than any point 
preceding it in the sequence, it is chosen to be the current point from which the search 
for the minimum proceeds. The algorithm can also move to points which have a larger 
Wald, although the probability of this happening decreases with the number of points 
at which Wald statistics have previously been evaluated. Eventually, after a certain 
number of best points are found, the search is once again widened by increasing the 
acceptance probability. There are many different available stopping rules for the 
algorithm. In this study, I set the maximum number of iterations equals to 100.  
 
223 
 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Sample selection 
In this chapter I will continue to use data drawn from the NCDS. The empirical 
analysis use information collected when the participants were aged 7, 11, 16, 23 and 
33 (Sweep 1 to 5). It matches information on the individuals’ highest academic 
education attainment at age 33 from the fifth sweep. Family background and personal 
ability variables are collected from the first four sweeps whereas participants who are 
still in education at the last sweep are dropped. In the main part of the analysis, I only 
focus on individuals who are studying as the A-level route. In other words, I explore 
non-HE attainment and define this term as obtained at least one A-level but not 
continuing to further HE studies. I also explore entry to all forms of HE, which 
includes diploma, degree level and higher degree level. The initial sample size 
reported in Chapter One is 2,500, of which 1,131 individuals had a HE qualification 
and 1,369 individuals obtained at least one A-level. After matching the sample size is 
reported as 1,109, in which samples within common support area are 1097. Therefore, 
the final sample includes 1,097 individuals. 
  
4.4.2 Definition of the variables 
As determinants of the HE participation decision, I consider a set of individual innate 
ability characteristics, family background socio-economic characteristics and 
secondary school characteristics. The family background characteristics are collected 
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from Sweep 2 and 3 of the survey for the period in which the individual grew up and 
complete compulsory education. Among the variables, I include parental education, 
parents’ interest to education, father’s social class group, number of older siblings and 
financial status. The parental education levels will serve as proxies for the endowment 
of ability inherited from the parents.  
 
The information on the parents’ education is derived from the age that the parents left 
school, which is reported in Sweep 3. The parental educational attainment is measured 
as completed years of schooling in their secondary school. NCDS provides rich 
qualitative information on parental interest in the education at diﬀerent ages of their 
offspring. I constructed eight dummies based on the information collected when 
individuals are at age of 16 to indicate the extent that presents parents are concerned. 
The father’s earnings was reported in 1974 when the child was 16. This measure is 
usually used as a proxy for family income. However, it is argued that information on a 
single year is only a crude proxy for the financial situation of the household.
48
 I 
alternatively use dummy as an indicator to assess whether the family was 
experiencing serious financial difficulties in 1969 or 1974. Finally, dummy variables 
are used to measure each of the fathers social class.  
 
Information with ability in the childhood is collected from earlier NCDS sweeps. The 
                                                             
48 The NCDS only records family income when the individual is 16. Since this measure might not reflect living 
standards earlier in childhood or persistent financial constraint, one alternative method applied by Chevalier and 
Lanot (2002) attempts to transform this single year earning variable into a continuous one by using additional 
information extraced from the Family Expenditure Survey.  
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NCDS contains data on arithmetic and reading tests performed by the children at the 
aged of 11 as the indicator of individual’s early innate ability. I rescale in each of the 
test results by quantiles to contrsuct dummy variables ranking the individual test 
results. Moreover, there are six categories of school types reported in NCDS including 
the missing value. For each of these individuals, it is possible to derive a set of 
dummy variables indicating whether the individual attended a comprehensive, 
secondary modern, grammar school, private school, and other types of school. 
 
4.4.3  Descriptive information  
Table 4.1 presents a list of the variables available including dummy variable derived 
from original data, along with their means, standard deviations, and minimum and 
maximum values.  It is noted that statistics because some variables are not consistent 
with the figure in Chapter 2, as the model suggested, both the actual and 
counterfactual log wage is required to calcluate the each individual’s expected return 
to education and, in turn, the ex ante decision to HE. Therefore, numbers of 
observations are dropped due to missing information on target variable (actual and 
counterfactual log wage). The average of the natural logarithm of actual gross hourly 
wages is 2.36. By contrast, the average figure of counterfactual wages is 2.32. As can 
be seen from Figure 1, the distribution of actual and counterfactual wage is somehow 
very similar across the samples. This evidence suggests that two wage distributions 
are almost identical if the participants had the tendency to create alternatives to 
occurred life events. The binary outcome variable is a decision whether or not to 
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participate in HE. There is a larger proportion for attending some form of HE, 59 % 
against 41 % which is the proportion for not attending the HE.  
 
In addition, less than half of the parents have otained A-level or above qualifications 
(44 % for father and 43 % for mother, respectively. ). About 46 % of individuals 
choose to attend comprehensive schools, only 7 % secondary mordens, 26 % grammar 
schools, and 11 % private schools. Regarding to the personal innate ability, most of 
inviduals in their early age are ranked as in the top two quintiles in math and reading 
test, while only 7 % of them are ranked as in the bottom two quintiles.   
 
Table 4.2 presents percentage of HE participation disaggregated in different input 
variables. Overall, the percentage of HE participation (59.43%) is higher than that of 
non-HE participation (40.57%) in my selected sample. Of the family characteristics 
inputs, almost all variables have impacts. In particular, indiviuals with parents 
obtained A-level and above qualifications are more likely have willingness to go into 
HE. The pattern makes it clear that parents with higher educational attainment also 
result to a higher HE participation rate for their offsprings. This is somewhat 
consistant with the idea of intergenerational educational mobility discussed in Section 
2. Individuals facing family finance constraints are more likely to stop chasing further 
study after age 16. Moreover, indiviudals attending comprehensive school had the 
lowest HE participation rate, while individuals who went throught grammar and 
private schools had a slightly higher rate. The pattern of decreasing % comes along 
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with increasing birth order postion. It also shows that the gap betwwen individuals 
from different class background. Individuals who come from Professional or 
Intermediate families seem to have a higher HE participation. Regarding early 
personal innate abilities, the patterns at lower quintile are fairly similar across the 
cohort. Only individuals in the top quintile have a siginificantly larger participation 
rate.  
 
4. 5 Empirical result  
In this section, I will report the results of the II testing and re-estimation that applied 
to the three hypotheses presented in Section 4.3. Before processing, several tests are 
designed to assess the explanatory power of Auxiliary model which are presented in 
Section 5.1. Original observations are calculated and collected from the result 
obtained in Chapter one. Explanatory dummies, explanatory power and starting 
calibration coefficients are created and computed in STATA. The performance of 
model evaluation, and estimation based on Wald Statistic normalised transformed 
Mahalanobis distance/ t-statistic is calculated in MATLAB
49
. 
 
4.5.1 Explanatory power of Auxiliary model 
To choose the number of explanatory variables that help explain the HE choices, 
several models are selected to assess how the actual data overall fit the auxiliary 
                                                             
49
 The MATLAB codes are available on request. 
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model. Model version (a) only includes parental educational attainment variables; 
besides parental education, there are 6 variables presenting parental interest to 
education are added to Model (b). Model (c) contains all family background variables, 
and model (d) includes all variables described in section 4.3. Thought    or pseudo 
   are very valuable measures of goodness of fit of a linear regression model, they 
are far less useful with Probit regression.
50
 I therefore imply alternative intuitively 
appealing ways of assessing the fit of Probit regression model commonly used in 
literatures.  
Table 4.3 summarises the goodness of fits of different auxiliary model. Column 2 
specifies which variables are included. Column 3 to 5 indicates the P value of 
Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) test, Receiver Operating characteristic (ROC) area and 
Correct Classification Rate.51 The results reveal the four models are all adequate 
models. Nonetheless, Classification correct rate is not sensitive to the increasing 
relative sizes of explanatory variable. ROC curve area is apparently over the default 
50% cutoff.
52
 Although Model (a) has the largest HL P-value, the performance of 
ROC area and Correct Classification rate is the worst among the four models. The 
reason it has the largest P-value is because it only has 2 degree of freedom. Model (b) 
performs not as good as model (c) and (d). The models (c) and (d) have almost the 
same ability to fit the data, but model (d) has a lower HL P-value. It prevails 
                                                             
50
 The pseudo    produced in STATA is based on the log-likelihood statistic, and was not recommended as it 
lacks an easily understood interpretation. Researchers try to predict the outcome, whereas the model only gives 
us the probability of the outcome. 
51
 Hosmer-Lemeshow test is implemented in STATA using the command estat gof.  
  ROC curve is implemented in STATA using command lroc 
  Correct Classification rate is implemented in STATA using command estat classification 
52
 50% is the discrimination one would expect if he tossed a coin to identify positive subjects, rather than use a 
Probit model. 
229 
 
increasing the number of explanatory variables cannot improve the goodness of fit to 
the data, but loss more degrees of freedom. As a result, the model (c) would be 
considered to be adequate to fit the data well. Table 4.4 lists input variables in the 
Probit model and the corresponding coefficients notation based on the conclusion of 
goodness of fits tests.  
4.5.2 Model Evaluation 
(a) Hypothesis 1  
The results for model (4.6A)’s t-statistics and confidence intervals for each 
explanatory variable included in auxiliary model are reported in Table 4.5. Column 2 
shows the estimated parameters on the actual data and Colum 3 and 4 present the 
lower and upper 95% bounds of the estimated parameters on the 1,000 bootstrap 
samples, respectively. Colum 5 indicates whether each actual parameter is inside the 
confidence interval calculated from the bootstrapping parameters.   
 
The normalized t-statistics is calculated as 14.59, which indicates the structural model 
cannot replicate the data as close as to that implied by the auxiliary model. Certain 
result is evident because 5 out of 16 coefficients obtained from auxiliary model lie 
outside the confidence interval. Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of the coefficient 
estimated from bootstrap sample data, with red straight line edges the 95 % up and 
bottom bounds and green line indicate the actual data coefficient position.  
On the other hand, the Wald statistic is a measure of the distance between the 
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simulations and the data. The lower the Wald, the better the model can be used for 
explaining the observed data jointly. Therefore, the p-value is the probability that the 
model is not rejected by the data and computed by 1-Wald. The Wald statistic is 
reported as 100 % in Table 4.5, which means the structural model is strongly rejected 
under the Hypothesis 1 at 95 % confidence level  
The result indicates individual’s decision to go for HE does not only depend on the 
expected return to HE and interest rate. It is not surprising that overall the model is 
rejected. The reason comes with two folds. First, according to large number of 
literatures, individual’s highest education attainment or their decision to HE 
empirically are more or less determined by other socio-economic variables, such as 
family and personal characteristics, as discussed in section 2. Second, recalling the 
ignorability assumption in PSM methodology, realized log wage is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with treatment status (HE decision), conditional on observed covariates. 
Therefore, if the assumption holds, expected return to education that obtained from 
the PSM therefore cannot be used as a predictor to calculate the decision to HE, 
ceteris paribus. The result here is in the line with the ignorability assumption in PSM.  
 
(b) Hypothesis 2  
The next step is to test the hypothesis 2. Under the hypothesis 2, expected return to 
education may itself affect directly and combined with some socio-economic 
characteristics also affect the probability of participating in HE indirectly through a 
clearly structured path.  
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Recall the equation (4.6B), socioeconomic related variable vector   is considered to 
include parental educational attainment, parental interest to their offspring’s education, 
birth order and family finance status. It obviously generates a different set of 
errors,    
    
. Before proceeding it is noted that to choose the starting calibration 
parameter value is somewhat important; or at least, to ascertain whether there exists a 
positive or negative association between the decision to participate HE and other 
socioeconomic variables.  
Suppose HE decision outcome is modelled as a function of expected return and 
expected return to education is modelled as function of socio-economic variables, 
simultaneously. The equation systems can be specified as follows: 
           
  ,    
           (4.13) 
Estimated result from equation (4.13) is inappropriate under hypothesis 2; it only 
allows a reasonable replication of the educational attainment data. However, the 
estimated coefficients can be used as a guide as to choose some calibration values that 
seem to be reasonable. All coefficients are allowed to change
53
 by re-estimating the 
structural model (4.6B) later by choosing different values of coefficients that best 
match the auxiliary model. 
 
The calibration value is computed using three-stage least square estimation in STATA 
and the result is shown in Table 4.6. Reading the table, the majority of the effect can 
be attributed to the direct effect of expected return to education. It reveals a total 
                                                             
53 In most cases, signs of the coefficient are not allowed to change; otherwise it will violate thesociology theory 
used in this case.  
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effect of 85 %. Both of parental education indicators have a positive impact on 
expected return to education, such effects are expected given a large body of 
empirical studies. However, the effect of parental interest to education is not 
statistically significant. On the other hand, finance status exert a somewhat negative 
impact (significant at 10%) on HE decision, whereas the negative Birth order effect is 
not statistically significant.  
The hypothesis 2 is that if the structural model is correctly specified, the set of 
calibration coefficient obtained from 3SLS should not differ significantly from those 
obtained from the auxiliary model using observed data. Table 4.7 summarizes how the 
test results on calibrated coefficients. Compared with the results in previous model, 
more coefficients become inside the 95 % bounds, but there is only 2 out of 26 
coefficients lie outside the 95 % bounds generated from the simulated data. In 
particular, Mother’s education attainment dummy is found to have the passive pattern 
in the data compared with the simulated bound. The bad finance indicator is shown to 
be more negative than that which the structural model could predict. The Wald 
Statistic reported is not as high as the previous models at 100 % and reduced at 
96.67 %. This implies however actual data based on the auxiliary model coefficients 
still cannot be captured by the corresponding joint distribution generated from model 
simulation at 5 % confident level. 
 
(c) Hypothesis 3 
Similar to hypothesis 2, perceived return to education in hypothesis 3 is a function of 
personal cognitive ability from age 11 to 16. As a result, the calibration value can be 
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computed from the equation systems designed below: 
           
  ,    
           (4.14) 
Table 4.8 list the 3SLS estimation results based on equation (4.14) used as guidance 
for the calibration value. The bottom quintile of both read score and math score at age 
11 are omitted after the estimation. This is possibly due to individuals at these two 
bottom quintiles only account for 1% of the total sample. Variables include 
individuals obtaining grade A-C in O-level and A-level Math, read and math score at 
age 11 in top quintile are all strongly positive associated with expected future wage 
return (statistically significant at 90 % level). Individual’s English 
language proficiency (Obtaining Grade A-C in O-level and A-level) only has 
insignificant and small impacts. Individuals’ math abilities at age 11 ranked in fourth 
quintile and lower however, are negatively associated with the expected return.  
 
 
Table 4.9 summarizes the test results on calibrated coefficients for structural model 
(4.6C). There is only 1 out of 15 coefficients lie outside the 95 % simulation bounds: 
Mother’s education attainment dummy is showing a more positive pattern. On the 
other hand, with a Wald percentile of 96, jointly, observed data can be explained by 
the structural model (4.13) at 99 % confident level. The Wald percentile is also 
reduced compared with model (4.6A) for hypothesis 1. 
 
Although the hypothesis models 2 and 3 with calibration value are still rejected at 95 % 
overall, it doesn’t mean the hypotheses are also rejected. It indicates P-value is even 
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closer to a non-rejection level. One can expect the model (4.6B) and (4.6C) used to 
explain the data behaviour better in the following case, since these coefficients can be 
re-estimated by II. This lends credence to the validity of the results and supports the 
hypotheses. 
 
4.5.3 Model estimation 
In this section we report the results for re estimating the hypothesis models by II. The 
idea of II is to obtain the set of coefficients that minimises the overall Wald statistic. 
As discussed in Section 3, I attempt to use the SA algorithm to minimize the Wald. In 
practice, I estimate the model several times, compare the Wald statistics and obtain a 
set of candidate plausible coefficients. For each of these optimal sets, I run II testing 
procedure on several times in order to check the robustness of each result. I then vary 
in the neighbourhood of the resulting estimation values, to ascertain the set of 
coefficients are close to or around the minimum.  
(a)  Hypothesis 2  
Table 4.10 lists the II estimation results for structure parameters of model (4.6B). 
Both parental education attainments that positively influence return to education can 
in turn increase their offspring’s participation of HE. The stronger absolute effect and 
evidence is found when the mother’s highest educational attainment is A-level or 
above based on the II estimates result. This is slightly different from the calibration. 
According to empirical studies, the birth order of an individual as a direct effect plays 
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an important role in determining the higher education participations (Black, et al. 
2005, Dyson, et al., 2010). However, this determinant is not found significant as an 
indirect effect in the case of II estimation. Significant differences in participation in 
HE can be attributed to the parental interest in education. Parents with over concerned 
to education invest has a positive effect in determining offspring’s HE participation 
through the perceived return equation. It is striking that family finance constraint has 
almost insignificant affect the HE participation decision than one usually expected. 
The figure is just as half as the calibration in absolute value.   
Table 4.11 summarises the corresponding test results once I re-estimate the structural 
model coefficients. The result is found to have considerably improved after the II 
estimation is applied. All coefficients lie outside the up and lower 95% bound derived 
from the simulated data. It demonstrates that the evaluation results based on the II 
estimates can fit the data better than the calibrated version. Alternatively, in Figure 
4.5 from the distribution generated from simulated data, one can see that all actual 
data (green line) are position in the 95 % bounds. It also prevails that the model 
successfully passed the joint test as the Wald statistics is 19.45 with a P value equals 
80.55%. It concludes these results strongly support hypothesis 2.  
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(b) Hypothesis 3 
Table 4.12 reports the II estimation results for structure parameters of model (4.6C). 
Focusing on the academic performance, the estimated results show individual’s 
O-level and A-level math ability play much more important role of determining HE 
participation (change from 7.6% to 16.8% and from 22.1% to 44.5%, respectively), 
through the return equation. Whereas impact of individual’s English 
language proficiency at O-level and A-level from estimation are relative similar to the 
calibrated ones. The corresponding coefficients have somewhat ignorable changes. 
Turning to the early cognitive abilities, estimated coefficients for read sore at top 
quintile increases from 11.3% to 44.25%, whilst decreases from -14.8% to -25.6% at 
second lowest quintile. Coefficients for math score at 11 are all round the calibration 
with no significant changes.  
 
Table 4.13 gives the test results based on the II estimation. The Normalised t-statistic 
has decreased from 3.89 to 2.18. Though the hypothesis 3 model can somewhat fit the 
data at least in a moderate level. There is still only 1 out of 15 coefficients lie outside 
the 95% range derived from the simulated data. Not surprisingly, mother’s education 
attainment (  ) shows the passive pattern in the data compared with the simulated 
bound. Figure 4.6 gives a more straightforward visual analysis of the distribution of 
coefficients estimated from bootstrap sample data, with red straight line edges the 
95 %ile up and bottom bounds and green line indicate the actual data coefficient 
position. Wald %ile decreases 28.1 (a corresponding P-value = 72%) compared to that 
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of from calibration, which implies the model can jointly capture the observed data in a 
more proper way.  
However, the result is striking that compared to Hypothesis model 1 and Hypothesis 
models using calibration, after the re-estimation by II method, all the coefficients in 
the Hypothesis models 2 and 3 pass Wald test quite easily. One possible explanation is 
that Hypothesis models 2 and 3 allow the derived errors (equation 4.5) of each person 
to be reduced substantially on re-estimation. Furthermore, re-estimation could 
possibly reduce the power of the Wald test substantially; and this nonetheless should 
be investigated in further study. 
 
 
4.6 Summarizing Remarks and Conclusions  
In this chapter I have attempted to build a micro model of HE participation 
incorporating factors for expected return to HE, and other personal ability and family 
socio-economic variables based on framework of education decision making 
behaviour of individual agents. In the model, the participation decision is 
hypothesised to be a function of: (1) the individual’s expected return to HE, (2) 
expected return but also perceived by family background such as parental influences, 
household credit constraints, etc.; and, (3) expected return but perceived by personal 
innate ability and academic performance. I then test these three hypotheses using the 
1958 British NCDS dataset. In contrast to the existing literature, this is achieved 
empirically by adopting the II method to first evaluate the role of the above factors on 
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participating in HE for young cohorts in the 1970s, and I then re-estimate the 
structural coefficients if the model failed to pass the test. Attempts to apply this new 
type of method on microeconomic level cross-sectional data is new to the existing 
literature.   
 
I summarise the findings as follows. First, the model based on Hypothesis 1 fails to 
pass both the Wald and normalised t-statistic in II. The main powerful conclusion is 
that Hypothesis model 1 is highly rejected and the power of the test is relatively high. 
This implies that HE participation does not only depend on an individual’s expected 
return to education, but shoulde more or less relate to other factors as proposed in 
Hypotheses 2 and 3.  
Secondly, Hypothesis 2 model using calibration is rejected by the Wald test at 95 %, 
but passes the test at more tolerant 99% confidence level. However, the II 
re-estimation applied on Hypothesis 2 model easily passes the Wald test. Thirdly, 
although the Hypothesis 3 model is not rejected by the Wald test at 95 percent level, 
there is a still a coefficient that lies outside the 95% simulation bounds after 
re-estimation. This result indicates sure that the predict ability of the model is 
uncertain.  
The conclusions from the above evidence for the effects of various factors on HE 
participation are considered to be tentative because the natures of the effects are not 
simple direct impacts and no studies has attempted to model and test causal effects. In 
this study, I only attempts to model the expected return to HE in explaining the HE 
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participation behaviour. Because Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 models are complete 
hypothesis individually, it is difficult to measure causal effects of different 
characteristics and it is also difficult to conclude whether these impacts are significant  
 
The magnitude accuracy of these effects also might be under consideration; however, 
it is evident and confident that the expected return to HE for determining the HE 
participation are biased in terms of family socio-economic background or personal 
attribute. It is worth noting that when applying II method to re-estimate the models, 
all the coefficients in the Hypothesis models 2 and 3 pass Wald test quite easily. This 
result is ambiguous. The problem is whether the errors term of each person are 
reduced substantially on re-estimation, or if there is a possibility that re-estimation 
reduce the power of the Wald test after the re-estimation. One possible explanation is 
that the power of the test is weak against Hypotheses 2 and 3 models, for both of 
which the models contain large number of degrees of freedom. These features should 
be investigated in future study. 
 
This study has observed several limitations. First, the model setup does not directly 
include personal and family characteristics.  Future research could include these 
agents' heterogeneity dimensions in order to assess the corresponding direct effects. 
For example, Gallipoli et al. (2007) use a model that incorporates several important 
mechanisms as essential parts of the lifetime earnings, such as: personal permanent 
ability, ability transmitted across generations, inter-vivo transfers from parents to 
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offspring permitted to ease liquidity constraints in the education decision, and so on. 
Secondly, due to the data limitation, this study only focuses on cohorts who 
participated in HE in the 1970s. As discussed in Chapter 1, the UK’s education policy 
has gradually shifted the burden of funding HE away from the government towards 
the students and their families. It is, therefore important to examine whether the effect 
of financial constraint is significant and to what extent the tuition fee can affect HE 
participation under the changes in the education law. Finally, this study only uses a 
pooled sample, further research may also consider allowing for gender heterogeneity.  
241 
 
Appendix D Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics, NCDS 1958 cohorts 
Variable Name Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Actual log wage 2.36 0.417 0.46 4.48 
Counterfactual log wage 2.32 0.422 0.46 4.48 
HE decision 0.59 0.491 0 1 
Father’s highest educational attainment is 
A-level and above 
0.44 0.497 0 1 
Mother’s highest educational attainment is 
A-level and above 
0.43 0.495 0 1 
Father’s interest to education at age 16     
Over concerned 0.02 0.137 0 1 
Very interested 0.56 0.495 0 1 
Some interest 0.16 0.368 0 1 
Missing value 0.16 0.361   
Mother’s interest to education at age 16     
Over concerned 0.01 0.116 0 1 
Very interested 0.58 0.493 0 1 
Some interest 0.18 0.383 0 1 
Missing Value 0.14 0.349   
Father’s social class at age 16     
Professional or Intermediate 0.48 0.499 0 1 
Family finance status     
Bad finance at age 11 or 16 0.05 0.222 0 1 
Type of secondary school      
Comprehensive 0.46 0.498 0 1 
Secondary Morden 0.07 0.256 0 1 
Grammar 0.26 0.436 0 1 
Private 0.11 0.314 0 1 
Birth order /number of older siblings 0.36 0.564 0 3 
Personal ability     
Read score      
Bottom quintile 0.01 0.079 0 1 
Second quintile 0.05 0.208 0 1 
Third quintile 0.12 0.328 0 1 
Fourth quintile 0.26 0.442 0 1 
Top quintile 0.46 0.498 0 1 
Math score   0 1 
Bottom quintile 0.01 0.079 0 1 
Second quintile 0.05 0.208 0 1 
Third quintile 0.12 0.329 0 1 
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Fourth quintile 0.27 0.442 0 1 
Top quintile 0.46 0.498 0 1 
 
Table 4.2 percentage of HE participation 
 percentage of HE participation 
 HE Non-HE 
Total Sample 59.43 40.57 
(No. Obs) (445) (652) 
Father’s highest educational attainment   
O-level 54.31 45.69 
A-level and above 65.98 34.02 
Mother’s highest educational attainment   
O-level  54.36 45.64 
A-level and above 66.31 33.69 
Father’s interest to education at age 16   
Over concerned 71.43 28.57 
Very interested 61.64 38.36 
Some interest 56.74 43.26 
Mother’s interest to education at age 16   
Over concerned 60.00 40.00 
Very interested 61.54 38.44 
Some interest 57.14 42.86 
Father’s social class at age 16   
Professional or Intermediate 66.16 33.84 
Family finance status   
Bad finance at age 11 or 16 49.12 50.88 
Type of Secondary School    
Comprehensive 53.56 46.44 
Secondary Morden 61.04 38.96 
Grammar 65.71 34.29 
Private 68.03 31.97 
Birth Order /Number of Older Siblings   
0 59.73 40.27 
1 57.32 42.68 
2 48.78 51.22 
3 40.00 60.00 
Personal ability   
Read score at age 11   
Bottom quintile 28.57 71.43 
Second quintile 40.00 60.00 
Third quintile 45.93 54.07 
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Fourth quintile 58.70 41.30 
Top quintile 65.27 34.73 
Math score at age 11   
Bottom quintile 46.15 53.85 
Second quintile 41.46 58.54 
Third quintile 49.21 50.79 
Fourth quintile 54.48 45.52 
Top quintile 65.43 34.57 
Whether obtained O-level English Grade 
A-C at 14 
  
Whether obtained O-level Math Grade A-C 
at 14 
  
Whether obtained A-level English Grade 
A-C at 16 
  
Whether obtained A-level Math Grade A-C 
at 16 
  
   
 
Table 4.3 Goodness of Fits of Different Auxiliary Model Version 
Model Explanatory variables 
include 
H-L test P-value ROC area 
% 
Correct 
Classiﬁcation % 
a Only Parental education 0.898 0.578 59.43% 
b Parental education;  
Parental interest in 
Education 
0.5798 0.584 59.53% 
c All family background 
variables 
0.6314 0.609 61.08% 
d All Family background; 
personal ability 
variables 
0.5012 0.612 61.16% 
 
244 
 
Table 4.4 Coefficients used in Auxiliary model 
Coefficients Definition 
   Constant term 
 Father’s highest educational attainment 
   A-level or above 
 Mother’s highest educational attainment 
   A-level or above 
 Father’s interest to education at age 16 
   Some interest 
   Very interested 
   Over concerned 
 Mother’s interest to education at age 16 
   Some interest 
   Very interested 
   Over concerned 
 Type of Secondary School  
   Comprehensive 
    Secondary Morden 
    Grammar 
    Private 
 Family finance status 
    Bad finance at age 11 or 16 
 Birth Order  
    Number of Older Siblings 
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Table 4.5 Coefficients estimate based on Calibration and Confidence Interval 
Parameters Actual data  
Coefficients  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
   0.1311 -0.1753 0.2322 IN 
   0.1644 -0.1469 0.1481 OUT 
   0.1839 -0.1485 0.1414 OUT 
   -0.0020 -0.3246 0.3030 IN 
   0.1127 -0.2651 0.2860 IN 
   0.3968 -0.5999 0.5465 IN 
   0.1103 -0.3104 0.3330 IN 
   0.0259 -0.2900 0.2876 IN 
   -0.2408 -0.6772 0.6350 IN 
   -0.2636 -0.2596 0.2733 OUT 
    -0.0521 -0.3264 0.3236 IN 
    -0.0069 -0.2916 0.2883 IN 
    -0.0292 -0.3364 0.3226 IN 
    -0.3239 -0.2965 0.1734 OUT 
    0.1282 -0.1226 0.1105 OUT 
T-Statistics:  14.59    
Wald Statistics:  100 P value: 0%  
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Table 4.6 Calibrated Coefficient from 3SLS estimation: Hypothesis 2 
Variables Coefficient  3 SLS Estimation  
(Use as Calibration) 
Return to education    0.850*** 
   
Father’s highest educational     0.063** 
Mother’s highest educational     0.049* 
Father over concerned    0.053 
Father very interested    0.003 
Father some interest    0.000 
Mother is over concerned    0.011 
Mother very interested    0.000 
Mother some interest    -0.009 
Birth order    -0.027 
Finance status     -0.121* 
Constant     0.021* 
   
No of Obs  1097 
Note ***Significant at the 1 % level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
Table 4.7 Coefficients estimate based on Calibration and Confidence Interval: Hypothesis 2 
Parameters Actual data  
Coefficients  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
   0.1311 -0.0919 0.3309 IN 
   0.1644 -0.1479 0.1703 IN 
   0.1839 -0.1435 0.1369 OUT 
   -0.0020 -0.2955 0.3213 IN 
   0.1127 -0.2706 0.2552 IN 
   0.3968 -0.5463 0.5496 IN 
   0.1103 -0.3136 0.3067 IN 
   0.0259 -0.2693 0.2754 IN 
   -0.2408 -0.6723 0.6897 IN 
   -0.2636 -0.2704 0.2575 IN 
    -0.0521 -0.3517 0.3287 IN 
    -0.0069 -0.2882 0.2713 IN 
    -0.0292 -0.3140 0.3336 IN 
    -0.3239 -0.3772 0.3062 IN 
    0.1282 -0.1213 0.1079 OUT 
Wald Statistics 96.97 P-value 3%  
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Table 4.8 Calibrated Coefficient from 3SLS estimation: Hypothesis 3 
Variables Coefficient 3SLS Estimation 
(Use as Calibration) 
Expected return to education    0.650*** 
Read score at 11   
Bottom quintile  (omitted) 
Second quintile    -0.148 
Third quintile    0.028 
Fourth quintile    0.024 
Top quintile    0.113* 
Math score at 11   
Bottom quintile  (omitted) 
Second quintile    -0.073 
Third quintile    -0.095 
Fourth quintile    -0.085 
Top quintile    0.100* 
O-level English Grade A-C obtained 
at age 14 
    0.027 
O-level Math Grade A-C obtained at 
age 14 
    0.076* 
A-level English Grade A-C obtained 
at age 16 
    0.006 
A-level Math Grade A-C obtained at 
age 16 
    0.221* 
Note ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
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Table 4.9 Coefficients estimate based on Calibration and Confidence Interval: Hypothesis 3 
Parameters Actual data  
Coefficients  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
   0.1311 -0.0248 0.4627 IN 
   0.1644 -0.1721 0.1656 IN 
   0.1839 -0.1746 0.1668 OUT 
   -0.0020 -0.3786 0.3848 IN 
   0.1127 -0.3257 0.3240 IN 
   0.3968 -0.6258 0.6445 IN 
   0.1103 -0.3833 0.3654 IN 
   0.0259 -0.3354 0.3336 IN 
   -0.2408 -0.7084 0.7770 IN 
   -0.2636 -0.3135 0.3105 IN 
    -0.0521 -0.4193 0.4192 IN 
    -0.0069 -0.3295 0.3508 IN 
    -0.0292 -0.3913 0.3987 IN 
    -0.3239 -0.3328 0.3702 IN 
    0.1282 -0.1327 0.1295 IN 
Wald Statistics 95.9 P-value 4.1%  
 
Table 4.10 II Estimation Results: Family background 
Variables Coefficient  Calibration  Estimates 
Father’s highest 
educational  
   0.063 0.147 
Mother’s highest 
educational  
   0.049 0.196 
Father over concerned    0.053 0.066 
Father very interested    0.003 0.051 
Father some interest    0.000 0.002 
Mother over 
concerned 
   0.011 0.106 
Mother very 
interested 
   0.000 0.022 
  Mother some 
interest 
   -0.009 -8.12e-04 
Birth order    -0.027 -9.6e-05 
Finance status     -0.121 -0.009 
Constant term     0.021 0.016 
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Table 4.11 Coefficients estimate based on II estimation and Confidence Interval: Hypothesis 3 
Parameters Actual data  
Coefficients  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
   0.1311 0.0645 0.5022 IN 
   0.1644 -0.1008 0.1884 IN 
   0.1839 -0.0797 0.2014 IN 
   -0.0020 -0.3078 0.3199 IN 
   0.1127 -0.2967 0.2782 IN 
   0.3968 -0.5759 0.6513 IN 
   0.1103 -0.3185 0.3036 IN 
   0.0259 -0.2947 0.2776 IN 
   -0.2408 -0.6548 0.6437 IN 
   -0.2636 -0.3026 0.3085 IN 
    -0.0521 -0.3417 0.3735 IN 
    -0.0069 -0.2753 0.3012 IN 
    -0.0292 -0.3233 0.3401 IN 
    -0.3239 -0.3349 0.2669 IN 
    0.1282 -0.1208 0.1199 IN 
Wald Statistics:  19.45 P value: 80.55%  
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Table 4.12 II Estimation Results: personal ability 
Variables Coefficient  Calibration  Estimates 
Read score at 11    
Second quintile    -0.148 
-0.2555 
Third quintile    0.028 
0.0194 
Fourth quintile    0.024 0.0387 
Top quintile    0.113 0.4425 
Math score at 11    
Second quintile    -0.073 -0.0533 
Third quintile    -0.095 -0.0249 
Fourth quintile    -0.085 -0.0056 
Top quintile    0.100 0.0845 
O-level English 
Grade A-C obtained 
at age 14 
    0.027 0.0346 
O-level Math Grade 
A-C obtained at age 
14 
    0.076 
0.1677 
A-level English 
Grade A-C obtained 
at age 16 
    0.006 0.0103 
A-level Math Grade 
A-C obtained at age 
16 
    0.221 0.4435 
constant  -0.064 -0.0492 
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Table 4.13 Coefficients estimate based on Calibration and Confidence Interval: Hypothesis 3 
Parameters Actual data  
Coefficients  
95% Lower 
Bound 
95% Upper 
Bound 
IN/OUT 
   0.1311 0.0141 0.4887 IN 
   0.1644 -0.1563 0.1733 IN 
   0.1839 -0.1688 0.1819 OUT 
   -0.0020 -0.3732 0.4152 IN 
   0.1127 -0.3275 0.3168 IN 
   0.3968 -0.6200 0.7453 IN 
   0.1103 -0.3901 0.3642 IN 
   0.0259 -0.3313 0.3099 IN 
   -0.2408 -0.7254 0.7969 IN 
   -0.2636 -0.3186 0.3153 IN 
    -0.0521 -0.4125 0.4436 IN 
    -0.0069 -0.3541 0.3310 IN 
    -0.0292 -0.4026 0.3809 IN 
    -0.3239 -0.3528 0.3763 IN 
    0.1282 -0.1420 0.1416 IN 
Wald Statistics 28.1 P-value 71.9%  
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Figure 4.2 Actual wage VS Counterfactual wage distribution 
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of Coefficient from Simulation Data, Model 3.6A 
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of Coefficient from Simulation Data, Hypothesis 2 Model using 
Calibration 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution of Coefficient from Simulation Data, Hypothesis 2 model by II estimation 
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Figure 4.6 Distribution of Coefficient from Simulation Data, model (3.6A) by II estimation 
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Chapter 5:  General conclusion 
 
5.1 Concluding comments 
 
This thesis examines both pecuniary and non-pecuniary return to HE in the UK and it 
empirically tests the model of demand for HE origins from human capital theory. All 
three empirical chapters use data from the British 1958 NCDS.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Firstly, the analysis of 
Chapter Two uses PSM regressions to estimate the returns to highest academic 
qualifications. After an extensive review of the empirical and methodological 
literature in this field, the first investigative chapter of this thesis exploits the rich 
dataset to examine returns to education in the UK for from 33 to 50 years of age. By 
this time, individuals should have enough labour market experience since completing 
their education to provide an accurate assessment of the value of their qualifications 
in the labour market.  
 
It is clear from Chapter Two that there is a variation in returns to education across the 
cohort, and the overall returns to educational qualifications at each stage of the 
educational process remain sizeable and significant, even after allowing for 
heterogeneity. The return rises with the greater disparity of the educational groups as 
age increases. Compared with leaving school at 16 without qualifications, the average 
incremental return at age 33 to O-levels is 13 %, for A-levels it is 33 %, and for HE it 
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is 50 %. When the cohorts were at age 42, the return incremental to O-levels is around 
16 %, for A-levels it is almost 40 %, and for HE it is about 58 %. On the other hand, 
in order to judge the impact of education on earning over lifetime, I restrict the sample 
to those individuals who attended all three follow up surveys after age 33, and 
re-estimate by using PSM. The result is relatively similar to that of the whole sample. 
This suggests that result there has been an increase in earnings over time for 
individuals who attained a higher educational attainment, which is highly robust.  
 
The results also show that females with HE attainments usually enjoy higher returns 
than males, and the gender gap constantly increases over the years. For example, 
when comparing A-levels with HE attainment, on average females enjoy a 7 % 
premium over males. However, when comparing individuals with O-levels or no 
qualifications, the wage gap is not significant. This finding reflects a tendency for 
lower educated women to gain less wage growth than men. I further argue that 
females without HE are lower paid, and this is due to the number of females who 
re-entered the labour market in their late thirties and early forties. Females without 
HE attainment are more likely to suffer an interruption in employment because of 
maternity and motherhood in their thirties. When they return to the labour market, 
they can hardly be paid relatively fair and high wages due to their lack of work 
experience, they also have fewer chances for promotion. 
 
Obviously HE offers much more possibilities to get better job, a higher income, and 
consequently achieve significant material benefits. But there are many non-monetary 
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reasons why individuals decide to achieve HE. The non-monetary benefits of 
education have attracted the attention in this thesis because they represent the positive 
impacts on utility which are not captured by traditional economic measures. Most of 
the research has aimed at establishing causal links between an individual’s education 
and health outcomes, as well as at evaluating particular effects. Chapter 3 starts by 
reviewing the large literature of the impact of education on health outcomes. However, 
a weakness of the most existing evidence to date is that much of the assessment of the 
effects of education has measured education in terms of years of schooling. This has 
commonly been investigated as a simple linear effect, without distinguishing the 
relative benefit of educational participation at some particular stage. Chapter Three 
also extended the analysis to later sweeps of the NCDS survey. This will allow for a 
wider range of outcomes to be considered and also allows for an analysis of the 
various ages at which these outcomes occur.  
 
The findings from Chapter Three suggest that attending HE may be an effective way 
to improve population health and reduce the likelihood of health damaging behaviours. 
In particular, by using the conventional OLS approach I find considerable evidence 
that education is strongly associated with health and risky health behaviours. 
Furthermore, the effects of education remain after the introduction of controls for 
socio-economic background and prior health conditions. By applying the PSM 
approach, I find that a substantial element of this effect is causal. In more detail, HE 
has significantly positive impact on individual’s general health status in terms of self 
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assessed health status. Higher educated individuals have better general health 
conditions and this impact increases as the cohorts grow older. Associational evidence 
shows a negative relationship between education and obesity, such that more 
education is associated with less obesity. The causality of education on obesity is 
significant when individuals were middle aged. The estimated effect is about -12.3 % 
for males and -10.7 % for females at age 42, and -13.6 % for males and -11.4 % for 
females at age 50. Moreover, HE also has substantial effects on initiation, cessation, 
and frequency of smoking and drinking alcohol. It is striking that the impact of HE on 
reducing the likelihood of depression in UK is insignificant. This may happen because 
HE attainment results in a higher occupation in the labour market and this leads to 
higher levels of stress. There may be existing trade-offs between stress and 
satisfaction of higher occupation that may lead to an ambiguous relationship between 
educational success and mental health. I also exhibit some robust evaluations and 
evidence of the quantitative effects of education assessed in terms of covariates 
balance and sensitivity to the unobserved hidden bias. The problem arises from the 
general health indicator including SRH, BMI and likelihood of obesity. It indicates 
that these results are relative vulnerable to unobserved bias when conducting 
R-bounds analysis. The robustness of the effects on general health indicators may be 
of interest in future research. 
 
According to human capital theory, investment in education would not occur unless 
the individual’s future earnings stream following the extra investment is higher than it 
would have been had he or she not invested. Therefore, if one compares the ex ante 
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expected earnings streams with and without investment, they would only be equal at a 
positive rate of return. This is the yield of the investment that is the most appropriate 
way to measure the decision of education. In contrast to existing literature that 
explores associations between HE participation and other factors, and which attempts 
to find the casual effects, in Chapter 4 I investigate the possibility that an individual’s 
expected future returns to HE itself can determine the decision of HE participation. 
The participation decision is hypothesised to be a function of: (1) the individual’s 
expected return to HE; (2) the expected return perceived by family socio-economic 
characteristics; and, (3) expected return perceived by early cognitive ability and 
academic performance. The three hypotheses are derived from the results obtained 
from the microeconomics framework of education decision making behaviour of 
individual agents. To test these hypotheses, I apply the Indirect Inference method to 
evaluate each hypothesis model and re-estimate the model to see if it fails to pass the 
test. I am the first to attempt to introduce this new type of method on microeconomic 
level cross-sectional data.  
 
The main powerful conclusion is that the model of hypothesis one is highly rejected 
and the power of the test is relatively high. This shows that the model fails to pass 
both the Wald and normalized T-statistic. The conclusions for the models of 
hypotheses two and three are ambiguous. Both models use calibration coefficients and 
again fail to pass the Wald test; however, when I re-estimate all of the coefficients in 
the hypothesis model, both models two and three pass quite easily. On the one hand, 
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because the natures of the effects are not simple direct impacts and causal effects of 
family and personal characteristics on HE participation are unclear, the accuracy of 
these effects might be under consideration. On the other hand, re-estimation seems to 
reduce the power of the II test substantially, and this should be further investigated. 
5.2 limitations 
Various limitations may exist in this study. The primary limitation of this study, then 
is the limitation of the data used. The estimates sample is only selected as the 
participants who were born in the 1950s, it may not reflect impact of recent the policy 
reform, especially introduction of the tuition fee in 1998. Secondly, the estimates take 
no account of the actual amount of time spent to achieve the different qualifications, 
hence the earnings forgone are not considered. Thirdly, comparisons may be 
alternatively made if we use additional rate of return in terms of incremented annually 
rather than on overall basis. While such an annualisation is reasonably straightforward 
for academic qualifications that generally studied on a full-time and uninterrupted 
basis. Last but not the least, I do not include psychic costs of studying and the effort 
needed to obtain different qualifications; these might also considerably differ between 
qualifications and thus contribute to explain differential returns. 
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5.3 Policy implications 
Although the work of this study is not sufficient to inform policy, I draw the following 
policy implication relative to the study results. Based on the result from Chapter 4, 
HE participation has been the preserve of higher socio-economic groups in the UK, 
although the participation has risen substantially in recent decades, the relative 
position of lower socio-economic groups in terms of HE participation is still poor. The 
policy response has been to expand HE further, in an attempt to widen access to 
previously under-represented groups.  
 
However, the introduction of tuition fees for HE have been considered as a barrier to 
finance this expansion. There are obvious arguments that this will have acted to 
depress demand for HE among lower socio-economic and poorer students. In fact the 
empirical evidence suggests that the private financial rate of return to HE in the UK is 
substantially high than that to non-HE. This implies that individuals would still be 
willing to invest in their own higher education, even if the government continuously 
cut subsidies and they are hence required to pay a greater cost. Furthermore, as long 
as the return to a HE has remained high throughout the period and there is evidence 
that the policy of expanding HE has not led to a collapse in the economic value of HE, 
the increasing HE subsidies are necessarily justified. On the other hand, even if it 
accepts positive non-financial impact of HE on health disparities, HE subsidies may 
be considered as the last resort if there is no alternative less expensive method to 
acquire the skills that ultimately affect health and individuals are aware of the health 
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benefits of HE. It is considered public expenditures on NHS and health care is still a 
straightforward way.   
 
5.4 Future work 
This thesis raises a number of questions that should be considered in future work. 
Firstly, I might keep track of the returns to more recent cohorts of individuals (e.g. 
BCS70 and the Millennium Cohort Study) with available data to continue to study the 
returns to education and the demand and supply of qualifications in the labour market. 
Evidence shows that participation has recently increased, and will remain so in the 
future. However, following the changes in the fees structure of HE over recent years, 
it is predicted that participation rates and the number of graduates will decline in the 
future. This should include estimates of the variance in returns. It is, therefore, 
important to examine the magnitude of returns to HE and the extent to which they 
have changed over the generations in order to examine the effect of the government’s 
policy of HE. 
 
In relation to non-pecuniary returns, more research is required to understand the 
mechanisms or mediate the effects through which these outcomes occur. According to 
the previous literature, the estimates of the effect to HE on health damaging 
behaviours may nonetheless not be fully identified. In some studies, behavioural 
patterns (such as smoking and drinking) are considered as the mechanism by which 
education can improve health. Another limitation of this present analysis is that it is 
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restricted to finding an average return to HE. However, it may not be the case that 
each level of qualification affects outcomes by the same magnitude. Therefore, further 
research needs to be developed to account for this issue. 
  
271 
 
References 
 
Aakvik, A., Salvanes, G. and Vaage, K. (2005) Educational Attainment and Family 
Background, German Economic Review, Vol 6(3) 377-394 
Aakvik, A., Kjell, G. and Kjell, V. (2010) Measuring Heterogeneity in the Returns to 
Education using an Education Reform. European Economic Review, 54, 
483–500. 
Adams, S. (2002) Educational attainment and health: Evidence from a sample of 
olderadults. Education Economics 10, 97-109. 
Agrawal, T. (2011) Returns to Education in India: Some Recent Evidence, working 
paper WP-2011-01, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research 
Albouy, V., and Lequien, L, (2009). Does Compulsory Education Lower Mortality? 
Journal of Health Economics, 28(1), 155-168. 
Almond, D., and Currie, J. (2010) Human Capital Development before Age Five. 
Forthcoming Handbook of Labor Economics. 
Alex, B., Richard, D. and Susan, P. (2002)  The Use of Propensity Score Matching in 
the Evaluation of Active Labour Market Policies. Permission of the 
Department Work and Pensions on behalf of the Controller of Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office. 
Angrist, J D., and William, E. (1998) Children and Their Parents’ Labor Supply: 
Evidence from Exogenous Variation in Family Size. American Economic 
Review, 88(3), 450–477.  
Arendt, J. (2005) Does education cause better health? A panel data analysis using 
school Reforms for identification. Economics of Education Review 24, 
149-160. 
Arendt, J. (2008) In sickness and in health - till education do us part: Education 
effects on hospitalization. Economics of Education Review 27, 161-172. 
Ashenfelter, O. and Cecilia, R. (1998) Income, Schooling, and Ability: Evidence from 
a New Sample of Identical Twins. The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 
272 
 
253-284.  
Battistin, E., and Sianesi, B., (2011) Misclassified treatment status and treatment 
effects:an application to returns to education in the UK. Rev. Econ. Stat. 
93 (2), 495–509. 
Batty, D., and Deary, I. (2004) Early life intelligence and adult health British 
Medicine Journal 329, 585-86. 
Battu, H., Belfield, C. and Sloane, P. (1999) Overeducation among graduates: 
Acohort view. Education Economics, 7: 21-38. 
Becker, G. (1976) Human Capital. New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Becker, G. (1964) Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, withSpecial 
Reference to Education. NBER: Chicago 
Becker, S., and Ichino, A., (2002), Estimation of average treatment effects based on 
propensity scores. The Stata Journal, 2: 358-377. 
Behrman, R., and Mark, R. (2004) Returns to Birth Weight. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 86(2), 586–601. 
Behrman, R., and Rosenzweig, M.R. (2002) Does Increasing Women's Schooling 
Raise the Schooling of the Next Generation? American Economic Review, 
Volume 92, Number 1, pages 323-334. 
Belzil, C. and Jørgen, H. (2003) Structural Estimates of the Intergenerational 
Education Correlation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 18(6), 679–690.  
Björklund, A., Mikael, L., and Plug, E. (2006) The Origins of Intergenerational 
Associations: Lessons from Swedish Adoption Data. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 121(3), 999–1028.  
Björklund, A., and Jäntti, M. (2009) ‘Intergenerational Income Mobility and the Role 
of Family Background,’ in Salverda, W., Nolan, B. and Smeeding, T.(eds.). 
Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality, Oxford University Press.  
Björklund, A., Jäntti, M. and Lindquist, M. (2009) ‘Family Background and Income 
During the Rise of the Welfare State: Brother Correlations in Income for 
Swedish Men Born 1932–1967’. Journal of Public Economics,93, 
273 
 
671-680.  
Björklund, A., and Salvanes, K.G. (2010) Education and Family Background : 
Mechanisms and Policies, NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper 
No. 14/2010  
Black. D., and Smith, J. (2004) How robust is the evidence on the effects of college 
quality? Evidence from matching, Journal of Econometrics, 121, 99-124 
Blackburn, McKinley L., and Neumark, David. (1992) Unobserved Ability, Efficiency 
Wages, and Interindustry Wage Differentials. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 107 (14) 21-36. 
Blackburn, McKinley L., and Neumark, David. Omitted-Ability Bias and the Increase 
in the Return to Schooling. Journal of Labour Economics, Volume 11, 
Issue 3, 1993, pages 521-544 
Blanden, J., Goodman, P. and Machin, S. (2005), Changes in intergenerational 
income mobility in Britain’, in M. Corak (ed.), Generational income 
mobility in North America and Europe, Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Blane, D. (2003) Explanations of the difference in mortality risk between different 
educational groups. International Journal of Epidemiology 32, 355-56. 
Blane, D., White, I.,  and  Morris, J.(1996) Education, Social Circumstances and 
Mortality, in Blane, D., Brunner, E., and Wilkinson, R.G (eds.), Health 
and Social Organisation, Routledge, London, pp. 171-187. 
Blaug, M. (1976) The Empirical Status of Human Capital Theory: A Slightly 
Jaundiced Survey, Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic 
Association, Vol. 14(3) 827-55 
Blossfeld, H., and Shavit, Y., (1993) Persisting Barriers: Changes in Educational 
Opportunities in Thirteen Countries. In Yossi Shavit and Hans-Peter 
Blossfeld (eds.) Persistent Inequality: Changing Educational Attainment 
in Thirteen Countries. Boulder: Westview Press. pp. 1-24 
Blundell, R., Dearden, C., Meghir and Sianesi, B (1999) Human Capital Investment: 
The Returns from Education and Training to the Individual, the Firm and 
274 
 
the Economy”, Fiscal Studies, Vol. 20.1, pp. 1-3. 
Blundell, R., Dearden, L., Goodman, A. and Reed, H. (2000) The returns to higher 
education in Britain: evidence from a British cohort. The Economic 
Journal, 110(461), 82-99. 
Blundell, R., Dearden, L., and Sianesi, B. (2005) Evaluating the Impact of Education 
on Earnings in the UK: Models, Methods and Results from the NCDS 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A, 168(3), 473–512. 
Black, S., Devereux, P.J. and Salvanes, K.G. (2005) The More the Merrier? The 
Effect of Family Composition on Children’s Outcomes. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 120(2), 669–700. 
Black, S., Devereux, P.J. and Salvanes, K.G. (2005) Why the Apple  
Doesn’t Fall Far: Understanding Intergenerational Transmission of Human 
Capital.  American Economic Review, 95(1), 437–449. 
Blanden, J. and Machin, S (2004) Inequality in the Expansion of Higher Education’ 
with Stephen Machin. Scottish Journal of Political Economy Special 
Issue on Education, 51, pp. 230-249. 
Braakmann, N, (2011) The causal relationship between education, health and health 
related behaviour: Evidence from a natural experiment in England. 
Journal of Health Economics. 
Bratti, M. and Braga, M. (2013) The effect of schooling on health: Evidence on 
several health outcomes and behaviors, Working paper 2013/10, 
University of York 
Blundell, R., and Dias, M.C., (2000) Evaluation Methods for Non-experimental Data, 
Fiscal Studies, Vol.21 no. 4, 427-468 
Bonjour, D, Cherkas, L, Haskel, J., Hawkes, D, and Spector, T. (2003) Returns to 
Education: Evidence from U.K. Twins. American Economic Review, 
93(5): 1799-1812. 
Brunello, G., Fabbri, D., Fort, M. (2012) The causal effect of education on body mass: 
Evidence from Europe. Journal of Labor Economics forthcoming. 
Brunello, G., Fort, M., Weber, G. (2009) Changes in compulsory schooling, education 
275 
 
and the distribution of wages in Europe. Economic Journal 119, 516{539. 
Burkhauser, R., and Cawley, J. (2008) Beyond BMI: The value of more accurate 
measures of fatness and obesity in social science research. Journal of 
Health Economics 27: 519-529 
Bratti, M., Naylor, R., Smith, J.,( 2005) Variations in the wage returns to a ﬁrst degree: 
Evidence from the British cohort study 1970, IZA Discussion paper 
No.1631. 
Bynner, J. and Parsons, S. (2002) Social Exclusion and the Transition from School to 
Work: The Case of Young People Not in Education, Employment or 
Training, Journal of Vocational Behavior, 60, pp.289-309.  
Caliendo, M., and R. Hujer. (2005) The Microeconometric Estimation of Treatment 
Effects - An Overview Working Paper. J.W. Goethe University of 
Frankfurt. 
Caliendo M. and S. Kopeinig (2008) Some practical guidance for the implementation 
of propensity score matching. Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 22(1), 
pp.31-72. 
Cameron, S. and Heckman, J. (1998) Life Cycle Schooling and Dynamic Selection 
Bias: Models and Evidence for Five Cohorts of American Males. Journal 
of PoliticalEconomy 106(2), 262–333. 
Cameron, S. and Heckman, J., (2001), The Dynamics of Educational Attainment for 
Black, Hispanic and White Males. Journal of Political Economy, 
109(3):455-499.  
Cameron, S. and Taber, C. (2004) Estimation of Educational Borrowing Constraint 
Using Returns to Schooling, Journal of Public Economics, 112(1).  
Card, D. (1999) The causal effect of education on earnings” in Ashenfelter, O and 
Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3A, 
1801-1863.Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Caponi, V. and Plesca, M. (2009) Post‐secondary education in Canada: can ability 
bias explain the earnings gap between college and university graduates? 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 42(3), 1100-1131 
276 
 
Caliendo, M. and Kopeinig, S. (2008) Some Practical Guidance for the 
Implementation of Propensity Score Matching’, Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 22 (1), pp. 31–72.  
Case, A., and Deaton, A (2005) Broken Down by Work and Sex: How Our Health 
Declines  In Analyses in the Economics of Aging . Chicago : University 
of Chicago Press . 
Carneiro, P. and Heckman, J. (2003) Human Capital Policies. In Heckman, J. and 
Krueger, A (Eds), Inequality in America: What Role for Human Capital 
Policies. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Carneiro, P., Meghir, C.and Parey, M. (2007) Maternal Education, Home  
Environment and the Development of Children and Adolescents. IZA 
Discussion Paper Series no. 3072. 
Carnoy, M., Loyalka, P., Dobryakova, M., Dossani, R., Froumin, I., Kuhns, K., Tilak, 
J.B.G., & Wang, R. (2013). University expansion in a changing global 
economy: Triumph of the BRICs? Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press 
Cassen, R., and Kingdon, G. (2007) Tackling low educational achievement, Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation, London, UK. ISBN 9781859355848 
Chandola, T., Clarke, P., Morris, J. N, and Blane, D. (2006) Pathways between 
education and health: a causal modelling approach Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 169(2), 337-59(23). 
Chevalier, A. (2003) Measuring over-education. Economica, 70: 509-531. 
Chevalier, A. (2004) Parental Education and Child’s Education: A Natural 
Experiment. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1153. 
Chevalier, A., and Feinstein, L. (2006). Sheepskin or Prozac: The Causal Effect of 
Education on Mental Health. Centre for Research on the Wider Benefits 
of Learning Discussion Paper. London: Institute of Education. 
Chevalier, A., and Lanot, G. (2002) The relative eﬀect of family characteristics an 
ﬁnancial situation on educational achievement. Education Economics 10, 
165–182 
277 
 
Chevalier, A., Harmon., C., Walker, I. and Zhu, Y. (2004) Does education raise 
productivity, or just reflect it? Economic Journal, 114: F499F517. 
Chowdry, H., Dearden, L., Goodman, A., and Jin, W. (2012) The distritubtion impact 
of the 2012-2012 higher education funding reforms in England. Fiscal 
Studies, 33: 211-235 
Clark, D., and Royer, H. (2010). The Effect of Education on Adult Health and 
Mortality: Evidence from Britain. National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 16013. 
Coburn, D., and Clyde, R. (2002) Socioeconomic status and preventative health 
behaviour Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 15, 67-78. 
Collier, W.,  Valbuena., J and Zhu, Y. (2011), Wha t Determines Post-Compulsory 
Educational Choice? Evidence from the Longitudinal Survey of Young 
People in England, KDPE 1112, University of Kent School of Economics 
Discussion Papers  
Conley, D and Glauber, R. (2008) All In The Family? Family Composition, 
Resources, and Similarity in Socioeconomic Status. Research in Social 
Stratification and Mobility, 26, 297–306.  
Conti, G., Heckman, J., and Urzua, S. (2010) The Education-Health Gradient. 
American Economic Review 234–238 
Cutler, D., and Lleras-Muney, A. (2012) Education and health: insights from 
international comparisons. NBER Working Paper No. 17738. Cambridge 
(MA): NBER. 
Cutler, D., and Lleras-Muney. A. (2008) Education and Health: Evaluating Theories 
and Evidence Making Americans Healthier: Social and Economic Policy 
as Health Policy edited by R.F. Schoeni, J. S. House, G. Kaplan, and H. 
Pollack. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Cutler, D., and Lleras-Muney, A. (2010) Understanding differences in health 
behaviors by education. Journal of Health Economics 29, 1-28. 
Currie, J, and Moretti, E. (2003) Mother’s Education and the Intergenerational 
Transmission of Human Capital: Evidence from College Openings and 
278 
 
Longitudinal Data Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1495-1532. 
expectancy by education, 1981-2000. Health Affairs 27, 350-360. 
Dale, S.B., and Krueger, A.B.(2002) Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More 
Selective College: an Application of Selection on Observables and 
Unobservables. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1491–1528. 
Dale, S.B., and Krueger, A.B.(2014). Estimating the Effects of College Characteristics 
over the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data. Journal of Human 
Resources, 49(2), 323-358. 
de Luna, X. and Lundin, M. (2014) Sensitivity analysis of the unconfoundedess 
assumption with an application to an evaluation of college choice effects 
on earnings. Journal  of Applied Statistics. 
De Walque, D. (2004) Education, information, and smoking decisions: Evidence from 
smoking histories, 1940–2000, World Bank Policy Research Papers No. 
3362. 
De Walque, D. (2010) Education, information and smoking decisions: Evidence from 
smoking histories in the United States, 1940-2000. Journal of Human 
Resources 45, 682-717. 
Dearden, L. (1999) Qualifications and earnings in Britain: How reliable are 
conventional OLS estimates of the returns to education? IFS Working 
Paper no. 99/7, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. 
Dearden, L. (1999) Qualifications and earnings in Britain: How reliable are 
conventional OLS estimates of the returns to education? IFS Working 
Paper no. 99/7, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. 
Dearden, L., Machin, S.,and Reed, H. (1997) Intergenerational Mobility in Britain. 
Economic Journal, 107, 47–66. 
Dehejia, R. H., and Wahba, S. (1999) Causal Effects in Non-experimental Studies: 
Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programmes. Journal of 
American Statistical Association, 94, 1053–1062. 
Dehejia, R. and Wahba, S. (2002) Propensity Score Matching Methods for 
Nonexperimental Causal Studies. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84 
279 
 
(1), 151–161. 
DiPrete, T. and Gangl, M. (2004) Assessing Bias in the Estimation of Causal Effects: 
Rosenbaum Bounds on Matching Estimators and Instrumental Variables 
Estimation with Imperfect Instruments’, Sociological Methodology, Vol. 
34, No.1, pp. 271-310. 
Dolton, P., and Makepeace, G. H. (1990). The earnings of economics graduates, 
Economic Journal, 100: 237-250. 
Dolton P., Makepeace, G. and Inchley, G. D. (1990) The early careers of 1980 
graduates: Earnings, earnings differentials and postgraduate study, 
Employment Department Group Research Paper no.78, London: HMSO. 
Duncan, G.J., Teachman, J., and Yeung, W.J. (1997) Childhood family income and 
completed schooling: Results from sibling models. Working paper, 
Northwestern University, Institute for Policy Research, July. 
Duncan, G.J., Yeung, W.J., Brooks-Gunn , J., and Smith, J. (1998), “How much does 
childhood poverty affect the life chances of children?” American 
Sociological Review, 63, 406-423. 
Dustmann, C. (2004) Parental Background, Secondary School Track Choice and 
Wages. Oxford Economic Papers 56, 209-230.  
Dyson, A., S. Goldrick, L. Jones, and Kerr (2010), K Equity in Education: Creating a 
fairer education system, Manchester: Centre for Equity in Education, 
University of Manchester. 
Edwards, L. N. and Grossman, M. (1980) The relationship between children's health 
and intellectual development Health: What is it Worth? edited by Selma 
Mushkin and David Dunlop, Elmsford NY: Pergamon Press, 203, 
273-314. 
Eide, E. and Waehrer, G. (1998) “Does It Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? 
Evidence on the Effects of Undergraduate College Quality on Graduate 
School Attendance.” Economics of Education Review. 17, 371-376. 
Elo I. T., and S. H. Preston. (1996) Educational Differentials in Mortality: United 
States, 1979-1985 Social Science and Medicine, 42(1), 47-57. 
280 
 
Ermisch, J. and Francesconi, M. (2001) Family Matters: Impact of Family 
Background on Educational Attainments. Economica, 68(2):137-156.  
Feinstein, L, and Sabates, R. and (2004). Education, Training and the Take-up of 
Preventive Health Care. Report No.12, Centre for Research on the Wider 
Benefits of Learning, Institute of Education. 
Feinstein, L. and Symons, J. (1999) Attainment in secondary schools Oxford 
Economics Paper, 51, 300-21. 
Fletcher, J., and Frisvold, D (2009) Can soft drink taxes reduce population weight? 
Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol. 28, Issue 1, 23-35 
Fogelman, K. (ed.) (1983) Growing up in Great Britain: Collected Papers from the 
National Child Development Study. London: Macmillan. 
Folkman, S. (1984) Personal control and stress and coping processes: a theoretical 
analysis Journal Papers of Social and Psychology, 86, 839-52. 
Furlong, A. and Cartmel, F. (1997) Risk and Uncertainty in the Youth 
Transition’,  The Nordic Journal of Youth Research, Vol. 5 (1) pp.3-20 
Gallie, D., (2000) Twentieth-Century British Social Trends, The labour force , in 
Halsy, A and Webb, J (eds), London, Macmillan:281-323 
Galindo-Rueda F and Vignoles A. (2005) The declining relative importance of ability 
in predicting educational attainment Journal of Human Resources, 40(2), 
335-353.  
Galindo-Rueda, F. and Vignoles, A. (2003), Class-Ridden or Meritocratic? An 
Economic Analysis of Recent Changes in Britain. Centre for Economics 
of Education Discussion Paper No. 32. 
Galindo-Rueda, F. and Vignoles, A. (2005) The Declining Relative Importance of 
Ability in Predicting Educational Attainment. Journal of Human 
Resources, 40(2):335-353. 
Carneiro, P., Meghir, C., and Parey, M (2007) Maternal Education, Home 
Environments and the Development of Children and Adolescents, 
Working Paper 15/07, the institute for Fiscal Studies 
Gayle, V., Berridge, D., and Davies, R. (2002) Young People’s Entry into Higher 
281 
 
Education: quantifying influential factors, Oxford Review of Education, 28 
(1): 5-20. 
Gottfredson,L . S. (2004) Intelligence: is it the epidemiologists' elusive" fundamental 
cause" of social class inequalities in health? Journal Papers of Social and 
Psychology, 86, 174-99.  
Gottfredson,L and Deary, I. (2004) Intelligence predicts health and longevity, but why? 
American Psychological Society, 13, 1-4. 
Greenfeld, L. A. and Statistics, U. S. B. o. J. (1998) “Violence by intimates: Analysis 
of data on crimes by current or former spouses, boyfriends, and girlfriends” 
US Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics. 
Gregg, P., and Machin. S. (2000) The Relationship Between Childhood Experiences, 
Subsequent Educational Attainment and Adult Labour Market 
Performance’, in Koen Vleminckx and Timothy Smeeding (eds.) Child 
Well Being in Modern Nations: What do we Know?, Policy Press. 
Gregory, A., Smith, G., (1993) Calibration in macroeconomics, in: Maddala, G. (Ed.), 
Handbook of Statistics vol. 11, Elsevier, St. Louis, Mo., pp. 703—719. 
Grossman, M. (1972) On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health 
Journal of Political Economy, 80(2), 223-55. 
Grossman, M. (2004) The Demand for Health, 30 Years Later: A Very Personal 
Retrospective and Prospective Reflection Journal of Health Economics, 
23(4), 629-36. 
Grossman, M. (2006) Education and Non-market Outcomes. Handbook of the 
Economics of Education, 1, 577-633. 
Grossman, M.  (2008) The Relationship between Health and Schooling: Presidential  
Address. Eastern Economic Journal, 34(3): 281–92. 
Hansen, K. and Vignoles, A. (2005) The United Kingdom Education System in an 
International Context, in Machin, S. and A. Vignoles (eds.) What’s the 
Good of Education? The Economics of Education in the United Kingdom, 
Princeton University Press: Princeton. 
282 
 
Heckman, J. (2006) Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing inDisadvantaged 
Children, Science, 312, 1900–1902.  
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., and Todd, P (1997): Matching as an Econometric 
Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training 
Programme. Review of Economic Studies, 64, 605–654. 
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H. and Todd, P. (1998) Matching as an Econometric 
Evaluation Estimator. Review of Economic Studies, 65, 261–294. 
Heckman, J., Lalonde, R., and Smith, J. (1999) The economics and econometrics of 
active labor market programs. In: Ashenfelter, A., Card, D. (Eds.), 
Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam. 
Henshaw, S. K. (1994) “US teenage pregnancy statistics”, New York: The Alan 
Guttmacher Institute. 
Hill, K., Hoffman, D. and Rex, T. R. (2005) The value of HE: Individual and societal 
benefits. Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University. 
Holland, Paul. (1986) Statistics and Causal Reasoning. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association. 81: 945-960. 
Holmlund, H., Lindahl, M., and Plug, E. (2008) The Causal Effect of Parent’s 
Schooling on Children’s Schooling: A Comparison of Estimation Methods. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 3630. 
Hotopf, M., Mayou, R., Wadsworth, M. and Wessely, S. (1999) Childhood risk factors 
for adults with medically unexplained symptoms: results from a national 
birth cohort study The American Journal of Psychiatry, 156, 1796-1800. 
Ichino, A., and Nannicini, N. (2006) from temporary help jobs to permanent 
employment: what can we learn from matching estimators and their 
sensitivity? Journal of Appied Econometrics, vol. 23(3), 305-307 
Imbens, G. W. and Lemieux, T. (2008) Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to 
practice. Journal of Econometrics 142, 615-635. 
Isohanni, I., Jobes, P. B., Jarvelin, M. R., Nieminen, P., Rantakallio, P., Jokelainen, J., 
Croudace, T. J. and Iso-hanni, M. (2001) Educational consequences of 
mental disorders treated in hospital: a 31-year follow-up of the Northern 
283 
 
Finland 1966 Birth Cohort Psychological Medicine, 31(2), 339-49. 
Jefferis, B. J., Power, C. and Hertzman, C. (2002) Birth weight, childhood 
socioeconomic environment, and cognitive development in the 1958 
British birth cohort study British Medical Journal, 325(7359), 305. 
Jones, A. M. (1994) Health, addiction, social interaction and the decision to quit 
smoking. Journal of Health Economics 13, 93{110. 
Jenkins, A., Vignoles, A., Wolf, A. and Galindo-Rueda, F. (2002) The Determinant 
and Labour Market Effects of Lifelong Learning. Centre for Economics of 
Education Discussion Paper No. 19. 
Juhn, C., Murphy, K. and Pierce, B. (1993) “Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns 
to skill.” The journal of Political Economy, 101(3), 410-442 
Jurges, H., Kruk, E., and Reinhol, S (2013) The effect of compulsory schooling on 
health-evidence from biomarkers. Journal of Population Economics, April 
2013, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 645-672 
Jurges, H., Reinhold, S., and Salm, M. (2011) Does schooling affect health behavior? 
Evidence from the educational expansion in Western Germany. 
Economics of Education Review 30, 862-872. 
Kang, L., and Peng, F., (2012) A selection analysis of returns to education in China, 
Taylor and Francis Journals, Vol. 24 (4), 535-554 
Keneckel, D. (1991) Health behaviour, health knowledge and schooling Journal of 
Political and Economics, 99, 287-305. 
Kerckhoff, A. C., and Trott, J.M. (1993) Educational attainment in a changing 
educational system. In Y Shavit and H-P Blossfeld. eds. Persistent 
inequality : changing educational attainment in thirteen countries (pp. 
133-156). Westview Press, Boulder, Colo.  
Komujer, I., and Ng. (2010), Indirect Estimation of Panel Models With Time Varying 
Latent Components, available at: 
http://www.columbia.edu/~sn2294/papers/kn_ind.pdf 
Kuntsche, E.., Gmel, G., Wicki, M., Rehm, J., and  Grichting, E. (2006). 
Disentangling gender and age effects of risky single occasion drinking 
over the adolescent years. European Journal of Public Health, 670-675 
284 
 
Kuntsche E, Knibbe, R., Gmel, G., and Engels R. (2005) Why do young people drink? 
A review of drinking motives. Clinical Psychology Review. 2005 
Nov;25(7):841-61 
Lauer, C. (2002) A Model of Education Attainment: Application to the German Case”, 
ZEW Discussion Paper, No. 02-06.  
Lauer, C. (2003) Family background, cohort and education: a French-German 
comparison based on a multivariate ordered probit model of educational 
attainment, Labour Economics, 10:231-251. 
Le, V.P.M., and Meenagh, D. (2013) Testing and Estimating Models Using Indirect 
Inference. Working Paper No. E2013/8, Cardiff Economics Working 
Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section 
Le, V.P.M., Meenagh, D., Minford, P., Wickens, M., and Xu, Y., (2015), Testing macro 
models by Indirect Inference: a survey for users. working paper E2015/9, 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business 
School, Economics Section 
Le, V.P.M., Minford, P., and Wickens, M. (2013) A Monte Carlo procedure for 
checking identification in DSGE models. working paper E2013/4, Cardiff 
Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, 
Economics Section 
Lechner, M. (2002). Program heterogeneity and propensity score matching: An 
application to the evaluation of active labor market policies. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics 84(2):205–220. 
Lechner, M., and C. Wunsch (2009a): "Active Labour Market Policy in East Germany: 
Waiting for the Economy to Take Off", Economics of Transition, 17, 
661-702. 
Levy, D. and Duncan, G. (2001) Using Siblings to Assess the Effect of Childhood 
Family Income on Completed Schooling, Joint Centre for Poverty 
Research Working Paper, North Western University. 
 
Lindahl., L. and Regnér, H. (2005) College Choice and Subsequent Earnings: Results 
285 
 
Using Swedish Sibling Data, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107, 
437-457. 
Lleras-Muney, A. (2005) The Relationship between Education and Adult Mortality in 
the United States. Review of Economic Studies, 72(1), 189-221. 
Lochner, L. (2011) Non-production benefits of education: Crime, health, and good 
citizenship. NBER Working Papers No. 16722. 
Long, K and Kropp, D (1986) Human Capital Versus Sorting: The Effects of 
Compulsory Attendance Laws, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
101 (3), 609-624. 
Lundborg, P. (2008) The health returns to education: What can we learn from twins? 
IZA Discussion Papers 3399. 
Lundborg, P. (2007) Smoking, Information Sources, and Risk Perceptions. New 
Evidence on Swedish Data Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 34(3), 
217-40.  
Lundborg, P. (2013) The Health Returns to Education: What Can We Learn from 
Twins? Journal of Population Economics, 26(2), 673-701 
Machin, S., (2008) The new economics of education: methods, evidence and policy. 
Journal of Population Economics, 21:1-19.  
Machin, S. and Vignoles, A. (2006) Educational Policy in the UK. Centre for 
Economics of Education, Discussion paper number CEEDP0057.  
Machin, S. and Vignoles, A. (2004) Education Inequality: The Widening 
Socio-Economic Gap. Fiscal Studies, 25(2):107-128.  
Mackenbach, J.P, Stirbu, I, Roskam A.J, Schaap M, Menvielle G, and Leinsalu M 
(2008) Socioeconomic Inequalities in Health in 22 European Countries. 
The new England Journal of medicine  ;358(23):2468-81. 
Makepeace, G., Paci, P., Joshi, H., Dolton, P. (1999) How Unequally Has Equal Pay 
Progressed Since the 1970s? A Study of Two British Cohorts . Journal of 
Human Resouces, 34: 534-556. 
Massimiliano, B., Robin, N., and Jeremy., S (2005) Variations in the Wage Returns to 
a First Degree: Evidence from the British Cohort Study 1970, IZA 
286 
 
Discussion Papers 1631, Institute for the Study of Labor 
Mare, R., (1980) Social Background and School Continuation Decisions. Journal of 
the American Statistical Association, 75:295-305.  
Marmot, M. G., Davey S. G., and Stansfield, S. et al. (1991). Health Inequalities 
among British civil servants: the Whitehall II study. Lancet 337 (8754): 
1387–1393. 
McVicar, D., and Rice, P. (2001). Participation in Further Education in England and 
Wales: An Analysis of Post War Trends. Oxford Economic Papers, 
53(1)(1), 47-66.  
McCulloch, A. and Joshi, H. (2002) Child development and family resources: an 
exploration of evidence from the second generation of the 1958 birth 
cohort. J. Popln Econ., 15, 283. 
McIntosh, S. (2004), “Further Analysis of the Returns to Academic and Vocational  
Qualifications”, Centre for Economics of Education Discussion Paper. 
McMahon, W. W. (1998). Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of the Social 
Benefits of Lifelong Learning. Education Economics, 6(3), 309–346.  
McMahon, W. W. (1999). Education and Development: Measuring the Social Benefits. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Migali, G.,  and Walker, I (2011) Estimates of the Causal Effects of Education on 
Earnings over the Lifecycle with Cohort Effects and Endogenous 
Education, Working Paper 2011/017, Lancaster University Management 
School  
Minford, P., Ou, Z., and Wickencs, M. (2013) Revisiting the Great Moderation using 
the Method of Indirect Inference. Working Paper No. E2012/9, Cardiff 
Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, 
Economics Section 
Mirowsky, J. and Ross, C. E. (1998) Education, personal control, lifestyle and health: 
a human capital hypothesis Research on Aging, 20(4), 415-49.  
Mirowsky, J. and Ross, C. E. (2003) “Social Status and Health.” New York: Aldine de 
Gruyter. 
287 
 
Montenegro, C., and Patrinos, H.A, (2012) Returns to Schooling around the World, 
Background paper for the WDR 2013. 
Naylor, R. and Smith, J. (2004) Returns to education: A signaling approach. mimeo, 
University of Warwick. 
Naylor, R., Smith, J. and McKnight, A. (2003), “Returns to educational performance: 
Evidence from UK graduates’ first destination labour market outcomes”, 
mimeo, University of Warwick. 
Oreopoulos, P. (2006) Estimating Average and Local Average Treatment Effects of 
Education when Compulsory Schooling Laws Really Matter. American 
Economic Review, 96(1): 152-175. 
Oreopoulos, P. (2006) The Compelling Effects of Compulsory Schooling: Evidence 
from Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics, 39(1):22-52. 
Oreopoulos, P., Page, M.E., and Stevens, A.,(2006) Does Human Capital Transfer 
from Parent to Child? The Intergenerational Effects of Compulsory 
Schooling. Journal of Labor Economics, 24(4), 729–760.  
O’Leary, N. C. and Sloane, P. J. (2005) ‘The return to a university education in Great 
Britain’, National Institute Economic Review, 193(1), 75. 
O’Leary, N. C. and Sloane, P. J. (2011) ‘The wage premium for university education 
in Great Britain during a decade of changing’, The Manchester School Vol 
79 No. 4 740–764 July 2011 
Page, M.E., (2006) Father’s Education and Children’s Human Capital: Evidence from 
the World War II GI Bill. Working Paper 06–33, UC Davies. 
Peel, M. and Makepeace, G (2012) Differential Audit Quality, Propensity Score 
Matching and Rosenbaum Bounds for Confounding Variables, Journal of 
Business Finance and Accounting. Vol. 39 606-648 
Pfeiffer, F. and Pohlmeier, W. (2012). Causal Returns to Schooling and Individual 
Heterogeneity. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6588, Institute for the Study of 
Labour. 
Plug, E., (2004), Estimating the Effect of Mother’s Schooling on Children’s 
Schooling Using a Sample of Adoptees. American Economic Review, 
288 
 
94(1), 358–368. 
Plug, E., and Vijverberg, W., (2003), Schooling, Family Background and Adoption: Is 
it Nature or Nurture. Journal of Political Economy, 11(3), 611–641.  
Power, C. and Hertzman, C. (1997) Social and biological pathways linking early life 
and adult disease British Medical Journal, 53, 210-22. 
Price, J., (2008) Quality Time: The Effect of Birth Order. Journal of Human 
Resources, 43(1), 240-265. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (2005): The economic benefits of higher education 
qualifications, A report produced for the Royal Society of Chemistry and 
the Institute of Physics. 
Psacharopoulos, G. and Patrinos. H.A., (2004). Returns to Investment in Education: A 
Further Update. Education Economics 12(2), 111-134. 
Ross, C. E. and Wu, C. (1995) The links between education and health American 
Sociological Review, 60(5), 719-45. 
Rose, D. (2001) Users’ Voices: The Perspectives of Mental Health Service Users on 
Community and Hospital Care. London: Sainsbury Centre for Mental 
Health.  
Rosenbaum, P. and Rubin, D. (1983) The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70: 41-55. 
Rosenbaum, P. (2005) Heterogeneity and Causality: Unit Heterogeneity and Design 
Sensitivity in Observational Studies. The American Statistician, 59, 
pp.147–152.  
Rosenbaum, P and Rubin, D. (1985) Constructing a Control Group using Multivariate 
Matched Sampling Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score, The 
American Statistician 39(1), pp.33–38.  
Rosenbaum, J. (2012) Degrees of health disparities: Health status disparities between 
young adults with high school diplomas, sub-baccalaureate degrees, and 
baccalaureate degrees, Health Serv Outcomes Res Methodol. 2012 Jun; 
12(2-3): 156–168. 
289 
 
Rothman, K.J.,
 
(2008) BMI-related errors in the measurement of obesity,International 
Journal of Obesity (2008) 32, S56–S59 
Rubin, D.B. (1974). Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomised and 
Non-randomised Studies, Journal of Educational Psychology, 66, 688-701 
Rubin, D.B. (1977). Assignment to a Treatment Group on the Basis of a Covariate, 
Journal of Educational Statistics, 2, 1-36. 
Rubin D.B. (1997) Estimating Causal Effects from Large Data Sets Using the 
Propensity Score. Annals of Internal Medicine, 8(2), pp.757-763. 
Rubin, D. B. (2001). Using propensity scores to help design observational studies: 
Application to the tobacco litigation. Health Services and Outcomes 
Research Methodology, 2(3–4), 169–188. 
Russell, G.C. and Shaw, S. (2009). A study to investigate the prevalence of social 
anxiety in a sample of higher education students in the UK. Journal of 
Mental Health, 18(3), 198–206.  
Sacerdote, B (2005) Slavery and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital, 
the review of economics and statistics, vol. 87(2), 217-234 
Sacerdote, B (2004) What happens when we randomly assign children to families? 
NBER Working Papers 10894, National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Inc.  
Saunders P. (1997) Social mobility in Britain: an empirical evaluation of two 
competing theories. Sociology, 31, 261-288. 
Schoeni, R. F., L. G. Martin, P. M. Andreski, V. A. Freedman. (2005) Persistent and 
Growing Socioeconomic Disparities in Disability Among the Elderly: 
1982-2002 American Journal of Public Health, 95(11), 2065-70. 
Saxton, J.M. (2000). Acute and chronic health effects of hand-arm vibration.  In: 
Legislation for noise and vibration: enforcement, compliance, and 
benefits.  ImechE Seminar Publication, 7-10.  Professional Engineering 
Publishing, London. 
Schultz, T. W. (2007) Population policies, fertility, womens human capital, and child 
290 
 
quality. In: Schultz, T., and Strauss, J. (Eds.), Handbook of Development 
Economics, Volume 4. North-Holland, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Schultz, T. W. (1961). Investment in Human Capital. American Economic Review, 51, 
1-17.  
Silles, M. A., 2009. The causal effect of education on health: Evidence from the 
United Kingdom. Economics of Education Review 28, 122-128. 
Smith, A., (1993) Estimating nonlinear time-series models using simulated vector 
autoregressions. Journal of Applied Econometrics 8, S63—S84. 
Smith, J. (2000) A Critical Survey of Empirical Methods for Evaluating Active Labor 
Market Policies. Schweiz. Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik, Vol. 
136(3) 1-22 
Smith, J A. and Todd, P.E. (2005). Does matching overcome Lalonde‟s critique of 
nonexperimental estimators? Journal of Econometrics, vol. 125, 1-2, 
305-353. 
Solon, G. (2002) Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives Volume 16, 59– 66 
Taber, K. S. (2001) The mismatch between assumed prior knowledge and the learner's 
conceptions: a typology of learning impediments. Educational Studies 27 
(2), 159-171. 
Todd, P. and Wolpin, K. (2006) Assessing the Impact of a School Subsidy Program in 
Mexico. American Economic Review, 96(5):1384-1417.  
Valbuena, J (2011) Family Background, Gender and Cohort Effects on Schooling 
Decisions. School of Economics Discussion Paper 11/14, University of 
Kent.  
Walker, I. and Zhu, Y. (2002) The returns to education: Evidence from the Labour 
Force Surveys. DfeS. 
Walker, I. and Zhu, Y. (2003) Education, earnings and productivity: recent UK 
evidence. Labour Market Trends, 111(3), 145-152. 
Walker, I. and Zhu, Y. (2003) The College Wage Premium and the Expansion of 
Higher Education in the UK. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110, 
291 
 
659-709. 
Walker, I. and Zhu, Y. (2011) Differences by degree: evidence of the net financial 
rates of return to undergraduate study for England and Wales. Economics 
of Education Review. 30, 6, 1177-1186 
White, I., Blane, D., Morris, J. and Mourouga, P. (1999) Educational attainment, 
deprivation-affluence and self-reported health in Britain: a cross-sectional 
study. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health, 53(9), 535-41. 
Wolfe, B., and Samuel, Z. (1997) Nonmarket Outcomes of Schooling, International 
Journal of Educational Research 27(6): 491-502. 
 
